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The following pages have been printed to accompany the
writer's collection of Cases on Agency, for use in the Department
of Law of this University. Nothing has been attempted beyond
the merest outlines of the subject. Explanation as well as Illus-
tration has in general been left to be supplied by the cases.
F. R. M.
University of Michigan,
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The subject of Agency belongs to a comparatively re-
cent period in our law. Blackstone scarcely refers to it.
"The law of principal and agent," says Blackstone's
learned editor, Professor Hammond (Bk. I, p. 710), 4, is
derived from the canon law, and has only been intro-
duced into the common law in recent times. If the
older books of English law arc examined, no such
words as 'principal and agent' will be found in them.
Wherever any question is discussed which would now
be treated under that head, it is treated of as master
and servant. Principal and agent does not occur in
Viner's Abridgement, or those preceding it; and it is
only at the end of the eighteenth century that we find
it beginning to appear as a separate title, as yet of
very limited application."
"As late as Blackstone," says Mr. Justice Holmes
in his book on the Common Law (p. 228), "agents
appear under the general head of servants, and the
first precedents cited for the peculiar law of agents
were cases of master and servant. Blackstone's lan-
guage is worth quoting: 'There is yet a fourth species
of servants, if they may be so called, being rather in
a superior, a ministerial capacity; such as steioards,
factors, and bailiff'*: whom, however, the law considers
as servants pro tempore, with regard to such of their
acts as affect their master's or employer's property.'
(1 Comm. 427)."
Agency belongs distinctively to a commercial ag> ,
and its growth has kept pace with the progress of com-

































































































































the range of individual and corporate activity is enor-
mously increased. As soon as it is conceded that one
man may be represented by another in business trans-
actions, and that he may have as many such repre-
sentatives as occasion may require, the field of commer-
cial activity is immensely widened. The modern
business man may thus be constructively present in
many places and carry on diverse and widely separated
industries at the same time.
The fundamental maxim of Agency, both as to right
and liability, is Qui facit per alium, facit per se. Its
second great maxim, also of right and liability, refer-
ring to the time when the relation is created, is Omnis
ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequi-
paratur.
Agency belongs in the field of contract law. The
relation between the principal and his agent is, as will
be seen, a contractual relation, while the purpose of its
creation is to bring about contractual relations between








































































































































§ 1. Agency defined.
2. Agency is a contractual
relation.
3. Can usually exist only by
assent of the principal.
4. Exceptions — Authority
created by law.
5. How agent compares with
servant.




S. How agent compares with
independent contractor.
9. Agency differs from trust.
§ 10. Agency to be distinguished
from sale.
11. Agency differs from lease.
12. The contract appointing —
Power of attorney.
13. Classification of agencies
— Actual or ostensible.
14-17. Universal, general
and special agency.




tween these classes of
agents.
§ 1. Agency defined. — Agency is a legal relation,
founded upon the express or implied contract of the
parties — or created by law — by virtu e of which one
party — called the Agent — is employed and authorized
to represent and act for the other, called the Principal
— in business dealings with third persons.
It Is said that agency is a "legal relation." It is unfortunate that
in our law we have no word which clearly represents the idea of
such a relation as agency or partnership and at the same time dis-
tinguishes it from other relations. The word "relation" is used in a

































































































































4 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§1-2.
relations with each other, as when A and B enter into a contract.
When a tort is committed, the parties are also often said to come
into relations with each other. In this case, however, the relation,
if it be such, is purely a temporary one; it is not permanent.
On the other hand, we speak of the relation of husband and wife,
the relation of parent and child, or the relation of guardian and
ward. In these cases it is obvious that the word "relation" is used
in an entirely different sense. The idea of permanence is involved,
and, more than all, we see that here are rights, duties and liabilities
which the law rather than the act of the parties has created, and
which the parties are usually unable, by any act or agreement of
their own, to alter or diminish. To such relations, in order to dis-
tingush them from the temporary sort above referred to, the term
status or condition is often applied. Lying between the casual rela-
tions first referred to and these relations of status, are certain others,
more permanent than the first class and more open to contractual
limitation and control than the second — cases wherein the parties
have agreed to occupy certain legal relations to each other for a time
subject to their control and upon conditions largely determinable
by their agreement. The most conspicuous of these relations are
those of Agency, Master and Servant, and Partnership.
We use the term, legal relation, therefore, not to distinguish it
from illegal relations, but to indicate that this is a relation in law —
a relation which the law recognizes.
§2. Agency is a contractual relation. —Agency
is a contractual relation and not a status. Even
though it be conceded that it finds its origin in the re-
lation of master and servant and that that relation was
originally the relation of master and slave, it is clear
enough that, regarded as an instrument for creating
contractual obligations between the principal and third
persons, agency does not exhibit those essential char-
acteristics of status necessary to mark it as such. As
stated by Sir William Anson, "so far as we are con-
cerned with Agency for the purpose of creating con-
tractual relations, it retains no trace in English law of
its origin in status. Even where a man employs as
his agent one who is incapable of entering into a con-
tract with himself, as where he gives authority to his
































































































































§§ 2-4.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 5
4
is never inherent. There must be evidence of intention
on the one side to confer, on the other to undertake,
the authority given, though the person employed may,
from defective status, be unable to sue or be sued on
the contract of employment."
See Anson on Contract, 330.
§ 3. Can usually exist only by assent of the prin-
cipal. — As a rule, therefore, authority to act as agent
can exist only by the express or implied assent of the
principal, either previously given or subsequently con-
ferred.
We shall find hereafter that there may be express creations of
the relation and implied creations. In fact, we shall doubtless find
that the cases in which the existence of the relation is implied from
the acts of the parties are the more numerous.
It is not at all necessary that the authority shall have been con-
ferred in advance, although it commonly is. After the act has been
done, the authority may be conferred and, by retroactive effect, it
goes back to the beginning.
§4. — Exceptions — Authority created by law. —
In a few cases, however, authority to act as agent lor
certain purposes arises by mere operation of law, as an
incident of some other relation in which, the parties al-
ready stand. Of these cases there are four chief types :
(1) The authority of the wife to buy necessaries on
her husband's credit.
(2) The similar authority of an infant child to bay
necessaries, in certain cases, upon his father's credit
(3) The authority of the vendor of personal prop-
erty in certain cases to sell the goods still in his posses-
sion to secure his pay.
(4) The authority of a ship-master to buy neces-
saries on the owner's credit.
In these cases the assent of the principal is not neces-
































































































































6 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§ 4-5.
This authority is said to be created by law, or to be
authority by necessity.
§ 5. How agent compares with servant. — The rela-
tion of principal and agent bears a close resemblance to
that of master and servant, but is not identical with it.
The characteristic of the agent is that he is a busi-
ness representative. His function is to bring about
contractual relations between his principal and third
persons.
The function of the servant i s to execute the com-
mands of his master chiefly in reference to tilings, but
occasionally with reference to persons when no con-
tractual obligation is to result.
A person who is ordinarily a servant may at times
act as agent, and vice versa.
"The distinction between a servant and an agent," it is said by
Mr. Justice Holmes in his edition of Kent's Commentaries (Vol. 2,
p. 260, note), "is the distinction between serving and acting for."
When I employ an agent, I am seeking to employ some one who
shall represent me in business dealings with other persons. The
purpose of the employment of the agent and his authorization is to
represent me and to deal for me with other persons. He is to come
in contact with other persons and he is to enter into contractual
relations for me with them.
On the other hand, if I want a ditch dug or any other kind of
manual service performed, the only thing that the person I employ
has to do is to deal with things. The main purpose of his employ-
ment is to accomplish some kind of manual labor and not to make
contracts at all. He has neither occasion nor authority to effect
contractual relations or impose contractual obligations upon me to
another person. Such a person is a servant.
If I say to A, "Go into the market and buy me a horse," my
purpose is that he shall go out and find a person who has a horse
for sale and make a contract with that person to sell that horse to
me. A is here an agent. If, when he brings the horse to me, I say
to him, "Put the horse in the stable and care for him," and A does
so, he then is a servant.
There are cases, of course, in which the servant is to come into
contact with other persons. The porter on a parlor car is an illus-
































































































































§§ 5-7.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIOl 7
passengers and look out for their comfort, he is a servant. The
case of the conductor is not so simple. If he has no other duties
than to manage the train; if he has no power to make contr
for carriage; if his sole duty is to collect tickets a: re is no
occasion in which he has the right to enter into contractual rela-
tions for his employer, then he will be purely a servant.
If, on the other hand, he is authorized not only to manage the
train but to make contracts for carriage, to collect pay, to make the
ordinary bargains that are made between carrier and passenger,
then he is also an agent. It is obvious, therefore, that the p.me per-
son may be at times a servant and at times an agent.
The agent usually is vested with more or less discretion, while
the servant is commonly required to act according to the directions
of his master; and this has sometimes been suggested as the basis
for distinguishing between the two relations.
See Baltimore & Ohio Employees' Relief Ass'n v. Post, 122 Pa.
St. 679, 9 Am. St. Rep. 147.
The true distinction, however, is believed to be that already men-
tioned.
§ 6. Distinction usually of little practical im-
portance. — The distinction between the two relations,
though in many aspects radical in theory, is, usually,
not of much practical importance, as the same rules
of law, in general, apply equally to both relations.
There is, in many quarters, a somewhat absurd repugnance to the
U6e of the word "servant," because it is supposed to emphasize social
distinctions which ought not to exist among us. This leads, in
popular language, to the substitution of the word "agent." and this
popular use is often exhibited by the courts, with the result that
even in legal language the word "agent" is coming to be more and
more used where the word "servant" would be more appropriate.
Fortunately it is usually immaterial and leads to uo serious diffi-
culty.
§ 7. Occasionally distinction important. —
There is, however, occasionally a case in which the dis-
tinction becomes important. A statute, for example,
may use one word or the other under circumstances
which call for strict construction, and it then becoi
important to distinguish.
Regina v. Walker, Agency Cases, 1, is a case of this nature.
































































































































S DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§ 7-8.
Cases, 4, presents another illustration. What was the question
there? Hamberger v. Marcus, 157 Pa. St. 133; Wildner v. Ferguson,
42 Minn. 112, 6 L. R. A. 338, and Lewis v. Fisher, 80 Md. 139, 45
Am. St. Rep. 327, present olher illustrations.
In Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, Agency Cases, 8, was Corbett an
agent or a servant? In "Wilson v. Owens, Agency Cases, 9, in what
relation did Egan stand? "What is said here as to the similarity of
the two relations?
In Tete v. Lanaiix (1893), 45 La. Ann. 1343, 14 So. Rep. 241,
there was a necessity, in view of a peculiar statute, to determine
whether a certain person was a clerk, or a broker. Said the court:
"A clerk is one who hires his services to an employer at a fixed
price under a stipulation to do and perform some specific duty or
labor which requires the exercise of skill. 'The broker is he who is
employed to negotiate a matter oeiween two parties, and who for that
reason is the mandatory of both.' R. C. C. 3016. The leading and
essential difference between a clerk and a broker is that the former
hires his services exclusively to one person, while the latter is
employed to make bargains and contracts between other persons
in matters of trade, commerce and navigation. For the services of
the former there is a fixed stated salary, while for the latter a com-
pensation, commonly styled brokerage, is allowed."
§ 8. How agent compares with "independent con-
tractor." — The agent — and the servant also — is fur-
— .iii.ii i, im Jb^mtf m \*'*k-
ther to be distinguished from th e "independent co n-
Uunjjg" who is one who exercises some independent
employment, in the course of which he undertakes to
accomplish a certain result, being responsible to his
employer for the end to be achieved and not for the
means by which he accomplishes it.
Judging from what has been already said, does the servant or
the agent more closely resemble the independent contractor? Why?
Thus in a recent case wherein a loaded vessel ju3t leaving port
was found to be on fire, and the master employed S. & Co., who were
doing business as shipping-merchants, to take charge of her and
rescue her cargo, the court said: "The employment of S. & Co.,
under these facts, was something more than the appointment of an
agent. It was more in the nature of an employment or hiring than
an appointment to an agency. It was in the nature of a contract
between the captain of the vessel, as the owner's agent, and S. & Co.,
whereby the latter agreed to extinguish the fire, and if necessary
































































































































8§ 810] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 9
tection of the vessel and cargo. They were employed to do a par-
ticular thing, and were contractors, Instead of agents, in the general
understanding of agency."
See Horan v. Strachan (1890), 80 Ga. 408, 12 S. E. Rep. C78, 22
Am. St. Rep. 471.
§9. Agency differs from trust. — Agency differs
in material respects from the ordinary trust.
See Hartley v. Phillips, (1901), 198 Pa. 9, 47 Atl. Rep. 929;
Knowles v. Scott, [1891] 1 Ch. 717; James v. Smith, [1891] 1 Ch.
384; Cleghorn v. Castle, (1900) 13 Hawaiian 186.
It is true that agency is often said to be a relation
of trust and confidence, and that property in the hands
of an agent is often held to be impressed with a trust
for the benefit of the principal, yet the two relations
are not identical._3— truetr-m-vohes control over prop-
erly, ageney may be totally disconnected with any pa>
ticular property. __The_Jjais4eeIJoIds'a legal__Utie JL Jhe
agent has usually no title at all. The trustee may act
hrins own name, the agent acts normally in the name
of his principal. Trust is not necessarily a contract
relation, agency is properly to be so regarded. A trust
does not necessarily or even usually involve any author
ity to enter into contracts which shall bind another,
the authority to make such contracts is the distinguish-
ing characteristic of agency. Other distinctions exist
but these are sufficient to mark the contrast.
See, for example, Central Stock Exchange v. Bendinger, (1901),
48 C. C. A. 726, 109 Fed. Rep. 926, 56 L. R. A. 875.
§ 10. Agency to be distinguished from sale. —
Agency is further to be distinguished from sale. Not
that thi" 1 two contracts are not ordinarily readily
enough distinguished, but because so many cases arise
wherein either through inadvertence or design con-
tracts have been given some of the characteristics of
































































































































10 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§ 10-18.
predominate as to determine the nature of the trans-
action. A typical ease is presented where goods are
put into the nanas of a person under a contract which
in seme of its parts seems to treat that person as an
absolute purchaser of the goods and in other parts
merely as an agent to sell them. No hard and fast rule
can be laid down for the determination of these contro-
versies. Names go for very little, and if the parties
have made a contract which really operates to transfer
the title it must be deemed a sale, even though the
parties have expressly declared that it shall be deemed
an agency.
See Mechem on Sales, §§ 41-49; Ex parte White, (1871), L. R.
6 Ch. App. 397; Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick (1897), 98 Tenn. 221, 39
S. W. R. 3, 36 L. R. A. 285, 60 Am. St. Rep. 854; Braunn v. Keally,
(1892), 146 Pa. St. 519, 23 Atl. R. 389, 28 Am. St. Rep. 811; Nor-
wegian Plow Co. v. Clark (1897), 102 Iowa 31, 70 N. W. Rep. 808.
§11. Agency differs from lease. — So agency may
be distinguished from lease. As in the preceding case
of sale, the tAvo contracts are usually very much un-
like; but, here as there, cases are met with wherein
one relation has apparently been disguised under the
name of the other. Here as there, also, names are of
no consequence, and the true nature of the contract
determines the case. If, therefore, though the contract
be called a lease, the alleged tenant is so far under the
direction and control of the alleged landlord as to make
the latter the real party in interest and the former
merely his representative, the contract will be held to
be one of agency.
See Petteway v. Mclntyre,— N. Car. — , 42 S. E. Rep. 851.
§ 12. The contract appointing — "Power of attor-
ney." — The contract by which the relation of principal
and agent is created is called a "contract of agency";
































































































































§§ 12-13.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 11
called his '-authority" or "power" j whejj the, authority
is conferred by formal instrument in writing, it is said
to be confi ired by "letter of attorney," or, more com-
monly by "power of attorney." When the authority is
conferred by power of attorney, the agent is frequently
called an "attorney," or more commonly, an "attorney
in fact."
If an agent is called upon to execute a deed, he signs it, "John
Smith," as principal, "by Richard Roe, his attorney," or, more com-
monly, "his attorney in fact"; he may say. "agent." The words,
"attorney in fact," are used chiefly to distinguish him from an
attorney at law.
See Loudon Savings Fund Society v. Hagerstown Savings Bank,
3G Pa. St. 498, 78 Am. Dec. 390, Cas. Ag. 371.
§ 13. Classification of agen -ies — Actual or osten-
sible. — Agencies are sometimes classified as actual or
ostensible.
The agency is actual when the agent has really been
employed and authorized by the principal; the agency
is ostensible when the principal intentionally, or by
want of ordinary care, leads a third person to believe
another to be his agent who has not really been em-
ployed and authorized by him.
This distinction is one which is made in the Code of California,
and has been adopted by several of the States in enacting their
Codes.
A man is an actual agent when he really has been employed, but
he is an ostensible agent when the principal, either intentionally or
by want of ordinary care, has held him out as though he were agent.
So far as third persons are concerned, it usually makes no difference
whether the agen actual or ostensible. If one person causes
another reasonably to believe, and to act upon the belief, that a cer-
tain man is his agent, then, so far as that other person is concerned,
the assumed agent is agent. The agent always knows whether he has
been employed, the principal always knows. As between themselves
there is no difficulty. Third persons, however, cannot usually know
whether he has really been employed or not, but if the principal
leads the third person to believe that the man is an agent, then tl !
principal is bound.
































































































































12 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§ 14.
§ 14. Universal, general and special agency.—
The most important classification of agencies is that
based upon the nature and extent of the authority con-
ferred into universal, general, and special agencies.
A universal agent is one authorized to do all acts for
his principal which can lawfully be delegated to an
agent.
A general agent is one having general authority to
act in reference to some transaction or to some kind
or series of transactions.
A special agent is one authorized to act only in a par-
ticular event and in accordance with specific instruc-
tions.
The distinction between the general and the special agent Is
not always easy to draw, and courts and writers have not agreed
upon the basis of it. judge Story has said: "A special agency
properly exists, when there is a delegation of authority to do a single
act; a general agency properly exists where there is a delegation to
do all acts connected with a particular trade, business or employ-
ment." Story on Agency, §17. Professor Parsons has said: "A
general agent is one authorized to transact all his principal's busi-
ness, or all his business of some particular kind. A particular
[special] agent is one authorized to do one or two special things."
1 Parsons on Contracts, *41. Mr. Evans says: "General agents are
such as are authorized to transact all business of a particular kind;
whilst a special agent is authorized to act only in a single transac-
tion." Evans on Agency (Ewell's ed.) p. 2.
Mr. Wright says that the general agent "is usually a person to
whom the principal has entrusted the management of a particular
business, such as an estate agent, or the manager of a business;
while the special agent is an agent given authority to deliver a
particular message or buy a particular thing on one occasion, or
do some special thing, and has no implied authority aliunde from
his position or the nature of his business." Wright on Principal and
Agent, 2d ed. 87, 88.
Something of the distinction may be made clear by an illustra-
tion. If I have a business which I cannot conduct In person, I may
employ an agent to manage it for me. In the very nature of the
case, however, in conferring his authority, I must do so in general
terms. I cannot easily do more than to empower him to manage it
































































































































IS 14-17.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 13
go Into details and prescribe how he shall conduct himself and what
he shall do In all the multitudinous contingencies which may arise.
I must give him authority in general terms and leave the details to
his discretion. On the ether hand, if I need a hor . I may send a
person into the market to buy one only on condition that it shall be
of the age, size, color, weight, disposition, speed and price which I
prescribe. This case admits of special and particular instructions;
the other did not. The former, the business manager, would be a
general agent. The latter, who is to buy the horse, would be a spe-
cial agent. But suppose I say to an agent, ''Go into the market and
buy me a horse," and limit him neither as to age, size, color, price
or otherwise. What kind of an agent is he? He has general
power, but is to act only on a particular occasion. It is believed
that the nature cf his power is the chief criterion, and that the dis-
tinction between the special and the general agent is one of degree
merely and not of kind.
Formerly very important results were made to flow from this
distinction; but the modern tendency is to minimize it, if not to
ignore it altogether.
See Butler v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766, Cas. Ag. 340; Loudon Savings
Fund Society v. Hagerstown Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St. 498, 78 Am.
Dec. 390, Cas. Ag. 371.
§ 15. It has been said that a principal can
ha ve bu t onejiniYersa 1 agent, and it has been doubted
whether such an agency could practically exist. It can
only be created, if at all, by clear and unambiguous lan-
guage, and will not be inferred from any general ex-
pressions, however broad.
See Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. J. L. 463, 97 Am. Dec. 72S; Barr v.
Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609; Wood v. McCain, 7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec. 612.
§ 10. A principal may have several general
agents and as many special agents as occasion may
require.
§ 17. The same person may at one time or in
regard to one transaction be a special agent of his prin-
cipal and at another time or in reference to other trans-
actions he may be a general agent. So, though he may
be authorized to act only in a particular case he may,
































































































































14 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§ 17-22.
See Jeffrey v. Bigelow (1835), 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 518, 28 Am. Dec.
476.
§ 18. How to be proved. — Whether an agency
is general or special is usually a fact to be proved. The
law itself makes no abstract presumption in reference
to it, though when an agency is once shown to exist,
the law would presume it general rather than special.
It is always true that anybody who relies upon the existence of
agency has imposed upon him the burden of proving it. He must
not only prove that it exists, but he must also show what kind~oTan
agency it is. The law never simply presumes that agency exists,
and it never simply presumes that an agent is general or special.
When it appears that an agency does exist, the court, if it makes
any presumption at all, presumes it to be general rather than lim-
ited, but, speaking generally, the fact of the agency must be shown
and also the nature and extent of it.
See Savings Fund Society v. Savings Bank, Cas. Ag. 371.
§ 19. Professional and non-professional agents.
—Agents may further be classified as professional and
n o n-p r of ess iona I.
Of the professional agents, the most important are
the attorney at law, the auctioneer, the broker and the
factor.
§20. The attorney at law is one whose profes-
sion it is to give advice and assistance in legal matters,
and to prosecute and defend in the courts the causes of
those who may employ him for that purpose.
§ 21. The auctioneer is one whose business it is
to sell or dispose of property, rights or privileges, at
public competitive sale, to the person offering or ac-
cepting the terms most favorable to the owner.
§ 22. The broker is one whose business it is to
bring parties together to bargain, or to bargain for
them, in matters of trade, commerce or navigation.


































































































































§§ 22-26.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. US
ers, stock-brokers, insurance brokers, peal estate
brokers, and tlie like.
§23. The factor is one whose business il is to
receive and sell goods for a commission. He is often
called a commission-merchant. If he guarantees pay-
ment for the goods he sells, he is said to act under a
del credere commission. When authorized t<> sell a
cargo which he accompanies on the voyage, he is called
a super-cargo.
§ 24. Distinctions between these classes of
agents. — These various classes of agents differ mate-
rially from each other. Thus the auctioneer is em-
ployed to sell or dispose of only, and not to buy, and his
sales are always public, lie is primarily the agent of
(lie seller only, blit lie becomes the agent of the bliyei;
also when he accepts his bid and enters his name upon/
the memorandum of the sale.
§ 25. The broker sells at private sale, and has
not usually the possession of the goods or property
which he sells, lie is regarded as the agent of the per-
son who first employs him, and he can not represent
both parties to the transaction unless with full knowl-
edge of his relations to the other each principal sees fit
to confide his interests to him. The broker acts prop-
erly in the name of his principal only, and he has not
usually any property in his possession upon which he
could claim a lien.
§ 26. The factor is entrusted with the posses-
sion of the goods, and sells usually in his own name.
Unlike the auctioneer, his sales are private. The factor
has a special property in the goods, a lien upon them
for his advances and charges, and, unless restricted,
may sell upon a reasonable credit.


































































































































FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED.
[§§ 27-29.
CHAPTER II.






35. How when contract il-
legal in part.
§ 27. The general rule.
28. The exceptions.
29. The first exception.
30. Illustrations.
31. The second exception.
32. How these cases re-
garded in law.
§ 27. The general rule. — It is the general rule that
an agency may be created for the transaction of any
lawful business-, and that whatever a person may law-
fully do, if acting in his own right and in his own be-
half, he may lawfully delegate to an agent.
§ 28. The exceptions. — The cases is which authority
cannot lawfully be delegated fall into one or the other
of two general classes:
I. Authority cannot be delegated for the perform-
ance of an act which from its nature or the terms of
the law requiring it, can only be performed by the
principal in person. The rule in this class of cases is
sometimes stated in this way : that authority cannot be
delegated for the performance of a purely personal
duty.
II. Authority cannot be delegated to do an act
which is illegal, immoral or opposed to public policy.
§20. The first exception. — It is a general rule
that a personal duty, trust or confidence imposed upon
one person cannot be delegated by him to another. So,
"if a public duty or trust is imposed on anyone, these,
not being things which one does in his own right, can-
































































































































§§ 29 -31.] FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. 17
It is this principle which creates the limitation, here-
after to be considered, upon the power of an agi q1 to
delegate Ins agency. But the same rule may operate in
some cases upon the principal, and it prevents him
from delegating to an agent those things which by stat
ute, custom or the inherent nature of the act are re-
quired to be done by him in person.
See United States v. Bartlett, Dav. 9, 24 Fed. Cas. 1021; Combes'
Case, 9 Co. 76, b.
§30. Illustrations. — Thus, for example, an
elector who is entitled to vote at a public election must
do so in person, and can not vote by agent. And where
a statute required an affidavit to be made concerning
matters peculiarly within the knowledge of a certain
person, it was held that he must make the affidavit him-
self, and that one made by an agent would not suffice.
See Mechem on Public Officers, § 187; United States v. Bartlett
supra.
So it has been held that power to make, under a
statute, an assignment for the benefit of creditors can
not be delegated to an agent, the court saying: "Where
an act authorized by statute must, from its nature or
the necessary construction of the statutory authority,
be done in person — for example, the statute authoriz-
ing a party to make his will — the power to do the act
cannot be delegated. Such cases fall within the excep-
tion to the general rule that a person may authorize
another to dispose of his property for him in any man-
ner he himself may do."
See Minneapolis Trust Co. v. School District, (1897) 6S Minn.
414, 71 N. W. Rep. 679. Compare In re Whitley Partners (1886)
32 Ch. Div. 337; Hyde v. Johnson, 2 Bing. N. C. 776, 29 Eng. Com.
L. 488.
§31. The second exception. — Under the second
































































































































IS FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. t§§ 31-33.
creation or enforce the performance of an agency which
has for its purpose or which naturally and directly
tends to promote, the commission of an act which is
cither illegal or immoral in itself, or which is opposed
to public policy.
It may be thought at first view that this is not an
exception to the rule at all— that the principal himself
could not do any of the acts which are so condemned.
This, of course, might be true of certain of them, but
there are still many cases wherein one might, with im-
punity, act in person, but could not appoint an agent
to act for him. Thus, for example, one may very fre-
quently resort to personal persuasion to procure legis-
lation, or obtain a contract or a pardon by personal
influence, and incur thereby no legal penalty, because
no express statute has made it an offense. Such prac-
tices, however, are undesirable, because they tend to
substitute personal influences for considerations of the
public good. They are opposed to public policy, and
though the law may not reach them directly, it will at
least refuse to lend its aid to enforce them.
§ 32. How these cases regarded in law. — The
law scrutinizes undertakings of this nature with great
strictness, and judges of their validity by their general
nature and natural and probable results. It makes no
difference that in the particular case nothing improper
was done or intended to be done. The law determines
the case by the tendency of undertakings of that kind,
and holds the particular contract unlawful if its gen-
eral nature brings it within the prohibited class.
§ 33. Illustrations. — The cases which fall under
this prohibitum are exceedingly numerous, but a few
classes will be mentioned.
Thus, contracts for employment which lead the agent
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§83.] FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. 10
principal and his own interesi may conflict, or wherein
his duty to one principal may conflict with his duty
to another principal, or which expose him to tempta-
tion to violate his duty to his principal;
See Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12;
Atlee v. Fink, 75 Mo. 100, 42 Am. Rep. 3S5, Cas. Ag. 14; Byrd v.
Hughes, 84 111. 174, 25 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag. 23.
to procure or to suppress legislation by bringing per-
sonal influence to bear upon the legislators;
See Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 535, Cas. Ag. 17;
Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa. St. 375, 24 Atl. R. 219, 15 L. R. A. 727;
Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. 898, SO L. R. A. 737; County
of Colusa v. Welch, 122 Cal. 428, 55 Pac. R. 243.
to procure action on the part of municipal bodies In-
corrupt persuasion ;
See Hayward v. Nordberg M'fg. Co., 85 Fed. R. 4, 29 C. C. A. 438.
to procure contracts from governments and heads of
governmental departments by like influences;
See Stanton v. Embrey, 98 U. S. 548, Cas. Ag. 631; Elkhart
County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep. 746, Cas. Ag. 18;
Beal v. Polhemus, 67 Mich. 130; Weed v. Black, 2 McArth. (D. C.)
268, 29 Am. Rep. 618; Gorman v. United States, 34 Ct. pf Ch. 237;
Wasserman v. Sloss, 117 Cal. 425, 49 Pac. R. 566, 59 Am. St. R. 209;
Commonwealth v. Press Co., 156 Pa. St. 516, 26 Atl. R. 1035.
to procure the suppression or defeat of public prosecu-
tions by other than the open and legally established
methods of procedure;
See Weber v. Shay, 56 Ohio St. 116, 46 N. E. 377, 60 Am. St. R.
743; Kirkland v. Benjamin, 67 Ark. 480, 55 S. W. 840.
to secure appointment to public or private office, by
personal solicitation or influence;
See Edward v. Randle, 63 Ark. 318, 38 S. W. 343, 36 L. R. A. 174;
Basket v. Moss, 115 N. C. 448, 20 S. E. 733, 44 Am. St. R. 463;
West y. Camden, 135 U. S. 507, 34 L. ed. 254; Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82
































































































































20 FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. [J 33
to procure pardons by like means;
See Deering & Co. v. Cunningham, 63 Kans. 174, 65 Pac. R. 263,
54 L. R. A. 410; Moyer v. Cantieny, 41 Minn. 242, 42 N. W. 1060.
to secure or suppress evidence;
See Lyon v. Hussey, 82 Hun 15, 31 N. Y. S. 281; Kennedy v.
Hodges, 97 Ga. 753, 25 S. E. 493; Quirk v. Muller, 14 Mont. 467, 36
Pac. R. 1077, 43 Am. St. R. 647, 25 L. R. A. 87; Crisup v. Grosslight,
79 Mich. 380, 44 N. W. 621.
to deal in prohibited articles or engage in forbidden
transactions;
See Sullivan v. Horgan, 17 R. I. 109. 20 Atl. R. 232; Helber v.
Schantz, 109 Mich. 669, 67 N. W. 913; Mexican International B'k'g
Co. v. Lichtenstein, 10 Utah 338, 37 Pac. R. 574.
to deceive and defraud the public;
See McDonnell v. Rigney, 108 Mich. 276, 66 N. W. 52; Merrill v.
Packer, 80 Iowa, 542, 45 N. W. 1076; Shipley v. Reasoner, 80 Iowa,
548, 45 N. W. 1077; McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454, 36 N. W. 218.
to further and increase litigation ;
See Peck v. Heurich, 167 U. S. 624; Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78,
24 Pac. R. 846; contra, Vocke v. Peters, 58 111. App. 338.
to do acts in contravention of statutes;
See Irwin r. Curie, 56 N. T. App. Div. 514, 67 N. Y. S. 380; Dudley
v. Collier, 87 Ala. 431, 6 So. R. 304, 13 Am. St. R. 55; Parks v. Dold
Packing Co., 6 Misc. R. 570, 27 N. Y. S. 289; Lowey v. Granite Asso-
ciation, 8 Misc. R. 319, 28 N. Y. S. 560.
to procure election to public or private office by im-
proper means;
See Roby v. Carter, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 295, 25 S. W. 725 ; Dansereau
v. St. Louis, 18 Can. S. Ct. R. 587; Dickson v. Kittson, 75 Minn. 168,
77 N. W. 820, 74 Am. St. R. 447.
to endeavor to bribe or corrupt the servant or agent ot
another ;
See Woodstock Iron Co. v. Richmond etc. Co., 129 U. S. 643, 32
L. ed. 819; Lum v. McEwen, 56 Minn. 278, s. c. Lum v. Clark, 57 N.
































































































































§5 33-34.] FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. 21
to commit crimes;
See Mexican International Banking Co. v. Liechtenstein, 10 Utah,
338, 37 Pac. R. 574.
to procure marriage for a commission or other com-
pensation;
See Duval v. Wellinan, 124 N. Y. 156, 26 N. E. 343; Morrison v.
Rogers, 115 Cal. 252, 46 Pac. R. 1072; Hellen v. Anderson, 83 111.
App. 506.
to create "corners"' and monopolies;
See Leonard v. Poole, 114 N. Y. 371, 21 N. E. 707, 11 Am. St. K.
667, 4 L. R. A. 728; Samuels v. Oliver, 130 111. 73, 22 N. E. 499.
to engage in stock gambling transactions or unlawful
dealings in other commodities or merchandise; or
See Kahn v. Walton, 46 Ohio St. 195, 20 N. E. 203; Wagner v.
Hildebrand. 187 Pa. St. 136, 41 Atl. R. 34; Dows v. Glaspel, 4 N. Dak.
251, 60 N. W. 60; Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336, 33 L. ed. 172;
Cashman v. Root, 89 Cal. 373, 26 Pac. R. 883, 12 L. R. A. 511, 23 Am.
St. R. 482.
these, and all others of like character or tendency the
law declares void.
See Bowman v. Phillips, 41 Kans. 364, 21 Pac. R. 230, 3 L. R. A.
631; Beebe v. Board of Supervisors, 64 Hun 377, 19 N. Y. S. 629;
Brown v. First National Bank, 137 Ind. 655, 37 N. E. 158. 21 L. R.
A. 206; Wood v. Mancheser Fire Ins. Co., 30 Misc. R. 230, 63 N. Y.
S. 427; Railroad Co. v. Morris, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 502, 3 Oh. Dec. 419.
Study the following cases, and be able to state how they illus-
trate the rule: Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, C
on Ag. 12; Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary, 9S Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep.
746, Cas. on Ag. 18; Byrd v. Hughes, S4 111. 174, 25 Am. Rep. 4 i2.
Cas. on Ag. 23; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, Cas. on Ag. 631;
Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 535. Cas. Ag. 17; Atlee v.
Fink, 75 Mo. 100, 42 Am. Rep. 385, Cas. Ag. 14.
§34. Validity as between principal and
agent. — But to make these contracts void as between
the principal and the agent, it is necessary that the
































































































































22 FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. [§§ 34-35.
the principal, or shall knowingly have assisted in giv-
ing it effect,
See Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. at p. 510.
§35. How when contract illegal in part. —
Where contracts of this nature are entire, that is, where
the mutual agreements are so connected and mutually
dependent that one part can not stand without the
others, the whole contract will be rendered void by the
illegality; but if the contract is severable, the invalid





































































































































WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT.
In general.
Who May Be Principal.
37. The general rule.
38. Rule applies to corpora-
tions and partnerships.
39. Natural or legal incapac-
ity.
40. Insane persons as princi-
pals.
41. Infants as principals.
42. Married women as princi-
pals.
2. Who May Be the Agent.
43. Less competence required
in agent than principal.
44. Infant as agent.
45. How authorized.
46. Married woman as agent.




§ 48. Husband as agent for hl»
wife.
40. Corporations as agents.
50. Partnerships as agents.
51. Incapacity arising from
adverse interest.
3. Joint Principals.




54. Clubs, societies, etc., as
principals.
4. Joint Agents.
55. Several agents may jointly
represent the same prin-
cipal.
56. If the power 13 joint and
several.
57. But where the agency is
one created by law.
§36.
In general. — Attention will next be given to
th" general question, Who may be principal or agent?
And as a not inappropriate part of the same gene
subject, the questions which arise where several per-
sons are jointly to be the principals or the agents, will
be here considered.
1. 'Who may he Principal.
§ 37. The general rule. — It is the general rule that
every person who is competent to act in his own ru
and in his own behalf may act by agent. We have seen

































































































































21 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§ 37-3S.
whatever he may do in person. The reverse of this is
also true in general, viz. : — that a person who is incom-
petent to act in his own right and in his own behalf
cannot act by agent ; neither can one do by agent what
he cannot do in person.
§ 38. Rule applies to corporations and partner-
ships. — This rule applies to collections of persons as
well as to single individuals. Hence corporations may,
and, from their nature, must usually act by agents;
and the existence of the agency and the effect of the
agent's acts are subject to the same rules which apply
to individuals. Thus it is said in a recent case, "It is
well settled that a corporation may contract and be
contracted wdth through an agent whose authority
may be implied from facts and circumstances showing
recognition or ratification by the corporation. Indeed,
it seems that the same presumptions are applicable in
this respect to corporations as to natural persons."
See Moyer v. East Shore Terminal Co. (1894) 41 S. Car. 300, 19
S. E. Rep. 651, 44 Am. St. Rep. 709.
So partnerships may, unless restricted, perform by
agent the acts which are within the scope of the part-
nership business.
See St. Andrews Bay Land Co. v. Mitchell, 4 Fla. 192, 54 Am. Dec.
340, Cas. Ag. 26; Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 280, Cas.
Ag. 27; Clark v. Slate Valley R. Co. (1890), 136 Pa. 408, 20 Atl. Rep.
562, 10 L. R. A. 238.
The rule applies to limited partnerships as well as
to ordinary partnerships.
See Park Bros. & Co. v. Kelly Axe Mfg. Co. (1892), 49 Fed. Rep.
618, 6 U. S. App. 26, 1 C. C. A. 395.
§39. Natural or legal incapacity. — Incapacity to


































































































































§§ 39-41.7 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. 25
natural where it inheres in the very nature, character
or situation of the person, as in the case of insane per-
sons, very young infants, and the like. It is legal where
it results from the operation of some arbitrary rule of
law, as in the case of married women at the common
law, or of the infant who has nearly but not quite
reached the age which may be fixed for his majority.
§40. Insane persons as principals. — Insane per-
sons and other persons who, from unsoundness of mind,
arc incompetent to make contracts, are incompetent to
act by agent.
See Plaster v. RIgney (1899), 97 Fed. Rep. 12, 38 C. C. A. 25.
But if the incapacity was not known to the other
party, who has acted in good faith and taken no ad-
vantage of it, an executed contract will not be set aside
if the other party can not be restored to his original
condition.
See Drew v. Nunn (1879), 4 Q. B. Div. 661.
§ 41. Infants as principals. — The rule has been laid
down, especially in the older cases, that an infant can
not appoint an agent, and that any such appointment
is void. The better rule is that the arjpointment is
simply voidable, like the infant's ordinary contracts,
and that as to those matters, l ike the purchase of neces-
saries, and the like, concerning which the infant could
act in person, he may act by agent.
See Coursclle v. We3'erhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 72 N. W. Rep. 697;
Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am. Rep. 178, Cas. on
Ag. 507; Askey v. Williams (18S9), 74 Tex. 291. 11 S. W. Rep. 1101,
5 L. R. A. 176; Beliveau v. Amoskeag Co. (1895), 68 N. H. 225, 40
Atl. Rep. 734, 44 L. R. A. 167; Trueblood v. Trueblood, S Ind. 195,
65 Am. Dec. 756, Cases on Agency 29; Armltage v. Widoe, "J M'
124. The last two cases show the older rule; the first one, the mod-
ern rule.
































































































































2G WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§41-42.
stances, employ a servant (Chappie v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 252) though
he could not appoint an agent. Service may often be a necessary
for which the infant may bind himself, but the appointment of
an agent has in view the creation of contractual obligations, and the
contractual capacity of the infant is limited.
§ 42. Married women as principals. — Unmarried
men, at common law, might act by agent, but mar-
ried women were incompetent to act in their own be-
half, and could not therefore act by agent. In most
Suites this incapacity has been largely removed by
statutes which usually provide that a married woman
may acquire and hold property as her separate estate
and may make contracts respecting it, as though she
were unmarried ; and a married woman may now act by
agent in respect to those matters concerning which the
statutes have made her competent to act in person. It
was said in a recent case, concerning one of these stat-
utes, "these provisions have brushed away many of the
disabilities of the wife under the common law; have
recognized her individual existence, and conferred upon
her distinct rights and powers respecting contracts, the
carrying on of business, the owning, controlling and
disposing of property, equal to those held and enjoyed
by her husband. She is clothed with, power to manage
her own affairs, and certainly has power to appoint
an agent or attorney to do that which she is capable
of doing in person."
See Munger v. Baldridge (1889), 41 Kans. 23ti, 21 Pac. Rep. 159,
13 Am. St. Rep. 273.
As will be seen in a later section (§ 48) where a
married woman may act by agent, she may appoint her
husband as such agent.
*»
In dealing with the question of the married woman's capacity to
act by agent, the starting point must be her common law incapacity,
which was practically complete. To a greater or less extent, this
































































































































IS 42-42.] WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. 27
uniform, nor do they usually completely remove the common law
disabilities. So far as the latter have not been so removed, they still
operate, and it is necessary, therefore, in each case to see how that
particular case is affected by the statute.
Compare Weisbrod v. Railway Co., 18 Wis. 35, 86 Am. Dec. 743,
Cas. Ag. 31, with Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 199, 27 Am. Rep. 38, Cas.
Ag. 33.
2. Who may be the Agent.
§ 43. Less competence required in agent than in
principal. — Inasmuch as it is tbe principal who is to
be brought into contractual relations with third per-
sons, it is obvious that the question of his capacity is
more important than that of the agent. The agent acts
in a representative capacity and exercises a derivative
authority. A less degree of competency is therefore re-
quired in the agent than in the principal, and it is said
that any person may be an agent except a lunatic, im-
becile or child of tender years. Hence infants, married
women, slaves and aliens have been held competent to
act as agents.
See Lyon v. Kent, 45 Ala. 656, Cas. on Ag. 37.
It is, of course, not meant that an infant, for example, is alwayrj
an appropriate agent: there are many occasions where much judg-
ment, discretion or special skill may be requisite, which an infant
would not ordinarily possess, but that is a consideration which ap-
peals rather to the principal's wisdom in selecting his representa-
tive than to any standard of ability which the law may require.
The most serious difficulty in this connection is to reconcile the
statement that an infant, slave or married woman may be an agent
with the declaration previously made that the relation of agency —
the relation between the principal and his agent — is a contractual
one. It is asked, how that can be a contractual relation which may
be entered into by one not having contractual capacity. This ap-
parent difficulty has seemed to some so serious that they have been
led to ascribe some other character to agency and to describe it
not as a contractual relation but as a status or "office." Whether
agency may properly be defined as Matus or not depends, of course,
upon what is meant by status, — a matter upon which the persons
who use that term are by no means agreed. (See Holland's Juris-
prudence, 9th ed., p. 133.) It must suffice here to say that the char-
































































































































28 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§43-45.
agency. To define agency as an office presents the same difficulties:
it certainly is not a public office, and to call it a private office is to
raise questions as difficult as those which this definition was sug-
gested to solve.
The true view doubtless is to regard the relation as a contractual
one, and to treat these as cases of imperfect relation as is done in
many other fields — the general contracts of the infant, for example,
which are merely voidable and not void, and then voidable by the
infant only and not by third persons.
§ 44. Infant as agent. — Though an infant may be
an agent, the relation is an imperfect one. The infant
agent may bind his principal, but neither the principal
nor third persons with whom the agent deals can ac-
quire the same rights against the infant agent which
they might have if he were an adult,
In the case of Cordross's Settlement, (1878) 7 Ch. Div. 728, Sir
George Jessel, M. R., said, "I will state that in my opinion it is good
law that an infant can exercise a power even though it be coupled
with an interest, where an intention appears that it should be exer-
cisable during minority."
But while the infant agent can thus doubtless effectually execute
the authority conferred upon him in such sense that neither the
principal nor the other party can disregard the contract merely be-
cause the agent was an infant, it is also doubtless true that the
principal could not enforce any contractual obligation against the
infant agent nor could the third person with whom the agent dealt
enforce against the agent such a contractual liability, for example,
as that which results when an adult agent assumes to make a con-
tract without authority. (See post § .)
§ 45. How authorized. — The infant may be
the agent of his parent or of strangers, but in either
case it must be by virtue of some actual authorization.
Even when he is to act for his parent, it must be by
virtue of the parent's authority, for, except in some
cases respecting necessaries, a child has no implied
authority, merely because he is the child, to bind his
parent as his agent, as, for example, in buying or sell-
ing goods, making contracts or loaning the parent's
































































































































§§45-47.] WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. 29
pressly given or it may be presumed from the parent's
conduct, as, for example, by his acquiescence in it when
brought to his attention.
See Johnson v. Stone, 40 N. H. 1ST, 77 Am. Dec. 706, Cas. Ag. 78;
Bennett v s Gillett, 3 Minn. 423, 74 Am. Dec. 774, Cas. Ag. 79; Hall
v. Harper, 17 111. 82; Swartwout v. Evans, 37 111. 442.
§ 4(>. Married woman as agent. — A married woman
might at common law be the agent of third persons,
even in their dealings with her husband. It was, how-
ever, as in the case of the infant agent, an imperfect
relation, because the married woman at common law
had no capacity to enter into contract relations. Un-
der the modern "Married Women's Acts," her capacity
to act as agent is usually made much greater.
§ 47. As agent for her husband. — Both at the
common law and under the modern statutes, the mar-
ried woman is competent to be the agent of her hus-
band. Her authority as her husband's agent is of two
kinds:
1. That created by law, even against the husband's
consent, to buy necessaries on his credit when he lias
neglected to supply her. This is a matter, however,
which does not concern us here, but belongs to the law
of husband and wife.
See Benjamin v. Dockham, 134 Mass. 418, Cas. on Ag. 71.
2. That which arises from his actual authorization,
either express or implied, as in the case of his other
agents.
The wife has no general authority as her husband's
agent merely because she is his wife. Her husband may
give her such authority, but it must be conferred either
expressly or impliedly, as in the ease of his other
agents.
Sec Benjamin v. Benjamin, 15 Conn. 347, 3D Am. Dec. 384, Cas.
Ag. 72; Cox v. Hoffman, 4 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) ISO, Cas. Ag. 39;
































































































































30 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§ 48-50.
§ 48. Husband as agent for his wife. — Where a
married woman is competent to act by agent (see ante
§ 42), her husband may be appointed as the agent. "If
she appoints her husband as her agent in such a matter,
and in making the appointment acts of her own free
will and without coercion from him," said the court
in Massachusetts, "we see no reason for regarding her
as incapable of authorizing any act to be done by him
in her name, and on her behalf, or for shielding her
from responsibility. It must be held that whatever is
done within the scope of the agency is done by her
authority."
See Shane v. Lyons (1898) 172 Mass. 199, 51 N. E. 976, 70 Am.
St. Rep. 261.
Her husband, however, has no authority as her agent
merely because he is her husband, but his authority
must be conferred a s in the case of any other agent.
And it is said that even clearer evidence of her appoint-
ment ought to be required, when he assumes to act as
her agent, than would be required if a stranger were
the agent.
See McLaren v. Hall, 26 Iowa, 297, Cas. Ag. 77; Rowell v. Klein,
44 Ind. 290; Rankin v. West, 25 Mich. 195; Rust-Owen Lumber Co.
v. Holt, 60 Neb. 80, 82 N. W. Rep. 112, 83 Am. St. Rep. 512.
§ 49. Corporations as agents. — A corporation may
act as agent either for individuals, partnerships, or
other corporations, if the act is within the scope of its
corporaTe powers and not forbidden. Corporations are
often organized for this express purpose, as in the case
of trust companies, and the like.
See Killingsworth v. Trust Co., 18 Ore., 351, 17 Am. St. Rep. 787,
Cas. on Ag. 40; McWilliams v. Detroit Mills, 31 Mich. 275.
§ 50. Partnerships as agents. — The same rule ap-
plies to partnerships. They may act as agent within
































































































































§f 50-51.J WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. 31
pressly organized for that purpose. Authority con-
ferred upon a firm is supposed to be conferred upon
each member of it, unless the contrary is expressed,
and therefore the authority may be exercised by any
one of the partners.
See Deakin v. Underwood, 37 Minn. 98. 5 Am. St. Rep. 827, Cas.
Ag. 68.
§51. Incapacity arising from adverse interest —
Incapacity to act as agent in certain eases arises from
adverse interest. The law does not permit a person to
assume to act as agent where he already has such an
interest in the same matter as may prevent his acting
fairly toward his principal. Thus the agent of one
party cannot, without the intelligent consent of both
principals, undertake to act in the same transaction as
the agent of the other party. Neither can a person,
without the full and intelligent consent of the other
party, undertake to be both a party to a transaction
and the agent of the other party.
This subject will be more fully considered hereafter.
See Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12;
Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396, 41 Am. Rep. 528, Cas. Ag. 538;
Byrd v. Hughes, 84 111. 174. 25 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag. 23; Davis v.
Hamlin, 108 111. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541, Cas. Ag. 461.
It is not necessary in this class of cases that the interest shall
be such as will or must prevent his acting fairly towards his prin-
cipal. Here, as before, the lav; judges of the whole class by the
tendency of any particular specimen in that class. It does not make
any difference in this particular case whether the agent might have
been able to sink entirely his own interest and act with the utmost
fidelity. It makes no difference that he is acting and has acted with
the utmost fidelity.
See Carr v. National Bank & Loan Co. 167 N. Y. 375, 60 N. E.
Rep. 649, 82 Am. St. Rep. 725.
If the principal at the time he employs the agent knows that the
latter has this interest, there Is no reason why he cannot employ him.
If he is willing to trust him in view of the facts he may do so. The
case spoken of Is where the interest is not disclosed. Without that
































































































































32 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§ 51-R3.
absolutely forbids the agent from assuming to act where he haa an
adverse interest.
See Wildberger v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 72 Miss. 338, 17 !3o.
Rep. 282, 48 Am. St. Rep. 558; Ramspeck v. Pattillo, 104 Ga. 772,
30 S. E. Rep. 962, 69 Am. St. Rep. 197.
3. Joint Principals.
§ 52. Agent may represent several joint princi-
pals. — An agent may be appointed to represent a num-
ber of joint principals. The interest which the asso-
ciates have may be that of partners, or of joint-tenants,
or tenants in common of property, or merely that of
persons who have united to form a club, society or asso-
ciation in order to accomplish some social, political,
religious or other similar purpose. What their interest
is, becomes material in determining the extent of their
powers and liabilities as joint principals.
Where a number of co-tenants execute several and separate pow-
ers of attorney to the same agent to dispose of the several interest
of each, the agent will have no authority to bind them all jointly.
Harris v. Johnston (1893), 54 Minn. 177, 55 N. W. Rep. 970, 40 Am.
St. Rep. 312. So where two principals unite in giving a joint power
to bind both jointly, there will be no authority to bind one only,
Gilbert v. How (1890), 45 Minn. 121, 47 N. W. Rep. 643, 22 Am. St.
Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380.
§ 53. Partners, co-tenants, etc., as principals. —
In the case of a partnership, each partner has usually
the power to appoint an agent whose acts, in reference
to the partnership affairs, will bind all of the part-
ners. But in the case of joint tenants, tenants in com-
mon, and other similar relations, one party is not, from
the mere fact of the relation, impliedly authorized to
act for all, and an agent appointed by one will bind
that one only and not all, unless all authorized his
appointment.
See Mussey v. Holt, 24 N. H. 248, 55 Am. Dec. 234; Tuttle v. Camp-
bell, 74 Mich. 652, 16 Am. St. Rep. 652; Morrison v. Clark, 89 Me.
































































































































55 54-55.1 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. '■>>'■>>
§51. Clubs, societies, etc., a3 principals. — Clubs,
societies, and unincorporated associations are not part-
nerships, and no power in one member to bind the
others will be implied from the mere fact of member-
ship. A person, therefore, who assumes to act as agent
of such a body can bind those only who have in so
way, previously authorized his appointment, expressly
or impliedly, or have subsequently ratified it
As in other cases, no particular method of conferring
the authority is necessary, unless made so by some i
press rule of the association. Such an appointment
may be authorized by the rules or regulations of the
association to which the member assents on joining, or
it may be made by those who vote for it at a meeting,
or it may be ratified by the members who subse-
quently take the benefit of the acts with knowledge of
the facts.
See Ash v. Guie, 97 Penn. St. 493, 39 Am. Rep. 818, Cas. Ag. 45;
Davison v. Holden, 55 Conn. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 40, Cas. Ag. 47;
Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa, 220, 52 Am. Rep. 436, Cas. Ag. 510; Bennet
v. Lathrop, 71 Conn. 613, 42 Atl. 634, 71 Am. St. Rep. 222.
Of course, to bind any one as principal in these cases, it must
appear that dealings upon credit were contemplated, for if it be
evident that the authority went no further than to pledge funds pro-
vided and supposed to be sufficient, no personal liability would
attach. McCabe v. Goodfellow (1892), 133 N. Y. 89, 30 N. E. Rep.
728, 17 L. R. A. 204.
i**""* 4. Joint Agents.
§ 55. Several agents may jointly represent the
same principal. — There may also be a number of
agents jointly representing the same principal. Where
they are appointed by a private principal, the law pre-
sumes that the principal relied upon their joint judg-
ment and discretion, and they must therefore all act
together in the execution of their authority, and a less
































































































































34 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§55-57.
be some provision in the instrument appointing them
or something in the circumstances, such as waiver, ac-
quiescence and the like, which indicates the consent of
the principal that less than the whole may act.
See Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114, Cas. on Ag. 50.
§ 56. If the power is joint and several, then
all or one only must act and not an intermediate num-
ber. If a partnership is the agent, the authority may,
as has been seen, be executed by any one of the part-
ners, in the absence of stipulations to the contrary.
The death or disability of one of two or more joint
agents will terminate the authority unless it is coupled
with an interest in the survivors.
See Deakin v. Underwood, 37 Minn. 98, 5 Am. St. Rep. 827, Cas.
Ag. 68.
§ 57. But where the agency is one created
by law, or is public in its nature, the rule is different.
In such cases all of the agents or officers must be pres-
ent to deliberate, or must have notice and an oppor-
tunity to be present and deliberate with the others, but
a majority of the whole number, if present, may then
lawfully meet. A majority of this meeting may then
exercise the power.
This rule applies to the directors of corporations.
Thus after due notice, a majority constitute a quorum,
and a majority of that quorum may act.
See First Nat. Bank v. Mt. Tabor, 52 Vt. 87, 36 Am. Rep. 734, Cas.






































































































































OF THE APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS AND THE EVIDENCE
THEREOF.
5 58. In general.
1. How the Agent May
Be Appointed.
59. Usually, only by act of
principal.
60. The method to be pursued.
61. 1. Authority to execute in-
struments under seal.
62. How when instrument
executed in presence of









Evidence of the Appoint-
ment.
70.
Authority not to be proved
by agent's admissions.
71.
But agent may be
called as a witness.





63. How corporation may
appoint.
64. 2. Authority required by
statute to be in writing.
65. In other cases, authority
may be conferred by pa-
rol.
§ 58. In general. — The questions next to be consid-
ered will be, 1, How the agent may be appointed, and
2, By *what evidence the fact of his appointment may
be established.
.f 1. How the [gent may be Appointed.
§ 59. Usually, only by act of principal. — Except
in those cases in which the law creates the authoritv,
it is the invariable rule, that an agent can only be ap-
pointed at the will and by the act of the principal,
though that will may find expression in many different
ways.
See Pole v. Leask, 33 L. J. Rep. Eq. 155, Agency Cases. 81.
§60. The method to be pursued. — The law usu-
































































































































36 APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. [§§ 60-S1 .
authority. The material question is as to the fact of
the appointment rather than as to the method adopted..
There are, however, two classes of cases — one arising
under the rules of the common law and one under
statutes — in which the authority must be conferred in
a particular way, and they are : 1. Cases wherein an
instrument under seal is to be executed ; and, 2, Cases
wherein some statute, usually designed to prevent
fraud or perjury, expressly requires the authority to
be conferred by writing. These two classes of cases
will be considered first.
§ 61. 1. Authority to execute instruments under
sea l f — it was the settled rule at common law — and this
rule still generally prevails — that authority to execute
an instrument necessarily under seal could be con-
ferred only by a written power under seal.
See Humphreys v. Finch, 97 N. Car. 303, 1 S. E. Rep. 870, 2 Am.
St. Rep. 293.
So authority to fill blanks in deeds or other sealed in-
struments can generally be conferred only by sealed
instrument, though there are cases wherein a principal,
who has confided to an agent a bond or deed containing
blanks to be filled and then delivered, will be held
bound to innocent parties, although the agent has filled
the blanks in an unauthorized manner.
See Phelps v. Sullivan, 140 Mass. 36, 54 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag.
101; White v. Duggan, 140 Mass. 18, 54 Am. Rep. 437; Humphreys v.
Finch, supra; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Oreg. 211, 28 Am. St. Rep. 746.
But much less significance is now attached to seals
than formerly, and there is a marked tendency in many
States either to abolish the old distinctions by statute,
or to disregard them as no longer suited to the times.
And even at common law, if the instrument to be exe-

































































































































§§ 61-63.] APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. 37
was sufficient for an unsealed instrument, the superflu-
ous seal would be disregarded and the authority held
sufficient.
See Heath v. Nutter, CO Me. 378, Agency Cases 91; Long v. Hart-
well, 34 N. J. L. 116, Cas. Ag. 92; Nichols v. Haines, 98 Fed. Rep.
692, 39 C. C. A. 235. Compare, in passing, Thomas r. Joslin, 30
Minn. 388, Cas. Ag. 427; Drury v. Foster. 2 Wall. 24, Cas. Ag. 120.
§ 62. How when instrument executed in
presence of principal. — So even though the instrument
to be executed were necessarily under seal, yet if the
instrument were executed in the presence of the prin-
cipal and by his express direction mere verbal author-
ity was sufficient. This rule still prevails.
See Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Cush. 483, 52 Am. Dec. 741, Cas. Ag.
100; Bigler v. Baker, (1894) 40 Neb. 325, 58 N. W. Rep. 1026, 24
L. R. A. 255.
The reason given for this rule is that "if the grantor's name is
written by the hand of another, in his presence and by his direc-
tion, it is his act, and the signature, in point of principle, is as
actually his as though he had performed the physical act of making
it." Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 30 N. J. Eq. 193.
§ G3. Kcw corporation may appoint. — It was
also the rule of the common law that a corporation
could contract only by deed under its corporate seal,
and that its appointment of an agent could be made
only in the same manner, but this rule has been quite
generally abandoned, and a corporation may now ap-
point agents in substantially the same manner that an
individual may employ them.
"A great deal of the difficulty," it is said in one case, "originally
felt in holding corporations liable for the acts of their agents within
the scope of their authority, arose from the supposition that it was
necessary that their appointment should be under the seal of their
principals. The decisions, both in England and America, have satis-
factorily disposed of this technical doubt, and it is now clearly the
law, particularly with regard to what are called trading corpora-
tions, that no such evidence of authority is required. A private


































































































































38 APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. [§§ 63-64.
their authority, in the same way, and it would appear in the same
form, as any individual person is." Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Vandiver (1862), 42 Pa. St. 365.
See Burrill v. Bank, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 163, 35 Am. Dec. 395; Noble-
boro v. Clark, 68 Me. 87, 28 Am. Rep. 22; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v.
South, etc., R. Co., 84 Ala. 570, 5 Am. St. Rep. 401; Williams v.
Fresno Canal Co., 96 Cal. 14, 31 Am. St. Rep. 172; Scofield v. Parlln
& Orendorff Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 804, 18 U. S. App. 692, 10 C. C. A. 83.
§ 64. 2. Authority required by statute to be in
writing. — In very many of the States, by statute (the
.statute of frauds or its equivalent) an agent to sell,
mortgage or lease lands or any interest therein (other,
usually, than leases for not more than one year), can
be authorized only by an instrument in writing.
Thus the statute in Michigan (Comp. L. 1897, §§9509, 9511) de-
clares that "No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a
term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or con-
cerning lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall hereafter be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by act
or operation of lav;, or by deed or conveyance in writing, sub-
scribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized by writing." And "Every contract for the leasing for a
longer period than one year, or for the sale of any lands, or any in-
terest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or seme note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by some person thereunto
by him lawfully authorized by writing." Statutes substantially sim-
ilar are found in Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, and
other States.
Not all of the States, however, have such statutes. Thus, Wis-
consin, for example, while it has a statute identical with the first
sei ion quoted above from Michigan, omits the words "by writing"
at the close of the second one. Indiana and Iowa do the same, and
there are various distinctions in other States which it is not prac-
ticable to reproduce here. The statute in each State must be con-
sulted whenever this general question arises. See, for example,
Lccg t. Hartwell, 34 N. J. L. 116, Agency Cases, 92; Malone v. Mc-
Cullough, 15 Colo. 460; Kozei v. Dearlove, 144 111. 23, 36 Am. St.
Rep. 416; White v. Breen, 106 Ala. 159, 19 So. Rep. 59, 32 L. R. A.

































































































































§§ 64-67.] APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. .".0
The policy of the law may extend this rule to other
cases. Thus, in Kentucky it is enacted thai "No per-
son shall be bound as the surety of another by the art
of an agent unless the authority of the agent is in writ-
ing, signed by the principal."
See Kentucky Statutes, 1899, §482; Simpson v. Commonwealth,
89 Ky. 412, 12 S. W. Rep. 630.
§ 65. In other cases, authority may be conferred
by parol. — Except in these cases, of instruments ond< r
seal, and statutes expressly requiring written author-
ity, it is the general rule that authority for the doing of
any act lawful to be done, including the execution of all
written instruments other than those mentioned above,
may be conferred without writing.
See Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330.
There seems to be an impression, easily acquired, but with diffi-
culty removed, that, because authority for the execution of instru-
ments under seal must be conferred by an instrument under seal,
authority for the execution of instruments in writing must be con-
ferred by writing. This, however, is not true. Except in the cases
already referred to, authority for the execution of written instru-
ments may be conferred without writing. Authority for the execu-
tion of negotiable instruments is no exception, though such an
authority is not easily implied. (See Jackson v. National Bank.
Agency Cases, 415; New York Iron Mine v. National Bank, Agency
Cases, 423.)
§G6. Need not be express. — The authority,
moreover, need not be expressly conferred. In tie 1
great majority of the cases it is informally conferred,
or is presumed from the acts and conduct of the prin-
cipal.
§ 67. Doctrine of estoppel applied. — The doc-
trine of estoppel is constantly applied, and the prin-
cipal will not be permitted to deny that which by his
words or conduct he has asserted, if such denial would
prejudice an innocent third person who has reasonably
































































































































40 APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. [§§67-69.
See Breckeuridge v. Lewis, 84 Me. 349, Ag. Cas. 103; Phelps v.
Sullivan, 140 Mass. 36, 54 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag. 101.
Estoppel, as here used, has been defined to be: "An impediment
or bar by which a man is precluded from alleging or denying a fact,
in consequence of his own previous act. allegations or denial to the
contrary." Jacob's Law Diet.
§ 68. General rule. — It may therefore be stated
as a general rule that whenever a person has held out
another as his agent authorized to act for him in a
given capacity; or has knowingly and without dissent
permitted such other to act as his agent in that ca-
pacity; or where his habits and course of dealing have
been such as to reasonably warrant the presumption
that such other was his agent authorized to act in that
capacity; whether it be in a single transaction or in a
series of transactions — his authority to such other to so
;■<•{ for him in that capacity will be conclusively pre-
sumed, so far as it may be necessary to protect the
rights of third persons who have relied thereon in good
faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudencej and
he will not be permitted to deny that such other was
his agent authorized to dp the act he assumed to do,
provided that such act was within the real or apparent
scope of the presumed authority.
See Savings Society v. Savings Bank, 36 Penn. St. 498, 78 Am.
Dec. 390, Cas. Ag. 371; Johnson v. Hurley, 115 Mo. 513, Cas. Ag. 84.
See also Pursley v. Morrison, 7 Ind. 356, 63 Am. Dec. 424; Hooe v.
Oxley, 1 Wash. (Va.) 19, 1 Am. Dec. 425; Tier v. Lampson, 35 Vt.
179, 82 Am. Dec. 634; Hubbard v. Tenbrook (1889). 124 Pa. St. 291,
16 Atl. Rep. 817, 2 L. R. A. 823, Cas. Ag. 367; Union Stock Yard Co.
v. Mallory, 157 III. 554, 41 N. E. Rep. 888, 48 Am. St. Rep. 341.
§ 69. -Limitations. — But authority will not
arise from mere presumption. _It must he based on
facts, for which the principal is responsible, and wiW
not arise from any mere argument as to the conven-
ience, utility or propriety of its existence.
The facts, moreover, from which it is implied must
































































































































§2 69-71.] APPOINTMENT OP AGENTS. 11
the authority is inferred from the adoption of arts of
a certain kind, its scope will be limited to the perfor m-
ance of a<is of the same kind.
See Bickford v. Menier, 107 N. Y. 490, Cas. Ag. 93; Graves v.
Horton, 38 Minn. 66, Cas. Ag. 82.
2. Evidence of the Appoint men I.
§ 70. Authority not to be proved by agent's ad-
missions. — The authority of the agent must in all cases
he traced to the principal, and must be established by
evidence of his acts or statements. As against the prin-
cipal, therefore, the agent's admissions or declarations
(as distinguished from his testimony, as a witness i;i
court), are not admissible for the purpose of establish-
ing, enlarging or renewing the agent's authority; nor
can his authority be established by showing that he
acted as agent, assumed to be agent or was generally
reputed to be agent. The agent's acts and statements
cannot be made use of against the principal until the
fact of his agency has first been shown by other evi-
dence.
See Hatch v. Squires, 11 Mich. 185, Cas. Ag. 106; Mitchum v.
Dunlap, 98 Mo. 418; Kornemann v. Monaghan, 24 Mich. 36; Graven
v. Korton, 38 Minn. 66, Cas. Ag. 82; Kane v. Barstow, 42 Kan. 465,
16 Am. St. Rep. 490; Mullanphy Savings Bank v. Schott, 135 111.
655, 26 N. E. Rep. 640, 25 Am. St. Rep. 401; Pepper v. Cairns, 133
Pa. St. 114, 19 Atl. Rep. 336, 19 Am. St. Rep. 625; Baltimore, etc..
Relief Ass'n v. Post, 122 Pa. St. 579, 9 Am. St. Rep. 147.
When it is said that the agent's statements, admissions and dec-
larations cannot be made use of until the fact of his agency has
been shown by other evidence, it is not meant that there must first
be a separate verdict found establishing that fact; what is meant
is, that there must first be some competent testimony offered tending
to prove that fact.
§ 71. But agent may be called as a witness.
— If the agent's evidence as to his authority is desired,
































































































































42 APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. [§§71-73.
nature and extent of his authority, where it rests in
parol, being as competent as that of any other witness.
It is necessary to distinguish between what the alleged agent
may admit, represent or declare, out of court, when he is not under
oath or subject to cross-examination, and his testimony as to the
facts concerning his authority when he is called as a witness.
See Howe Machine Co. v. Clark, 15 Kan., 492, Cas. Ag. 107;
Thayer v. Meeker, 86 111. 470.
His testimony, moreover, "cannot be restricted to the
more words used by the principal, but is admissible
generally on the whole subject."
Zze Lawall v. Groman. ISO Pa. 532, 37 Atl. Rep. 98, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 662.
The agent's testimony, further, like that of any other
witness, is not necessarily conclusive. It has such
weight as its credibility entitles it to receive. Thus it
might be found from other evidence that he was agent,
though he testified that he was not, or that he was the
agent of one party, though he testified that he was
agent of another.
See State v. Bristol Savings Bank, 108 Ala. 3, 18 So. Rep. 533,
54 Am. St. Rep. 141.
§ 72. What constitutes the best evidence. —
^Yhere the authority is conferred by written instru-
ment, the writing is the best evidence of the existence
and nature and extent of the authority, and must be
produced, or its absence accounted for, in any case in
which the question of the existence of the authority is
directly involved; but where the question is only col-
laterally involved, that is, where it arises incidentally
in some other controversy, parol evidence may be ad-
mitted, even though the authority was in writing.
See Neal v. Patten, 40 Ga. 363; Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 38 N. J. L. 39.
§ 73. How question determined. — Where the
































































































































|7X.] APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. 43
question whether aii agency has been created by it, and
if so, what is its scope and effect, are questions of law
for the court.
So if there be no writing but the facts are not dis-
puted, the question whether under the undisputed f.
an agency exists, and if so, what is its nature and ex-
tent, is likewise for the court.
But where the authority is not in writing and the
facts are in dispute, it is for the jury to determine, un-
der proper instructions from the court, not only the
existence of the agency, but also its nature and effect.
See Savings Society v. Savings Bank, 36 Penn. 498, 78 Ata. Dec.
390, Cas. Ag. 371; Railroad Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606; Wilicox v.
Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 45 S. W. Rep. 781, 66 Am. St. Rep. 701; See-

































































































































OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION.
[§ 74.
CHAPTER V.
OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION.
§ 74. How question arises.
1. What is Ratification.
75. Ratification defined.
2. What Acts May Be Ratified.
76. In general, any act which
might previously have
been authorized.
77. Not void or illegal
acts.
78. Forgery.
3. Who May Ratify.
79. In general, any person
who might authorize.
80. State, corporation, etc.
81. Infants — Married women.
82. Agent.
4. Conditions of Ratification.
83. What conditions must ex-
ist.
5. What Amounts to a Rati-
fication.
84. General rule.
85. Ratification by instrument
under seal.
86. Ratification by authority
subsequently conferred.
87. Ratification by conduct.
88. By accepting benefits.
89. By bringing suit.
90-91. By acquiescence.
, The Effect of Ratification.
92. In general.
93. Revocability.
94. Effect as between princi-
pal and agent.
95. Effect as to rights of third
party against principal.
96. Effect as to rights of prin-
cipal against third party.
97. Effect between agent and
other party.
98. In tort.
§ 74. How question arises. — The matters thus far
dealt with have been those which relate to the creation
of authority before an act is done. Cases, however, not
infrequently arise in which a person ha,s done an act
as agent for another which proves to be unauthorized
either because the authority was not broad enough to
include it, or because though it once existed it had ex-
pired, or because, perhaps, there was no semblance at
any time of authority and the act was based upon a
mere gratuitous assumption of authority. In all of
































































































































5§ 74-76.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 45
bound and may repudiate the act when brought to his
attention.
Suppose, however, on the other hand, that, when the
act is brought to his attention, he approves of it, and
would be glad to have it regarded as an act done on his
account; or su ppose that when the act La brought to
his attention, he is so indifferent towards it that he
simpl y does nothing, leaving th e matter in such con-
dition tha t, an infcrPTW of approval is just as legiti -
mate as the inference of disapproval, or, perhaps, is
stronger. What is now the legal situation? May an
una uthorized act be subsequently either e vprpssly or
impliedly approved; and if so what are the nature and
effect of such approval?
To the first question, the answer of the law is cer-
tain : .There may be a subseq uent approval of unau -
thorized acts. The law terms that subsequent
approval Ratification. As to the second question,
AVhat is the effect of such an approval or ratification,
and in what cases will it be operative? it is the purpose
of the present chapter to supply the answer.
1. What is Ratification .
§ 75. Ratification defined. — Rati fication is , the
adoption and affirmance by one person of an act which
another, without authority, has assumed to do as his
agent.
See McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, Cas. Ag. 109; Zott-
ruan v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96, 81 Am. Dec. 96.
2. What Art* may he Ifatifirf.
§ 76. In general, any act which might previously
have been authorized. — As a gen eral, rul e, a P e rson
may ratify the previous unauthorized doing by another
































































































































46 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 76-79.
still lawfully do himself, and which he might then and
can still lawfully delegate to such other to be done.
The act so ratified may be either the making of a
contract, or, within the limits referred to in the follow-
ing section, the commission of a tort.
§ 77. Not void or illegal acts. — Rat ification
can not render valid acts which were void when done,
or acts which were then so far illegal in themselves
that they could not then be lawfully authorized; but
an act which is a trespass, singly because it was not
authorized, may be ratified by the subsequent approval
of the person whose authority was needed; and so a
person may assume liability by the adoption of an act
which another has done in his behalf and as his agent,
and which proves to be a trespass or other tort because,
while it might lawfully be done under some circum-
stances, it w r as not lawfully done in the case in
question .
See Brewer v. Sparrow, 7 Barn. & Cres. 310; Wilson v. Tumman,
6 Man. & Gr. 236; Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124.
§ 78. Forgery. — Whether a forgery can be rati-
fied has been much disputed, but the weight of
authority is to the effect that responsibility for the act
may be assumed by ratification, though not so as to
affect the forger's liability for his crime.
See Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447, Cas. Ag. 110; Henry
v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275, 5 Am. St. Rep. 613, Cas. Ag. 115. See also
Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. Rep. 498, 12 L. R.
A. 140.
3. Who may Ratify.
§ 79. In general, any person who might authorize.
— As a general rule any person who was competent to
































































































































§§79-82.] OP- AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 47
tent to do it, may ratify its unauthorized doing b\
another as his agent.
$80. State, corporation, etc. — Thus the State,
municipal and private corporations, partnerships, and
partners, may ratify what it or they could and can still
authorize. And of course, e cuitccrsu, neither can do
by ratification what it would be powerless to authorize
directly.
See State v. Torinus, 26 Minn. 1, 37 Am. Rep. 395; Forbes v.
Hagman, 76 Va. 168, Agency Cases, 122; School District v. Insurance
Co., 62 Me. 330, Caa. Ag. 194; Melledge v. Iron Co., 5 Cush. (Mass.)
158. 51 Am. Dec. 59; North Point, etc., Co. v. Utah Canal Co., 16
Utah 246, 40 L. R. A. 851; Union School Furniture Co. v. School
District, 50 Kans. 727, 20 L. R. A. 136; Commercial Electric L. & P.
Co. v. Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288, 72 Am. St. Rep. 103.
§ 81. Infants— Married women.— It^has been
said that an infant can not ratify, but t h e true rule
is that both infants, and married women under the mod-
ern statutes, may ratify such acts and, of course, surh
only as they are competent to authorize.
See Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124; Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall, 24,
Agency Cases, 120; Rowell v. Klein, 44 Ind. 290; McLaren v. Hall,
26 Iowa, 297, Cas. Ag. 77; Reed v. Morton, 24 Neb. 760, 40 N. W.
Rep. 282, 1 L. R. A. 736; MacFarland v. Heim, 127 Mo. 327, 29 S. W.
Rep. 1030, 48 Am. St. Rep. 629.
§82. Agent.— An agent cannot ratify his own
act^ nor caflj™ "' +™ jflflt T PTlfa ra titT„tte apt nfl ""
fellow agent: but pne afient may ratify ffrg fl^ftf *"•
other agent of the same uriminal, where the agent who
ratifies has himself general authority to do the act rat-
ified.
See Ironwood Store Co. v. Harrison, 75 Mich. 197, Cas. Ag. 124.
The same rule is expressed in a different way when It is saii
"An agent can in some cases ratify an act done by a sub-agent by
adopting it as his own, but such ratification will not bind the prin-
cipal unless it is an act which was within the agent's authority to
































































































































48 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§ 8S.
4. Conditions of Ratification-.
§ S3. What conditions must exist. — In order to
effect a ratification, the following conditions must
exist :
a. The person ratifying must have the present abil-
ity to do the act himself or to authorize it to be done.
b. The person for whom the act was done must have
been identified or capable of being identified. In other
words, the person who did the act must have acted for
the particular person ratifying or, if he did net know
who the particular person was, then for persons of his
description. *
See Foster v. Bates, 12 M. & W. 225, Agency Cases, 127.
c. The act must have been done, by the person act-
ing, as agent and not on his own account. That is, the
person who did the act must at the time not only have
intended to act on behalf of the person ratifying, but
it seems also to be necessary that he should then have
professed to act for a principal, though it is not neces-
sary that he should have disclosed who the principal
was.
See the very late case of Keighley v. Durant [1901] App. Cas.
240, overruling Durant v. Roberts [1900], 1 Q. B. 629; Mitchell v.
Minnesota Fire Ass'n, 48 Minn. 278, 51 N. W. Rep. 608; Ferris v.
Snow, — Mich. — , 90 N. W. Rep. 850, wherein it is held that it is
necessary that he should have professed to act as agent. It seems,
moreover, to be sufficient that he professed to act as agent, though
he had a fraudulent purpose to really take the benefit on his own
account. In re Tiedeman [1899], 2 Q. B. Div. 66. See also Ham-
lin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327, Agency Cases, 136.
On the other hand, in Hayward v. Langmaid [1902], — Mass. — ,
63 N. E. Rep. 912, it is held not to be necessary that he should have
been understood to De dn agent by the person with whom he dealt.
d. The person ratifying must have been in existence
at the time the act was done.
































































































































§83.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 10
made or acts done by the promoters of a proposed corporation than
in any other class of cases. The question is, may the corporation
when organized ratify these acts done or contracts made before it
had any existence? There is real difficulty in saying that there may
be rati;! ration by a body which had no existence and therefore no
power to do or authorize the act when done. Some courts, realizing
the difficulty, have held that there may be adoption but not. ratifi-
cation. One difference in result is that in the case of adoption the
contract is not deemed to be made until the date of the adoption,
while in case of ratification the contract is deemed to be made from
the beginning. Some courts seem to regard it merely as a difference
in names.
See McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, Agency Cases,
128; Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Christy, 79 Penn. St. 54, Agency Cases,
131; Schreyer v. Turner Flouring Co., 29 Oreg. 1, 43 Pac. Rep. 719.
e. The person alleged to have ratified must, at the
time of the alleged ratification, have either had full
knowledge of all of the material facts relating to the
art ratified or he must have deliberately assumed
responsibility for the act, having all the knowledge of
the facts which he cared to have. Knowledge of the
material facts is essential, but knowledge of the legal
effect of those facts is not essential.
See Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen (Mass.) 493, Cas. Ag. 146; Scott v.
Railroad Co., 86 N. Y. 200, Agency Cases, 148; Wheeler v. Sleigh
Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 347, Cas. Ag. 138; Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291,
Cas. Ag. 204; Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 5 So. Rep. 190, 2
L. R. A. 808; Cram v. Sickel, 51 Neb. 828, 71 N. W. Rep. 724, 66 Am.
St. Rep. 478; American Exchange Bank v. Loretta Mining Co., 165
111. 103, 46 N.-E. Rep. 202, 56 Am. St Rep. 233; Bierman v. City
Mills, 151 N. Y. 4S2, 15 N. E. Rep. 856, 56 Am. St. Rep. 635; Brown v.
Wright, 58 Ark. 20, 22 S. W. Rep. 1022, 21 L. R. A. 467.
/. The principal cannot ratify the act so far as it is
favorable to him, and reject it as to the residue; but he
musi ratify all or none. If he takes the benefits he
mast also assume the burdens. But where the principal
has authorized the doing of a certain act, he does not
by accepting the benefits of that act assume responsi-
bility for an additional unauthorized act of whose

































































































































50 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 83-84.
See Eberts v. Selover, 44 Mich. 519, 38 Am. Rep. 278, Cas. Ag.
150: Wheeler v. Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 347, Cas. Ag. 13S; Baldwin
v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 199, Cas. Ag. 196; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y.
79, Cas. Ag. 154; Roberts v. Rumley, 58 Iowa, 301, Cas. Ag. 143;
Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Aughey, 144 Pa. St. 398, 22 Atl. Rep.
667, 27 Am. St. Rep. 638; Eastman v. Relief Ass'n, 65 N. H. 176, 18
Atl. 745, 23 Am. St. Rep. 29; Daniels v. Brodie, 54 Ark. 216, 15 S. W.
Rep. 467, 11 L. R. A. 81; Busch v. Wilcox, 82 Mich. 336, 47 N. W.
Rep. 328, 21 Am. St. Rep. 563.
g. The facts alleged to show the ratification must
be such, and there must be such reliance upon them,
that the party relying upon them will be prejudiced if
the ratification is not established.
See Doughaday v. Crowell, 11 N. J. Eq. 201.
/;. The ratification can not be made to so operate as
to cut off the intervening rights of third persons who
have acted in good faith and without notice of the acts
sought to be ratified.
See Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, Agency Cases, 160.
i. The party alleging that ratification has taken
place must establish it by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
See Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex. 120, 84 Am. Dec. 611.
No new consideration is necessary. The original con-
sideration suffices.
See Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. Rep. 498, 12
L. R. A. 140.
5. What Amounts to a Ratification.
§ 84. General rule.— Ratification may be either ex-
press or implied. There are cases in which it must be
express or formal. It is a general rule that the act of
ratification must be of the same nature as that which
would be required to confer authority to do the ratified
































































































































85 84-87.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 51
would have been required, ratification by an instrument
under seal is access ary ; if written authority vvas requi-
site, r atification by writing is necc s sary.
See Hawkins v. McGroarty, 110 Mo. 516, Cas. Ag. L67; Ko:
Dearlove, 114 111. 23, 32 N. E. Rep. 542, 30 Am. St. Rop. H6; Worrall
v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330; Zottman v. Sau Francisco. 20
Cal. 96, 81 Am. Dec. 96.
§ 85. Ratification by instrument under seal.
— The tendency, however, is strong to abolish the rule
which requires ratification under seal.
See Mclntyre v. Park, 11 Gray (Mass.) 102, 71 Am. Dec. 690, Cas.
Ag. 170.
And here, as in other eases, if the instrument to be
ratified was unnecessarily under seal, the ratification
may be made without seal.
See Adams v. Power, 52 Miss. 828; Worrall v. Munn, supra; Zott
man v. San Francisco, supra.
§ 80. Ratification by authority subsequently con-
ferred.— Ratification may be effected by subsequently
conferring authority to do the act to be ratified.
See Rice v. McLarren, 42 Me. 157, Cas. Ag. 190.
§ 87. Ratification by conduct. — Inasmuch as au-
thority for the doing of most acts may be conferred by
parol, the ratification of most acts may be eff< cted by
parol. This is the rule wherever some technical
requirement like that of writing or sealing does not
intervene. In the great majority of cases, ratification
is inferred from conduct, and this is often done where
the party had no express intention to ratify or even in-
tended not to ratify. The principle of estoppel applies
here and where a party by his words or conduct has led
another to believe that tlu k act was done by his author-
































































































































52 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 87-89.
, ; ejudice of the other who has in good faith relied
'ii it.
See ante §§ G7, 68; Dixon v. Bristol Sav. Bank, 102 Ga. 461, 31 S.
E. Rep. 96, 66 Am. St. Rep. 193; Brown v. Wilson, 45 S. Car. 519, 23
S. E. Rep. 630, 55 Am. St. Rep. 779; Ward v. W'illiams, 26 111. 447,
79 Am. Dec. 385, and note: Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Cowell, 28 Pa.
St. 329, 70 Am. Dec. 128; Gillett v. Whiting, 141 N. Y. 71, 35 N. E.
Rep. 939, 38 Am. St. Rep. 762.
§ 88. By accepting benefits.— One of the most
common methods of ratifying an act. is by accepting the
benefits of it; and it is the general rule that a person
who, with knowledge of the facts, accepts the benefits
of the act must accept also its responsibilities.
See Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563, Cas. Ag. 177; .Tones v. Atkin-
son, 68 Ala. 167, Cas. Ag. 192; Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291, 18
Am. Rep. 480, Cas. Ag. 204; Mayer v. Dean, 115 N. Y. 556, 22 N. E.
Rep. 261, 5 L. R. A. 540; Mining Co. v. Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23, 36
C. C. A. 633; Thomas v. City Nat Bank, 40 Neb. 501, 58 N. W. Rep.
943, 24 L. R. A. 263; Reed v. Morton, 24 Neb. 760, 40 N. W. Rep.
282, 1 L. R. A. 736; Savings Bank v. Butchers' Bank, 107 Mo. 133,
17 S. W. Rep. 644, 28 Am. St. Rep. 405; Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis.
222, 52 N. W. Rep. 88, 33 Am. St. Rep. 32; Sherman Center Town Co.
v. Morris, 43 Kan. 282, 19 Am. St. Rep. 134; Hitchcock v. Griffin Co.,
99 Mich. 447, 58 N. W. Rep. 373, 41 Am. St. Rep. 624.
§ 89. By bringing suit. — Another common
method is by bringing suit based upon, and for the en-
forcement of the act, This, when done with a knowl-
edge of the facts, shows an intention to take the bene-
fits of the act, and the burdens must be taken with the
benefits.
This rule, however, would not apply to suits brought
for the purpose of avoiding or repudiating the unau-
thorized act, or to suits brought to prevent loss by it.
See Shoninger v. Peabody, 57 Conn. 42, Cas. Ag. 172; Roberts v.
Rumley, 58 Iowa, 301, Cas. Ag. 143; Park Bros. & Co. v. Kelly Axe
Mfg. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 618, 6 U. S. App. 26, 1 C. C. A. 395; Pickle v.
Muse, 88 Tenn. 380, 12 S. W. Rep. 919, 17 Am. St. Rep. 900; Wheeler
& Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Aughey, 144 Pa. St. 398, 22 Atl. Rep. 667, 27

































































































































OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION.
§90. By acquiescence. — When a person learns
that anot her has assumed, without authority, to do
some act for him as his agent, he has the option to
repudiate or ratify the act, but he must do one thing
or the other, lie has a reasonable time within who h
to decide, but if,., with knowledge of the facts, he fails
to repudiate the act within a reasonable time, he will
Ik' deemed to have affirmed it.
See Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150, Cas. Ag. 1S6; Hazard v.
Spears, 4 Keyes, 469, Cas. Ag. 182; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327,
Cas. Ag. 136; Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen (Mass.) 447, Cas.
Ag. 110; Scott v. Railway Co., 86 N. Y. 200, Cas. Ag. 148; Central
R. & B. Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala. 292, 4 So. Rep. 828, 7 Am. St. Rep.
48; Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Cowell, 28 Pa. St. 329, 70 Am. Dec.
128; Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. Kittel, 52 Fed. Rep. 63, 2 C. C. A. 615;
Central Trust Co. v. Ashville Land Co., 72 Fed. Rep. 361, 18 C. C. A.
590; Union Switch Co. v. Johnson Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 940, 10 C. C. A.;
Raymond v. Palmer, 41 La. Ann. 425, 6 So. Rep. 692, 17 Am.
St. Rep. 398; Quinn v. Dresbach, 75 Cal. 159, 7 Am. St. Rep. 138.
This rule, according to the weight of au-
§ 91. -
thority, applies whether the person who did the unau-
thorized act was an agent for other purposes or a mere
stranger who had volunteered to act as agent; though
ratification is less readily presumed where the person
was such a stranger.
See Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150, Cas. Ag. 186; Ladd v. Hilde-
brant, 27 Wis. 135, 9 Am. Rep. 445; Terry v. Provident Fund Society,
13 Ind. App. 1, 41 N. E. Rep. 18, 55 Am. St. Rep. 217.
6. The Effect of Ratification.
§ 92. In general. — The general effect of ratification
under the conditions named, is as stated in the familiar
maxim Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur ct vmndat
■priori aequiparatur, that the act becomes the act of
the principal, with its benefits and burdens, from the
beginning, as though he had previously authorized it
to be done; except, that if the rights of third persons
































































































































54 OP AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. ["§92-95.
have intervened between the act and its ratiiication,
such rights cannot be cut off by the ratification.
See Cook v. Tullis, L8 Wall. (U. S.) 332, Cas. Ay. 160; Mccracken
v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 5S1, Cas. Ag. 109.
§93. Itevocability. — Ratification, once intelli-
gently made, is irrevocable, so far as the rights of third
persons arc concerned; but, on the other hand, repudi-
ation unless it lias led some one interested to change
his situation to his detriment may ordinarily be subse-
quently changed to ratification.
See Jones v. Atkinson, 68 Ala. 167, Cas. Ag. 192; Neely v. Jones,
16 W. Va. 625, 37 Am. Rep. 794; Sanders v. Peck, 87 Fed. Rep. 61.
59 U. S. App. 248, 30 C. C. A. 530.
§ 94. Effect as between principal and agent. — As _
between the principal and the agent, the effect of the
ratification is to release the agent from all liability to
the principal for acting without authority; and to give
the agent Uiesa in< ' lights against the principal, — as for
compensation, reimbursement, etc., — which he would
have had if the act had been previously~alithorized.
The principal must ratify the whole act, and his con-
duct, it is held, will be liberally construed in favor of a
ratification.
See Wilson v. Dame, 58 N. H. 392, Cas. Ag. 526; Bank v. Bank,
13 Bush (Ky.), 526, 26 Am. Rep. 211, Cas. Ag. 206; Hazard v. Spears,
4 Keyes (N. Y.), 469, Cas. Ag. 182; Szymanski v. Plassan, 20 La.
Ann. 90, 96 Am. Dec. 382; Risbourg v. Bruckner, 3 Com. B. N. S.
812, 91 Eng. Com. L. 810; Brewer v. Sparrow, 7 B. & C, 310, 14 Eng.
Com. L. 144; Frixione v. Tagliaferro, 10 Moore's Pr. Coun. Cas. 175;
Smith v. Cologan, 2 Term Rep. 188n.
§ 95. Effect as to rights of third party against
principal. — As between the principal and the party with
whom the agent dealt, the effect of the ratification is to
give the other party the same rights against the princi-
































































































































5§ 95-97.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 55
viously authorized. This is the aspect of the question
most frequently arising, and the rule is declared in the
familiar ma:-:!;n Omiiis ratihubitio retrotrahitur et
rnandato priori aeguiparatur.
See Ileyn v. O'llagen. 60 Mich. 150, Cas. Ag. 186; Hyatt v. Clark,
118 N. Y. 5G3, Cas. Ag. 177.
§ 96. Effect as to rights of principal against
third party. — The ratification of the act by the princi-
pal being equivalent to prior authority, will operate to
cut off any remedies which he might otherwise have
had against the third party based upon the want of
authority, a.s, for example, the right to recover property
or money received by the other party from the agent.
Whether the principal by ratifying it can acquire the
same right to enforce against the other party a con-
tract made on his behalf which he would have had if it
had been previously authorized, is a question upon
which the cases are in some conflict. The rule sus-
tained by the weight of authority seems to be that the
principal mav ratifv the unauthorized contract and
then enforce it against the other party, if he does so
within a reasonable time and before the other party has
withdrawn from it.
See Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686, Cas. Ag. 215; McClintock v.
Oil Co., 146 Penn. 144, 28 Am. St. Rep. 785, Cas. Ag. 219; Bolton v.
Lambert, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 295, Cas. Ag. 222; In re Tiedeman [1899],
2 Q. B. 66; Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43, 5 Am. St. Rep. 103,
and note; 25 Am. L. Rev. 74.
The Wisconsin cases and the English cases represent extreme
views. The rule of the Pennsylvania case is more likely to be fol-
lowed. The question is one of real difficulty. In addition to the
discussions referred to in the notes to the* cases, see 9 Harv. L.
Review, 60; 5 Law Quar. Rev. 440; Fry on Specific Performance
(3d Eng. ed.), 711.
§ 97. Effect between agent and other party. — In
contract. — A person who assumes to deal as agent
































































































































5G OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 97-98.
no authority incurs, in many instances, as will be seen
hereafter, an individual liability to the person so dealt
with. As between such another party and the agent
of a disclosed principal, the effect of the ratification
in contract cases is to release the agent from liability
to the other party for having made a contract without
authority; and it gives the agent the same rights
against the other party which he would have had if the
contract had been previously authorized.
See Spittle v. Lavender, 2 Brod. & Bing. 452, 6 Eng. Com. L. 224.
If the principal were undisclosed, ratification will
not pro tect the agent from liability to the other party,
but it will charge the principal and give the other party
an option to hold the principal or the agent as he
choo ses.^
See post, § 243.
§ 98. In tort. — But in cases of tort, the rule
is different: The ratification by the principal makes
him liable also for the tort to the third person, but it
does not release the agent from his liability to the third
person for his participation in the tort. Both princi-
pal and agent are thereafter liable. It is no defense
to the agent when sued for a tort that he acted as the
agent of another in committing it.
See Stephens t. Elwall, 4 Maule & Sel. 259, Cas. Ag. 226; Delaney
v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 456, Cas. Ag. 514; Os-
borne t. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437, Cas. Ag. 518; Miller




































































































































OF DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE AGENT.
99. In general.
100-2. Agent generally cannot
delegate authority to
sub-agent.
§ 103 Under what circumstances
justified.
104-5. Effect of appointment of
sub-agent.
§99. In general. — Thus far there has been consid-
ered the (question of the appointment of agents by the
principal himself, either before the act was done — by
authorization, or after it was done — by ratification.
Some consideration is required of the question whether
authority can be conferred not by the principal him-
self but by some one else to whom that power has been
confided.
There can be no doubt, of course, that the principal
may authorize an agent to employ other agents, as
where the manager of a business is clothed with the
power of employing all such servants and agents as the
conduct of the business may require. In such eas< -.
employment of agents by the agent authorized to em-
ploy them, within the scope of the employment, is an
appointment by the principal under the general maxim
Qui facit per alium, farit per se } and the agents so ap-
pointed are the agents of the principal as fully as
though appointed by him in person.
Another and a different question is, not whether an
agent may thus be authorized to appoint agents who
will derive authority directly from the principal, but
whether an agent who has been given certain authority
may himself hand that authority over in whole or in
































































































































58 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. [§§99-101.
him. It is the question, not whether an agent may be
authorized to appoint other agents, but whether he may
appoint sub-agents. The difference may be seen by
inquiring whether an agent appointed by an agent is
the agent of the principal or the agent of the agent.
The act of handing down authority conferred is fre-
quently spoken of as delegation of the authority, and
the question arises in other departments of the law than
agency.
§ 100. Agent generally cannot delegate authority
to sub-agent. — It is the general rule, finding expres-
sion in the familiar maxim, Delegatus non potest dele-
gari, that an agent cannot delegate his authority to a
sub-agent, without the expressed or implied consent of
his principal. This is always the rule where the act
to be performed requires the exercise of judgment or
discretion, or where the principal evidently trusted to
a personal performance by the agent.
The rule is based upon the presumption that the
principal has selected the particular agent because he
relied upon, or desired the benefit of, that particular
person's judgment, discretion, experience, skill or abil-
ity, and it would be a manifest injustice, as well as
a disappointment of expectations, if the person so
selected could turn the matter over to another of whom
the principal may be ignorant and to whom he might
not be willing to entrust the authority.
See Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray (Mass.) 518, 64 Am.
Dec. 92, Cas. Ag. 229; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73, 29 Am. Rep.
105, Cas. Ag. 231; McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 43 N. W. 800,
17 Am. St. Rep. 178, 6 L. R. A. 121; Davis v. King, 66 Conn. 465,
50 Am. St. Rep. 104 and exhaustive note; Central, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Price, 106 Ga. 176, 71 Am. St. Rep. 246.
§ 101. These are the considerations also which
































































































































§§ 101-103.] DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. 5S
under another name, that is, assigning his contract of
agency. "In the case of sue!) a contract," it is said in
a recent case, "it is a presumption of law that the trust
is exclusively personal, and that it cannot be trans-
ferred or delegated by the agent without his principal's
consent."
See Bancroft v. Scribner, 72 Fed. Rep. 988, 44 U. S. App. 480, 21
C. C. A. 352; Peterson v. Christensen, 26 Minn. 377, Cas. Ag. 234.
§ 102. The rule, however, is not inflexible. It
is based upon the presumed intention of the principal
and is intended for his protection. There are cast-,
moreover, wherein the reason is not present, and the
rule should not then prevail. Ifjhe c ase doe s not in-
volve the exercise of any special skill, judgment or dis-
cretion, or, though it does, if it appears that the prin-
cipal is willing that the authority may be delegated,
then exceptions should be recognized, and the law
admits them. Hence —
§ 103. Under what circumstances justified. — Unless
the contrary is expressed, authority to appoint a sub-
agent will be implied — (1) where the act to be done
is mechanical or ministerial only; (2) where the au-
thority can not be executed without the employment
of sub-agents; (3) where their employment is in accord-
ance with a known and well established usa<re; and
(4) where the circumstances were such that it was evi-
dently contemplated, when the agent was appointed,
that sub-agents would be employed.
See Harralson v. Stein, 50 Ala. 347, Cas. Ag. 23G; Grady v.
Insurance Co., 60 Mo. 116. Cas. Ag. 23S; Exchange Nat. Ban!. 7.
National Bank, 112 U. S. 276, Cas. Ag. 239; Cummins v. Heald, 24
Kan. COO, 36 Am. Rep. 264, Cas. Ag. 247; Bailie v. Augusta Say.
Bank, 95 Ga. 277, 21 S. E. Rep. 717, 51 Am. St. Rep. 71; McKlnnon

































































































































60 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. [§§ 103-105.
An appointment of a sub-agent, though not originally
authorized, may be ratified by the principal in the
same manner and with like effect, as in other cases.
See Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431. See also Barret v. Rhern, 6
Bush (Ky.) 466; Montagu v. Forwood [1893], 2 Q. B. Div. 350.
§ 104. Effect of appointment of sub-agent. — If the
sub-agent is employed with the express or implied con-
sent of the principal, then the sub-agent is to be
regarded as the agent of the principal. He is liable to
the principal directly, and the original agent is not
responsible to the principal for the acts of the sub-
agent, unless lie failed to exercise good faith and due
care in his appointment.
See Davis v. King, 66 Conn. 465, 50 Am. St. Rep. 104, and note;
Bradford v. Hanover Ins. Co., 102 Fed. Rep. 48, 43 C. C. A. 310, 49
L. R. A. 530; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Bradford, 201 Pa. St. 32, 50
Atl. Rep. 286, 55 L. R. A. 408, 1 Michigan Law Review, 140.
§ 105. If the employment of the sub-agent was
not so authorized by the principal, then the sub-agent
is to be deemed the agent of the original agent only,
and the latter is responsible to the principal for the
acts of the sub-agent.
See Barnard v. Coffin, 141 Mass. 37, 55 Am. Rep. 443, Cas. Ag.
































































































































§§ 1CKJ-107.] TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY.
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CHAPTER VII.
OF THE TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY.
9 106. In general.
I. Termination by Act of
Parties.
107. What methods fall under
this head.
108. Termination by original
agreement.
109. Termination by subse-
quent act of parties.
1. Termination By Mutual
Consent.
110. Agency may be termi-
nated at any time by
mutual consent.
2. Revocation By Principal.
111-112. Power of principal to
revoke.
113-115. Not when coupled
with an interest.
116. How revoke.
117. Notice of revocation.
3. Renunciation By Agent.
118. Power of agent to re-
nounce authority.
§ 119. Enforcement of contract
of agency.
120. Agency at will.
121. Discharge of agent justi-
fied when.
122. Renunciation by agent
justified when.
II. Termination by Opera-
\ UK Law.
123. In general.
124. Death of principal.
125. Death of agent.
126. Insanity of principal or
agent.
127. Bankruptcy of principal
or agent.
128. Marriage of principal.
129. War.
130. Destruction of subject
matter.
131. Termination of power
over subject matter—
Sub-agents.
§ 100. In general. — Ilaving now given some atten-
tion to the question of how agency may be created, it
may be well to consider next the question of how it may
be terminated. The agency may be terminated in one
of two general ways: —
1. By the act of the parties.
2. By operation of law.
I. TERMINATION BY ACT OF PARTIES.
§ 107. What methods fall under this head. — The

































































































































62 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§ 107-110.
(a) By force of their original agreement; or
(6) By the subsequent act of one or both of them.
§108. Termination by original agreement, — The
authority will be terminated by force of the original
agreement where it comes to an end because of some
limitation either expressly or impliedly impressed upon
it at the time of its creation.
By force of the original agreement, therefore, the
agency is terminated —
(1) When the object for which it was created has
been accomplished; and
(2) When the time originally fixed for its continu-
ance has expired.
§ 109. Termination by subsequent act of parties.
— The authority will be terminated by the subsequent
act of the parties —
(1) Where it is terminated by their mutual con-
sent.
(2) Where the principal revokes it.
(3) Where the agent renounces it.
1. Termination by Mutual Consent.
§ 110. Agency may be terminated at any time
by mutual consent. — The agency may be terminated
by mutual consent of the principal and agent at any
time. Notwithstanding any limitation or condition
originally imposed, the same power that made the ar-
rangement in the first instance can subsequently waive
the condition or remove the limitation. So far as any
authority depends upon the act of the parties (as dis-
tinguished from authority created by law) the law has
no purpose to subserve which will require the continu-
ance of the relation, when both parties desire and agree
































































































































§§111-113.] TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. (IH
2. Revocation by Principal.
§ 111. Power of principal to revoke.— Usually at
any time. — In the ordinary case, agency is (rented to
subserve some purpose which the principal has in mind.
It is the principal's will that is to be executed, his
interest that is to be promoted. The agent usually has
no other interest than to carry the principal's purpose
into effect and earn the promised compensation. If,
therefore, the principal's circumstances are altered, if
his purpose change, if his inter- 1 will be better served
by discontinuing the enterprise than by prosecuting it,
he certainly ought to have it in his power to withdraw
the authority; and the agent can ordinarily have no
interest in the matter which will justify him in insist-
ing upon going on, if his claim to such damages as he
may legally have sustained by the termination of the
authority be recognized. It is, therefore, the general
rule that the principal may revoke the agent's author-
ity at any time before 1 its execution and for any reason
deemed sufiicient to himself.
See Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670; State
v. Walker, 88 Mo. 279; Owen v. Frink, 24 Cal. 171, 178; Lord v.
Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107.
§112. Of course, if the authority has been
executed, or the agent has entered into a legally bind-
ing contract, the authority, though otherwise revocable,
cannot be revoked so as to affect these acts already
done. If the authority has been executed in pari only,
and the residue be severable, the authority as to such
residue may be revoked as in other cases.
§ 1 13. Not when coupled with an interest. —
"While revocability is thus the rule in the ordinary c.
there may be cases wherein there is something more
































































































































64 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§113-114
something more than a mere agent — cases wherein he
has, in the property or thing concerning which the au-
thority exists, some proprietary interest of his own
which the continuance of the authority is necessary to
protect — cases wherein, in the language of the law,
the authority is "coupled with an interest." In such
cases the rule of revocability does not apply so far as
to permit the principal to cut off the authority neces-
sary ior the protection of the agent's interest.
See Smyth v. Craig, 3 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 14; De Forest v.
Bates, 1 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 394; Raymond v. Squire, 11 Johns. (N.
Y.) 47; Jackson v. Burtis, 14 id. 391.
§ 114. Precisely what shall be deemed to be
an authority "coupled with an interest" is not easy to
define, but it is everywhere agreed that it must be an
interest or estate in the subject matter of the agency,
and not merely an interest in the results which are to
flow from the execution of the authority.
An interest in the subject matter, concerning which
the authority was given, in order to render it available
as a security for some claim or demand, would be an
interest which would prevent revocation; but an inter-
est merely in the form of a right to commissions or
profits out of the proceeds of the execution of the
authority would not be sufficient.
In the former case there is something existing in
which the agent has a present interest before the au-
thority is executed; in the latter case the thing in which
he has an interest, namely, the proceeds of the execu-'
tion of the authority, obviously cannot come into exist-
ence until after the authority is executed. The former
interest is sufficient to prevent revocation ; the latter is
not.
See Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn. 526, Cas. Ag. 314; Mansfield
v. Mansfield, 6 Conn. 559, 16 Am. Dec. 76; Chambers y. Seay, 12,

































































































































§§115-116.] i ELIMINATION OF THE AGENi 65
§ 115. The mere fact that the authority w£U
called "irrevocable" or "exclusive" will not prevent its
revocation.
See Chambers v. Seay, 73 Ala. 373, Cas. Ag. 252; Blackstone y.
Buttermore, 53 Penn. 266, Cas. Ag. 255.
And even the fact that the principal may have ex-
pressly agreed that the agency shall continue for a cer-
tain period will not prevent his revoking the authority
before that time, if not coupled with an interest; but
he will be liable to the agent for the damages which
the agent sustains on account of the revocation con-
trary to the agreement.
See Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 84 Ga. 714, 8 L. R. A. 410, Cas.
Ag. 273; Missouri v. Walker, 125 U. S. 339, Cas. Ag. 277; Wilcox &
G. Sew. Mach. Co. v. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627, Cas. Ag. 283; Durkee v.
Gunn, 41 Kan. 496, 13 Am. St. Rep. 300, Cas. Ag. 312.
Distinction is sometimes made in these cases between
the power to revoke and the right to revoke; the prin-
cipal always having the power to revoke but not hav!
the rig lit to do so in those cases wherein he has agreed
not to exercise his power during a certain period. If,
in the latter case, he does exercise his power he must
respond in damages.
See Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn. 526, Cas. Ag. 314.
The same conclusion is reached by distinguishing
between the authority and the contract of employment.
The authority may be withdrawn at any moment, bur
the contract of employment can not be terminated in
violation of its terms without the principal's becoming
liable in damages.
See Turner v. Sawdon [1901], 2 K. B. 653.
§116. How revoke. — The revocation need not be
express. It may be implied from circumstances, as

































































































































66 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§116-118.
the agency, or appoints another agent to perform the
undertaking, or himself intervenes to perform it in per-
son. It will also in general result from the dissolution
of a partnership or of a corporation which was the prin-
cipal; and from the severance of the joint interest of
joint principals.
See Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206, Cas. Ag. 257; Ahern v. Baker, 34
Minn. 98, Cas. Ag. 288; Salton v. Cycle Co. '[1900] 1 Ch. Div. 43.
§ 117. Notice of revocation. — Upon revoking the
authority of a general agent, the principal must give
notice of the revocation to persons who have previously
dealt with the agent as such, or he will continue to be
bound by the agent's acts. The notice required is simi-
lar to that required upon the dissolution of a partner-
ship, namely, actual notice to those who have extended
credit in reliance upon the authority and general public-
notice to others.
See Claflin v. Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 301, Cas. Ag. 294; Wheeler v.
McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, Cas. Ag. 362; Maxcy Mfg. Co. v. Burnham, 89
Me. 538, 36 Atl. 1003, 56 Am. St. Rep. 436.
Where a power of attorney has been recorded, the instrument re-
voking it should be likewise recorded. Gratz v. Improvement Co.,
82 Fed. Rep. 381, 53 U. S. App. 499, 27 C. C. A. 305, 40 L. R. A. 393.
Notice is not necessarv of the revocation of the au-
thority of a special agent, unless he has entered upon
the execution of the authority.
Notice must also be given to the agent of the revoca-
tion of his authority.
See Salton v. Cycle Co. [1900] 1 Ch. Div. 43.
3. Renunciation by Apent.
§ 118. Power of agent to renounce authority.
— The agent may also renounce his authority at any
time, but if he does so in violation of an agreement to
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notice, he will be liable to the principal for the damages
sustained.
§ 119 Enforcement of contract of agency.- Courts
will not undertake to enforce specific performance of a
contract of agency, nor will they interfere to prevenl
by injunction a violation of the contract, except in
cases involving services of such a peculiar and personal
character that damages would be inadequate cod pen-
sation.
See Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn. 52C, Cas. Ag. 314; Cort v.
Lassard, 18 Oreg. 221, 17 Am. St. Rep. 726, Cas. Ag. 31G; Rogers
Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278; Bishop v.
American Preservers' Co., 157 111. 284, 41 N. E. Rep. 765, 48 Am. St.
Rep. 317.
§ 120. Agency at will.— Where no period is fixed
for the continuance of the agency, and no stipulation
is made respecting its termination, it is presumed to
be at will, and either party may terminate it without
liability at any time by giving reasonable notice.
See Sheahan v. Steamship Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 167, 57 U. S. App.
254, 30 C. C. A. 593; Rees v. Pellow, 97 Fed. Rep. 167, 38 C. C. A. 94.
But contracts for a definite time may in some cases
be presumed from the circumstances, even though no
express understanding to that effect was had.
See Rhodes v. Forwood, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 256, Cas. Ag. 259;
Turner v. Goldsmith [1891], 1 Q. B. Div. 544, Cas. Ag. 266; Lewis
v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo. 534, Cas. Ag. 269; Glover v. Henderson, 120
Mo. 367, 25 S. W. Rep. 175, 41 Am. St. Rep. 695; Warren Chemical
Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 586, 23 N. E. Rep. 908, 16 Am. St.
Rep. 788.
§121. Discharge of agent justified when.— And
even though employed for a definite time, the agent
may lawfully be discharged, if he proves incompetent
for the task assumed, or if he is guilty of wilful dis-
































































































































68 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§ 121-124.
immoral conduct as amounts to a breach of his implied
undertaking to conduct himself with fidelity and pro-
priety.
See Dieringer v. Meyer, 42 Wis. 311, 24 Am. Rep. 415, Cas. Ag.
289; Bass Furnace Co. v. Glasscock, 82 Ala. 452, 60 Am. Rep. 748,
Cas. Ag. 291.
§ 122. Renunciation by agent justified when.—
The agent may also lawfully terminate the relation if
he is required to do dishonest or unlawful acts.
II. TERMINATION BY OPERATION OF LAW.
§ 123. In general. — The authority may also be ter-
minated in many cases by mere operation of law upon
the happening of some event which makes the further
continuance of the agency incompatible, impracticable
or impossible. The most important of these events
are:
§ 124. Death of principal. — The death of the prin-
cipal operates to instantly terminate au authority, not
coupled with an interest. "The interest which can
protect a power after the death of the person by whom
it was created must be an interest in the thing itself.
The power must be ingrafted upon some estate or in-
terest in the thing to which it relates." A mere interest
in commissions or profits to result from the execution
of the power is not enough.
See Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, Cas. Ag. 322; Knapp v.
Alvord, 10 Paige, 205, 40 Am. Dec. 241, Cas. Ag. 328; Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. Rep. 784, 36 Am. St.
Rep. 696; Pacific Bank v. Hannah, 90 Fed. Rep. 72, 59 U. S. App.
457, 32 C. C. A. 322; Gardner v. First Nat. Bank, 10 Mont. 149, 10
L. R. A. 45.
By the weight of authority the rule applies even
though the fact of the death may not be known to the
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though the harshness of this rule has caused it in some
cases to be changed by statute, and some courts deny
it so far as it would operate to defeat interests acquired
in ignorance of the death.
See Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y. 600, Cas. Ag. 331. Contra. See
Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76;
Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. 520, 13 id. 574; Dick v. Page, 17 Mo. 2:^4;
Deweese v. Muff, 57 Neb. 17, 73 Am. St. Rep. 488.
§125. Death of agent. — The same result must also
ensue from (he death of the agent, except in those casts
in which the agent had an authority coupled with an
interest.
S 12G. Insanity of principal or agent. — The in-
finity of the principal or the agent must also ordi-
narily operate to terminate an authority not coupled
with an interest; saving, usually, the rights of third
persons who, in ignorance of the insanity, have parted
with things of value to which they can not be restored.
See Matthiessen, etc., Co. v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L. 536, Cas. Ag.
335; Sands v. Potter, 165 111. 397, 46 N. E. Rep. 2S2 ; Drew v. Nunn,
4 Q. B. Div. 661.
§ 127. Bankruptcy of principal or agent. — The
bankruptcy — not the mere insolvency — of (lie principal
will also ordinarily terminate an authority not coupled
with an interest. The bankruptcy of a business agent
would ordinarily have the same effect.
S128. Marriage of principal. — The marriage of
a woman at common law would revoke a power of at-
torney previously given by her, but this result would
not ensue under many of the modern statutes. But in
any event the marriage of the principal will terminate
an authority, not coupled with an interest, where the
execution of the authority would operate to defeat
rights acquired by the marriage.
































































































































70 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§ 129-131.
§ 129. War. — War between the country of the prin-
cipal and that of the agent will suspend, if not abro-
gate, many kinds of authority.
See Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, Cas. Ag. 336; Williams
v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55; Sands v. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626, 10 Am.
Rep. 535.
§ 130. Destruction of subject matter. — The de-
struction of the subject matter of the agency, or of the
principal's interest therein, must usually terminate
the agency.
§ 131. Termination of power over subject-mat-
ter— Sub-agents.— And finally the termination of the
principal's power over the subject-matter must operate
to terminate any authority derived from him. For like
reasons, the termination of the authority of the agent
must also operate ordinarily to terminate the author-
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CHAPTER VIII.






137. Appearance given to au-
thority by principal
controls.
§ 138. Distinction between au-
thority and instructions.
139. Extent of general author-
ity.
140. Known limitations.
141. Extent of special author-
ity.
142. Incidental powers.
§132. Distinctions. — It has been seen in preced-
ing sections that the authority of the agent may be
conferred expressly, but that it is also and p
more frequently left to be inferred from the words and
conduct of the principal. While the authority may
thus be conferred in either way, some important conse-
quences depend upon whether one method or the other
was adopted. If the authority is express, we shall
naturally expect to find that its extent, and the time,
place and conditions of its exercise, will be fully set
forth and clearly defined; and if that be the case both
the agent and third persons will have little occasion
for uncertainty or doubt as to its extent. If, on the
other hand, the authority is to be implied, the questions
whether any authority is properly to be implied, and, if
so, what kind and how much, must necessarily be mat-
ters upon which opinions may differ and which must
often remain undetermined until some competent
authority has passed upon them.
It has been seen also that authority whether express
or implied may be of a general character or may be
































































































































72 NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY. [§§ 132-134.
is the one or the other, important consequences may or
may not attach.
These distinctions, then, are to be kept in mind : As
respects the manner of conferring it, the authority may
be either express or implied. As respects its extent,
it may be either general or special.
§ 133. Express authority. — Where the authority is
express, it is, as has been stated, natural to expect that
its extent and the conditions of its exercise will be clear-
ly denned. To the degree to which this is true, the limits
fixed will be conclusive upon all persons charged with
notice of them. No other main power can be deemed to
be conferred than that expressly mentioned. Persons
dealing with an agent known to be acting under such
an express power, are bound to take notice of its limita-
tions; and where they are dealing with reference to a
matter concerning which the law requires written au-
thority or authority under seal, they are bound to take
notice of that fact and will be charged with restrictions
contained in the instrument conferring such authority,
though they may have had no actual knowledge of them.
See Hurley v. Watson, 68 Mich. 531; Stainback v. Read, 11 Gratt.
(Va.) 281, 62 Am. Dec. 648; Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex. 120, 84 Am.
Dec. €11; Peabody v. Hoard, 46 111. 242; Busch v. Wilcox, 82 Mich.
336, 47 N. W. Rep. 328, 21 Am. St. Rep. 563.
§ 134 . Implied authority. — As has been seen in
earlier sections, authority may often be implied from
the words or conduct of the principal or from the cir-
cumstances of the case. Authority, however, which is
so implied cannot exceed the natural and legitimate
effects of the facts from which it is inferred, and must
be confined to the performance of similar acts under
similar circumstances. It must, moreover, be inferred
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can not arise from mere presumption or from tbe mere
propriety or convenience of its existence.
See Graves v. Horton, 38 Minn. 66, Cas. Ag. 82; Bickford v.
Menier, 107 N. Y. 490, Cas. Ag. 93; Atkins v. Lewis, 108 Mass. 534.
§ 135. General authority. — Distinction has been
made, in earlier sections, between the general and the
special agent, and the same general distinction is made
in the character of the authority conferred. The
authority is general where the principal has, either
pressly or impliedly, held the agent out as authorized
to act generally in relation to some subject or class of
subjects.
See Butler v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766, Cas. Ag. 340; Hatch v. Taylor,
10 N. H. 538, Cas. Ag. 345.
§ 136. Special authority. — The authority is special
where the principal has expressly or impliedly held the
agent out as authorized to act only in a particular
manner, or in accordance with specific instructions.
See Butler v. Maples, supra; Hatch v. Taylor, supra; Bryant v.
Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec % 96, Cas. Ag. 355.
§ 137. Appearance given to authority by princi-
pal controls. — In every case, persons dealing with the
agent as such, are bound to ascertain the extent of his
authority; but, whether the agency be general or spe-
cial, the principal will be bound to third persons by the
authority as he has caused it to appear. He is not
bound by appearances which the agent alone has given
to the authority, without the principal's express or
implied consent.
See Law v. Stokes, 32 N. J. L. 249, 90 Am. Dec. 655; Walsh v.
Hartford F. Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 5; Kingsley v. Fitts, 51 Vt. 414; Han-
over Nat. Bank v. American, etc., Co., 148 N. Y. 612, 51 Am. St. Rep.
































































































































7-1 NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY. [§§ 138-139.
§ 138. Distinction between authority and in-
structions. — It is essential to keep in mind that author-
ity and the instructions of the principal are not neces-
sarily identical. There may, of course, be cases wherein
the instructions constitute the authority — where they
are contemporaneous and coextensive with its creation.
But this is not necessarily or even ordinarily true. The
authority of the agent is the aggregate of the powers
which, in contemplation of law, the principal has con-
ferred upon the agent. It may consist not only of what
the principal said but of what he did or failed to do.
Actions often speak louder than words, and certainly
the effect which the law attributes to the words or con-
duct of the principal cannot be changed by his declara-
tions or instructions.
Usage, or what is customary in similar cases, may
contribute to determine the authority; estoppel may
affect it ; subsequent ratification may enter into it ; ex-
press rules of law may modify or enlarge it; and, so
far as innocent third persons are concerned, it is vain
for the principal to give his agent instructions not to
do what the law, as the result of all of these forces, de-
termines that he is authorized to do.
Instructions, moreover, are often intended to be se-
cret. To disclose them would not infrequently defeat
their purpose. However proper they may be, therefore,
as between the principal and the agent, in determining
their relations, they cannot be expected to affect third
persons who are ignorant of them.
See Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96, Cas. Ag. 355;
Little Pittsburg, etc., Co. v. Little Chief, etc., Co., 11 Colo. 223, 7
Am. St. Rep. 226.
§ 139. Extent of general authority. — Where au-
thority has been conferred to act generally in reference
































































































































§§ 139-141.] NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITV. 75
have no notice to i he contrary, have the right to pre-
sume that the agent has authority to do whatevi r is
usual and 'proper in such cases; and their rights i
not be affected by the fact that the principal had giv< ;i
the agent secret instructions which would limit this
usual authority.
See Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96, Cas. Ag. 355;
Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 195, Cas. Ag. 358;
Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 362; Hub-
bard v. Tenbrook, 124 Pa. St. 291, 10 Am. St. Rep. 585, 2 L. R. A.
823, Cas. Ag. 367; Watteau v. Fenwick, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 346, Cas.
Ag. 369; Austrian v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. Rep. 50, 34
Am. St. Rep. 350; Wilson v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 51 S.
Car. 540, 29 S. E. Rep. 245, 64 Am. St. Rep. 700; Ruggles v. Am.
Central Ins. Co., 114 N. Y. 415, 21 N. E. 1000, 11 Am. St. Rep. 674.
§140. Known limitations. — What has thus
been said about secret instructions can, of course, have
no application to known limitations. ''No principle
is better settled in law, nor is there any founded on
more obvious justice, than that if a person dealing
with an agent knows that he is acting under a circum-
scribed and limited authority, and that his act is out-
side of and transcends the authority conferred, the
principal is not bound; and it is immaterial whether
the agent is a general or a special one, because a prin-
cipal may limit the authority of the one as well as that
of the other."
See Quinlan v. Providence Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 356, 31 N. E. Rep.
31, 28 Am. St. Rep. 645.
§141. Extent of special authority. — Where the
authority is special, the agent's power may be as lim-
ited as the principal sees fit to make it, and these limi-
tations will be effective unless the principal has, by
conduct or otherwise, held the agent out as having an
authority greater than that actually conferred.
































































































































76 NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY. [§§ 141-142.
?56; Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96, Cas. Ag. 355; Towle
v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 195, Cas. Ag. 358; Wheeler v.
McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 362; Dyer v. Duffy, 39
W. Va. 14S, 19 S. E. Rep. 540, 24 L. R. A. 339.
§142. Incidental powers. — Every delegation of
power, whether it be general or special, carries with it,
by implication, unless the contrary is expressed, inci-
dental authority to do all those things which are rea-
sonably necessary and proper to carry into effect the
power granted. This implied power can not, as to third
persons, be cut off by secret limitations.
See Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag.
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CHArTEK IX.
OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY.
§ 143. What here considered.
1. Of Construction in General.
144. Necessity for construc-
tion.
145. Necessity for evidence.
146. By whom construed —
court — jury.
147-148. How construed.
2. Of the Construction of
Particular Powers.
149. What here included.












Authority to collect or re-
ceive payment.
156. Authority to make nego-
tiable paper.
157. Authority to manage busi-
ness.
§ 143. What here considered. — Having ascer-
tained how authority may be conferred and seen some-
thing of the rules which determine its nature and
extent, it becomes material now to discover what acts
may be authorized under it, and especially what inci-
dental powers may be deduced from more general pow-
ers expressly conferred. Attention will, therefore, next
be given to the question of the construction or interpre-
tation of the authority. — 1. In general, and 2. As ap-
plied to particular powers.
§144.
1. Of Construction in General.
Necessity for construction. — Every person
who proposes to deal with an agent, as such, must, as
has been seen, ascertain not only that authority exists,
but also that it is adequate to authorize the proposed
act. It thus becomes necessary to examine into it, and
































































































































78 CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§144-146.
to construe it, to determine whether it is broad enough
to meet the present need.
§ 145. Necessity for evidence. — It is also true that
the person who has dealt with an agent, as such, and
who desires to enforce the results against the principal,
must be prepared to prove, if it be denied, not only that
there was some authority, but also that there was such
authority as justified the act relied upon. If it becomes
necessary, therefore, to have recourse to the courts, the
plaintiff must be prepared to prove the authority, and
to show that when properly construed it justified the
act doue.
Something as to the evidence required has already
been seen in an earlier section.
§ 146. By whom construed — Court — Jury, — While
the party who deals with the agent must usually, in the
first instance, put his own construction upon the au-
thority, he must, when he comes into court, abide by
the construction which the law puts upon it.
It is the general rule that the construction of writ-
ten instruments, and the determination of the legal ef-
fect of undisputed facts, are matters for the court. If,
therefore, the authority is created by written instru-
ment, the writing must in general be produced, and
the nature and extent of the authority thereby con-
ferred will be determined by the court. So, though not
in writing, if the facts are not disputed, the court will
determine their effect; but if the facts are in dispute
it must usually be left to the jury to determine, under
proper instructions from the court, whether there was
any authority, and, if so, what was its extent.
See Loudon Savings Fund Society v. Hagerstown Savings Bank,
36 Penn. St. 498, 78 Am. Dec. 300, Cas. Ag. 371; Willcox v. Hines,
































































































































§§ 147-148.] CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. 70
§147. How construed. — In determining the sco]
and extent of the authority, the construction adopted
must be a fair and reasonable one and not a strain* -1 or
unnatural one. The authority is to be construed in
the light of the surrounding circumstances and with
the situation of the parties and thek evidenl purposes
in view. Thus, for example, though the language used
may be general, it must be limited in its application
by the specific purpose to be accomplished, and must
be confined in its operation to the principal's own pur-
poses and business.
See Camden Safe Deposit Co. v. Abbott, 44 N. J. L. 257, Cas. Ag.
376.
So a power from several jointly will not authorize
acts binding one only, nor will separate powers from
several authorize a contract binding them all jointly.
See Gilbert v. How, 45 Mian. 121, 47 N. W. Rep. 643, 22 Am. St.
Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380; Harris v. Johnston, 54 Minn. 177, 55 N. W.
Rep. 970,' 40 Am. St. Rep. 312.
§ 148. Where the authority is conferred by
an express and formal instrument, the presumption
is that the parties have put into it all the powers in-
tended to be conferred. "A formal instrument dele-
gating powers is ordinarily subjected to strict interpre-
tation, and the authority is not extended beyond that
which is given in terms, or which is necessary to carry
into effect that which is expressly given. They are
not subject to that liberal interpretation which is given
to less formal instruments, as letters of instruction,
etc., in commercial transactions, which are interpreted
most strongly against the writer, especially when they
are susceptible of two interpretations, and the agent

































































































































80 CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§148-151.
See Craighead v. Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279, 2S Am. Rep. 150, Cas.
Ag. 373. Powers of attorney are strictly construed: Hotchkiss v.
Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 32 S. E. Rep. 36, 43 L. R. A. 806; Campbell
v. Foster Home Ass'n, 163 Pa. St. 609, 30 Atl. Rep. 222, 43 Am. St.
Rep. 818; Frost v. Erath Cattle Co., 81 Tex. 505, 17 S. W. Rep. 52,
26 Am. St. Rep. 831; Gilbert v. How, 45 Minn. 121, 47 N. W. Rep.
643, 22 Am. St. Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380; Harris v. Johnston, 54 Minn.
177, 55 N. W. Rep. 970, 40 Am. St. Rep. 312.
2. Of the Construction of Particular Poicers.
§149. What here included. — It is obviously im-
possible to consider every kind of authority which may
be conferred upon an agent All that will be attempted
will be to refer to the common forms most frequently
presenting themselves.
§ 150. Authority to sell land— "When exists. — Au-
thority to sell land must be clearly conferred, and
usually, as has been seen (§64) by written instru-
ment. The power is not lightly inferred or easily de-
duced from general expressions, such as a power to
attend to "all business" or to do "all things concern-
ing" the principal's business, and the like.
See Coquillard v. French, 19 Ind. 274; Billings v. Morrow, 7 Cal.
171, 68 Am. Dec. 235; Ashley v. Bird, 1 Mo. 640, 14 Am. Dec. 313;
Hotchkiss v. Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 32 S. E. Rep. 36, 43 L. R. A. 806.
Merely placing the property in the hands of a broker
for sale, or listing it with a real estate agent, in the
ordinary way, does not amount to an authority to sell
or even to make a binding contract to sell. The only
authority ordinarily deduced in such cases is simply
to find a purchaser to whom the principal may sell.
See Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240, 6 Am. Rep. 617; Armstrong v.
Lowe, 76 Cal. 616; Stewart v. Pickering, 73 Iowa, 652, 35 N. W. Rep.
690; Stillman v. Fitzgerald, 37 Minn. 186, 33 N. W. Rep. 564; Delano
v. Jacoby, 96 Cal. 275, 31 Am. St. Rep. 201.
§ 151. What included. — Authority to actually
































































































































§§ 151-152.] CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. 81
trary is expressed, implied power to make the convex
ance; to insert the usual covenants of warranty; and to
receive so much of the purchase price as is to be paid
('own; but it does not authorize a sale upon credit, or
a mortgage, or an exchange, or a dedication to public
use, or a conveyance in payment of the agent's own
debt.
See Lyon v. Pollock, 99 U. S. 668, Cas. Ag. 378; Gilbert v. How,
45 Minn. 121, 22 Am. St. Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380; Leroy v. Beard, 8
How. (U. S.) 451, Cas. Ag. 382; Peters v. Farnsworth, 15 Vt. 155, 40
Am. Dec. 671, Cas. Ag. 387; Lumpkin v. Wilson, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 555,
Cas. Ag. 390; Campbell v. Foster Home Ass'n, 163 Pa. 609, 30 Atl.
Rep. 222, 43 Am. St. Rep. 818; Hawxhurst v. Rathgeb, 119 Cal. 531,
63 Am. St. Rep. 142; Frost v. Cattle Co., 81 Tex. 505, 17 S. W. Rep.
52, 26 Am. St. Rep. 831.
Whether it will apply to land not then owned by the
principal, but subsequently acquired by him, is in dis-
pute.
See Penfield v. Warner, 96 Mich. 179, 35 Am. St Rep. 591, and
note.
§ 152. Authority to sell personal property. — Un-
like the case of real estate, authority to sell personal
property is not ordinarily required to be conferred by
written instrument. It may be created by words or
conduct, and may be express or implied. It is the gen-
eral rule in regard to chattels, not including negotia-
ble paper, that no person can transfer a better title
than he himself has. Authority to sell is not to be
inferred from the mere fact of possession; but where
the true owner has clothed another not only with pos-
session but with the ordinary evidence of ownership,
as where he delivers to him securities endorsed in blank
or permits the title to stand in his name, he will be
estopped from asserting his title as against a bona fide
purchaser from the person so in possession.

































































































































82 CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§ 152-154.
Smith v. Clews, 105 N. Y. 283, 59 Am. Rep. 502, Cas. Ag. 396; McNeil
v. Tenth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. Rep. 341; Nixon v.
Brown, 57 N. H. 34.
§ 153. "What included. — Authority to sell
personal property carries with it, unless the contrary is
declared, implied power to agree upon the terms and
conditions of the sale; to warrant the principal's title;
to give warranties of quality if such property is usually
sold with such a warranty; and to receive so much of
the price as is to be paid at the time of the sale.
See Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin, 51 N. H. 56, 12 Am. Rep. 45;
Putnam v. French, 53 Vt. 402, 38 Am. Rep. 682; Pickert v. Marston,
68 Wis. 465, 60 A. Rep. 876, Cas. Ag. 411; Bierman v. City Mills Co.,
151 N. Y. 482, 45 N. E. Rep. 856, 56 Am. St. Rep. 635; Court v.
Snyder, 2 Ind. App. 440, 28 N. E. Rep. 718, 50 Am. St. Rep. 247.
But no implied power exists to afterwards collect
the remainder of the price; or to give credit unless that
is usual; or to exchange the property for other prop-
erty, or to mortgage or pledge the property; or to apply
it to the agent's own use; or to make any other unusual
contract.
See McKindly v. Dunham, 55 Wis. 515, 42 A. Rep. 740, Cas. Ag.
399; Hibbard v. Peek, 75 Wis. 619, Cas. Ag. 403; Billings v. Mason,
SO Me. 496, Cas. Ag. 406; Huntley v. Mathias, 90 N. C. 101, 47 Am.
Rep. 516, Cas. Ag. 408; Kane v. Barstow, 42 Kan. 465, 16 Am. St.
Rep. 400; Edwards v. Dillon, 147 111. 14, 35 N. E. Rep. 135, 37 Am.
St. Rep. 199.
An agent authorized to sell goods and who has made
a sale has thereby ordinarily no authority to after-
wards rescind the sale or agree to take back the goods.
See Diversy v. Kellogg, 44 111. 114, 92 Am. Dec. 154; Adrian v.
Lane, 13 S. C. 183. As to power of agent for sale of agricultural
implements to alter the contract made by him, see Bannon v. Ault-
man, 80 Wis. 307, 49 N. W. Rep. 967, 27 Am. St. Rep. 37; Peterson
v. Wood, M. & R. Co., 97 Iowa 148, 66 N. W. Rep. 96, 59 Am. St. Rep.
399.
§154. Authority to buy. — An agent authorized I o
































































































































§§154-155.] CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. S3
credit if not Bupplied with funds, and may make repre-
sentations as to his principal's credit for that purpc
Unless the contrary is declared lie may agree upon I
price and terms of sale within the limit of what is
usual or reasonable. He must not exceed limits openly
fixed as to the kind or amount, and he has no implied
power to make negotiable paper for the price
See Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 362;
Komorowski v. Krumdick, 56 Wis. 23, Cas. Ag. 413; Hubbard v.
Tenbrook, 124 Penn. 291, 10 Am. St. Rep. 585, 2 L. R. A. 823, Cas. Ag.
367; White v. Cooper, 3 Penn. St. 130.
§ 155. Authority to collect or receive payment.—
An agent authorized to collect can receive nothing but
money in payment. He has no implied authority to re-
lease or compromise the debt, or to extend the time, or
to receive payment before it is due.
See Cram v. Sickel, 51 Neb. 828, 66 Am. St. Rep. 478; Herring
v. Hottendorf, 74 N. C. 588; McHany v. Schenck, 88 111. 357; Law-
rence v. Johnson, 64 111. 351; Smith v. Kidd, 68 N. Y. 130, 23 Am.
Rep. 157.
Authority to receive payment is not implied merely
from the fact that the agent sold the goods for which
the money is due, or negotiated the contract or loan
upon which it is payable. In the latter case the fact
that the securities, as for example the bond and mort-
gage, are left in the possession of the agent who nego-
tiated the loan, will justify an inference of authority
to receive payments upon them, but the party paying
must see at his peril that the securities are in the pos-
session of the agent on each occasion when he pays.
Thus a traveling salesman, or "drummer," authorized to solicit
orders for goods to be sent by his principal, and who takes such an
order for goods which are so supplied, has thereby no implied power
to subsequently collect payment for them. McKindly v. Dunham,
55 Wis. 515, 42 Am. Rep. 740, Cas. Ag. 399; Janney v. Boyd, 30 Minn.
































































































































S4 CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§ 155-157.
son, 105 Ala. 344, 16 So. Rep. 884, 53 Am. St. Rep. 125; Kornemann
v. Monaghan, 24 Mich. 36. As to the implied authority of a loan
agent to receive payment, see Crane v. Gruenewald, 120 N. Y. 274,
Cas. Ag. 87; Smith v. Kidd, 68 N. Y. 130, 23 Am. Rep. 157; Double-
day v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410, 10 Am. Rep. 502; Security Co. v. Graybeal,
85 Iowa 543, 52 N. W. Rep. 497, 39 Am. St. Rep. 311.
§ 156. Authority to make negotiable paper. — Au-
thority to make or endorse negotiable paper is not to be
lightly inferred. It can be implied only when abso-
lutely necessary to the execution of the main power.
And when expressly conferred it is subject to a very
strict construction, and the agent can bind the princi-
pal only when he has acted within the precise limits of
his authority.
See Jackson v. Bank, 92 Tenn. 154, 18 L. R. A. 663, Cas. Ag. 415;
Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380, 17 Am. St. Rep. 900; King v. Sparks,
17 Ca. 285, 4 Am. St. Rep. 85, Cas. Ag. 418; Helena Nat'l Bank v.
Rocky Mt. Tel. Co., 20 Mont. 379, 63 Am. St. Rep. 628.
§ 157. Authority to manage business. — Authority
to manage the principal's business does not imply power
to make negotiable paper; or to sell the business; or to
borrow money unless absolutely necessary; or to pledge
or mortgage the principal's property; or to make any
contract not within the usual scope of the business.
See Brockway v. Mullin, 46 N. J. L. 448, 50 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag.
419; Vescelius v. Martin, 11 Colo. 391, Cas. Ag. 422; New York Mine
v. Bank, 39 Mich. 644, Cas. Ag. 423; Helena Nat. Bank v. Rocky Mt.
Tel Co. supra; Glidden & Joy Co. v. Nat. Bank, 16 C. C. A., 534, 32


































































































































§8158-159.] EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY.
CHAPTER X.
OF THE EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY.
i 158. In general.
159. Excessive or defective ex-
ecution.
160. Execution of written in-
struments.
161. Execution of sealed in-
struments.
§ 1C2. Execution of negotiable
instruments.
163. Execution of simple con-
tracts.
1G4. Parol evidence to explain.
§ 158. In general. — It is the general duty of the
agent to execute the authority in the name, and for the
benefit of the principal, and to confine his acts within
the scope of the authority conferred upon him.
It is also especially to the interest of the agent to so
execute the authority as to bind the principal and not
himself.
§ 159. Excessive or defective execution. — The exe-
cution of the authority in a given case may fail either
because the agent has neglected to fully exercise his
authority, or because he has exceeded it. A deficient
execution will ordinarily not bind the principal, though
it may so operate as to bind the agent personally. An
excessive execution will not necessarily be defective.
If there has been a complete execution of the power
and the excess can be distinguished and disregarded,
the authorized portion may be given effect.
See Thomas v. Joslin, 30 Minn. 388, Cas. Ag. 427.
The execution of the authority may also fail because
the agent has attempted something wholly beyond the
power conferred, or has undertaken to do that which
































































































































86 EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§ 159-160.
Thus a power from two jointly to deal with their
joint interests will not justify dealing with the sep-
arate interests of one only; and, conversely, a power
from several to deal with their separate interests will
not justify a contract which assumes to bind them
jointly.
See Gilbert v. How, 45 Minn. 121, 47 N. W. Rep. 643, 22 Am. St.
Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380; Harris v. Johnston, 54 Minn. 177, 40 Am. St.
Rep. 312.
§ 160. Execution of written instruments.— It is in
the execution of written instruments that question is
most likely to arise, because they show on their face
precisely what was done and are less open to explana-
tion by the surrounding circumstances. It may often
happen, therefore, that the agent may, through inad-
vertence, ignorance or mistake, so execute as to bind
his principal, or himself, or no one, even when his desire
and intention were to bind the principal.
To bind the principal, the instrument should be made
in the name of the principal and not in the name of the
agent ; the promises or undertakings should be made in
the name of the principal ; and the signature should be
that of the principal, though affixed by the hand of the
agent.
If William White is principal and Benjamin Black
is the agent, the proper signature would be: William
White, by Benjamin Black, his agent, (or, his attorney
in fact). The words his agent or his attorney in fact,
though proper and desirable, might be omitted without
destroying the effect.
On the other hand, to sign thus: Benjamin Black,
Agent, is clearly insufficient to bind the principal, but
would ordinarily bind the agent. So of a signature
thus: Benjamin Black, Agent of William White. Here
the word agent, or Agent of William White, simply
































































































































§§160-162.] EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY 87
descriptio personae. To sign Benjamin Black, Agent
for William White , is also usually regarded as insuffi-
cient to bind William While, and for the same reason.
See Hobson v. Hassett, 76 Cal. 203, 9 Am. St. Rep. 103, Cas. Ag.
442; Stinson v. Lee, GS Miss. 113, 8 So. Rep. 272, 9 L. R. A. 830,
Western Publishing House v. Murdick, 4 S. Dak. 207, 56 N. W. Rep.
120, 21 L. R. A. 671.
§ 101. Execution of sealed instruments. — The same
general considerations apply with added force to in-
struments under seal, because, of all kinds of contracts
in writing, those under seal are most inflexible and
least open to explanation by outside circumstances.
To bind the principal upon instruments under seal, the
instrument must be so executed as to show upon its face
that it is the deed of the principal ; that the covenants
are his; that he makes the grants; and that the signa-
ture and seal are his, though affixed by the agent. If
the grants and covenants are those of the agent, the
mere fact that he describes himself as "agent" will not
relieve him from personal liability, or make the act
the principal's.
See McClure v. Herring, 70 Mo. 18, 35 Am. Dec. 404, Cas. Ag. 429;
Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec. 126; Shanks v. Lancaster, 5
Gratt. (Va.) 110, 50 Am. Dec. 108; Knight v. Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22,
57 Am. Rep. 534, Cas. Ag. 434.
§ 162. Execution of negotiable instruments. — Ne-
gotiable instruments, such as promissory notes and bills
of exchange, occupy a peculiar place in our law. They
are instruments of commerce and are designed to cir-
culate freely in the transaction of business. It is highly
important that they shall be clear, definite and unam-
biguous, and shall show upon their face who are the
parties upon whose responsibility they rely. In the
execution of negotiable paper, therefore, the rule is

































































































































S8 EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§162-164.
shall show upon its face who the principal is, that it is
his promise, and that the signature is his, though made
by the hand of his agent. It is not sufficient that the
principal be named in the body of the instrument only
unless it also appears that the promise is his and that
the agent signs for him. Where no principal is thus
named, the agent will be personally liable although he
signs as "agent.''
See Hobson v. Hassett, 76 Gal. 203, 9 Am. St. Rep. 193, Cas. Ag.
442; Reeve v. Bank, 54 N. J. L. 208, 16 L. R. A. 143, Cas. Ag. 446;
Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, 17 Am. St. Rep. 171, 5 L. R. A. 496,
Cas. Ag. 448; Stinson v. Lee, 68 Miss. 113, 8 So. Rep. 272, 9 L. R. A.
830; Miller v. Roach, 150 Mass. 140, 22 N. E. Rep. 634, 6 L. R. A. 71;
Mathews v. Dubuque Mattress Co., 87 Iowa 246, 54 N. W. Rep., 225,
19 L. R. A. 676; McKensey v. Edwards, 88 Ky. 272, 10 S. W. Rep.
815, 3 L. R. A. 397; McCandless v. Belle Plaine Canning Co., 78 Iowa
161, 42 N. W. Rep. 635, 16 Am. St. Rep. 429, 4 L. R. A. 396.
§ 163. Execution of other simple contracts. — In
the case of other written contracts, the peculiar rules
applicable to sealed instruments and negotiable paper
do not apply; and while it is true that parol evidence
can not be admitted to contradict or alter the writing,
more regard is paid to the intention of the parties, and
if that is clear, and can be given effect consistently
with the terms of the instrument, it will usually con-
trol.
See Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392, 2 Myer's Fed. Dec. 170, Cas.
Ag. 452; Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28, 32 Am. St. Rep. 430,* 15
L. R. A. 509, Cas. Ag. 454.
§164. Parol evidence to explain. — In attempting
to determine the liability of the parties to an instru-
ment in writing executed by an agent, the question
constantly arises whether parol evidence may be re-
ceived to show who was intended to be the party bound.
Upon tli is question the cases seem to be in hopeless con-
































































































































§ 164. j EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY. SO
tract. In the case of instruments under seal, the rule
is that only those appearing on the face of the instru-
ment as the parties to it can be bound, or can enforce
the contract.
See Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. 617, Cas. Ag.
436.
In the case of negotiable instruments also strict rules
are usually applied. If the promise is clearly the prom-
ise of the principal or of the agent, it cannot be altered.
Parol evidence is admissible only when the paper is
ambiguous — when, for example, some portions of it look
like the promise of the principal and other portions of
it look like the promise of the agent — and when the
action, is between the original parties, or those who,
from the ambiguity or otherwise, are charged with
actual or constructive notice of the true intention.
See Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, 17 Am. St. Rep. 171, 5 L. R.
A. 496; Keidan v. Winegar, 95 Mich. 430, 54 N. W. Rep. 901, 20 L. R.
A. 705; Sparks v. Despatch Transfer Co., 104 Mo. 531, 15 S. W. Rep.
417, 12 L. R. A. 714; Society of Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed. Rep. 730,
15 C. C. A. 632; McCandless v. Belle Plaine Canning Co., 78 Iowa
161, 42 N. W. Rep. 635, 16 Am. St. Rep. 429, 4 L. R. A. 396; Peterson
v. Homan, 44 Minn. 166, 46 N. W. Rep. 303, 20 Am. St. Rep. 564;
Heffron v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, 15 Am. St. Rep. 764.
In the case of other written contracts, the rule goes
further and it may not only be shown in a doubtful cas,'
who was the person intended to be bound; but even
where the promise on its face is clearly that of the
agent, parol evidence is admissible to charge an un-
named principal — that is, to show that he also is liable
— though, not to discharge the agent. In such a case
the other party may hold either the principal or the
agent at his option.
See Higgins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & Wels. 834, Cas. Ag. 456; Hunt-
ington v. Knox, 7 Cush. 371, Cas. Ag. 587; Jones v. Williams, 139
Mo. 1, 39 S. W. Rep. 486, 61 Am. St. Rep. 436; Bulwinkle v. Cramer,

































































































































DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [§§165-166.
CHAPTEK XI.
OF THE DUTIES OF THE AGENT TO THE PRINCIPAL,
5. In general.
1. To Be Loyal to His
Trust.
166. In general.
167.* Incapacity resulting — Can-
not be agent of both,
parties.
168. — Cannot deal with him-
self.
169. Voidability of transac-
tions.
170. Further limitations.
171. Usage does not alter rule.
2. To Obey Instructions.
172. Agent must obey instruc-
tions.
173. Good faith, etc.— no ex-
cuse.
174. In what form of action
liable.
175. Sudden emergency as ex-
cuse.
176. Ambiguous instructions.
177. Effect of custom.
3. To Exercise Care.
§ 178. Duty to exercise care.
179. Special skill required in
some cases.
180. How when services gratu-
itous.
181. Negligence in loaning
money.
182. Negligence in insuring.
183. Negligence in collecting.
184. Liability for defaults of
cprrespondents.
4. To Account for Money
and Property.
185. Duty to accounts.
186. Cannot deny principal's
title, etc.
187. Duty to give notice of col-
lection.
188. Agent must not mix prin-
cipal's funds with his
own.
5. To Give Notice to His
Principal.
189. Duty to give notice.
§ 165. In general. — It is not possible to consider
here every possible duty which the agent may owe to his
principal, but the most important duties may be briefly
dealt with, and the principles given will suggest the
rules which will govern other cases.
1. To he Loyal to his Trust.
§ 1G6. In general. — It is the duty of the agent to
conduct himself with the utmost loyalty and fidelity to

































































































































§5166-167.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. 01
or permit himself to be placed in a position where hii
own interests may conflict with the interests of his
principal.
When the principal employs an agent, the law pre-
sumes that he does so in order to secure to himself the
benefits of the agent's skill, experience or discretion and
to reap the fruits of the performance of the undertak-
ing. The law presumes that he expects — and it gives
him the right to expect — that the agent so employed
will endeavor to further the principal's interests and
will use his powers for the principal's benefit. If, then,
instead of serving the principal, the agent is seeking
to serve himself, or some other person — if, instead
of promoting his principal's interests, the agent is en-
deavoring to promote his own or some other person's
interest at the expense of the principal's — the funda-
mental considerations underlying the existence of the
relation will be defeated. This the law constantly aims
to prevent
The rule, however, is one based upon the presumed
intention of the principal and is designed to protect
his interests. The principal may therefore waive the
benefit of the rule if he does so with full knowledge of
the facts. In the absence of such a waiver, the rule is
absolute.
See Levy v. Spencer, 18 Colo. 532, 36 Am. St. Rep. 303; Hofflin v.
Moss, 67 Fed. Rep. 440, 32 U. S. App. 200, 14 C. C. A. 459; Ramspeck
v. Pattillo, 104 Ga. 772, 30 S. E. Rep. 962. 69 Am. St. Rep. 197; Wild-
berger v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 72 Mias. 338, 17 So. Rep. 282, 48
Am. St. Rep. 558.
§167. Incapacity resulting — Cannot be agent
of both parties. — In order to secure the perform-
ance of this duty of the agent and to remove as far as
possible all temptation and opportunity to violate it,
































































































































92 DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [§167.
which might otherwise he harmless. Thus, as has been
already seen, the law does not ordinarily permit a per-
son to assume to become an agent where he already
has in the same transaction such an interest, either of
his own or as agent for some other person, as may pre-
vent his acting fairly toward his principal. The law
recognizes that "no man can serve two masters" and
give to each of them his undivided allegiance and sup-
port.
Where, however, the principal is fully advised of the
adverse interest, and is given an opportunity to protect
himself and to refuse to be represented by an agent
who can not give him undivided attention, and he still
is willing to employ the agent, he may do so ; and if he
does, the law holds that he has waived the benefit of the
rule.
Except with the full knowledge and consent of both
principals, therefore, a person who is already agent
of one party cannot undertake to act as agent of the
other also. If he does do so, it is not only a breach of
his duty, for which he is liable, but any transactions
entered into by the agent may be repudiated by the
principal who was ignorant of his dual agency. As has
been already seen, it is not necessary to prove actual
fraud: the undertaking to represent both parties is in
itself a fraud upon the principal's rights.
See Carr v. National Bank and Loan Co., 167 N. Y. 375, 60 N. E.
Rep. 649, 82 Am. St. Rep. 725; New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National
Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85; Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Hope Ins. Co., 8 Mo.
App. 408; Herman v. Martineau, 1 Wis. 151, 60 Am. Dec. 368.
No compensation can be recovered by an agent who
has thus been secretly in the employment of the other
party.
See Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12;

































































































































§§167-169.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. 93
Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 20 Atl. Rep. 513, 20 Am. St Rep. 931; Barry v.
Schmidt, 57 "Wis. 172, 46 Am. Rep. 35.
§ 108. Cannot deal with himself. — The saine
considerations apply where the agent is also secretly
acting in the same transaction on his own account.
Except with the full knowledge and consent of his
principal, an agent authorized to buy for his principal
cannot buy of himself; an agent authorized to sell can-
not sell to himself; an agent authorized to buy or sell
for his principal cannot buy or sell for himself; nor can
an agent take advantage of the knowledge acquired of
his principal's business to make profit for himself at
his principal's expense.
The same rule applies to leases, and other similar
transactions.
See People v. Township Board, 11 Mich. 222, Cas. Ag. 459; Davis
v. Hamlin, 108 111. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541, Cas. Ag. 461; Vallette v.
Tedens, 122 111. 607, 3 Am. St. Rep. 502; Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo.
444, 100 Am. Dec. 304.
And what the agent cannot do directly, he cannot do
indirectly, as by buying, selling, or dealing in the name
of another, but really for himself.
See Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327, 78 Am. Dec. 192, Cas. Ag.
465; Hull v. Chaffin, 54 Fed. Rep. 437, 12 U. S. App. 206, 4 C. C. A.
414.
§ 169. Voidability of transactions. — In all these
cases, the transaction is voidable at the election of the
principal. It makes no difference that the principal
has not been injured, or that the agent has given him as
good terms as anybody would, or even better terms, or
that the sale or purchase has been at the price fixed by
the principal; or that there was no bad faith or inten-
tion to defraud ; it is still voidable at the option of the
principal.


































































































































$4 DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [§§ 169-172.
466; Greenfield Savinga Bank v. Simons, 133 Mass. 415, Cas. Ag.
476; Rochester v. Leyering, 104 Ind. 562, Cas. Ag. 478
§ 170. Further limitations. — For like reasons, an
agent authorized to settle or compromise a claim
against his principal cannot buy it and enforce it him-
self; nor will an agent charged, for example, with the
duty of paying taxes, removing incumbrances, and the
like, be permitted, by neglecting his duty, to allow liens
or claims against his principal to accumulate, and then
buy or acquire the liens or claims for himself. The
agent in such a case will be deemed to hold in trust for
the principal.
See Noyes v. Landon, 59 Vt. 569; Bowman v. Officer, 53 Iowa,
640.
If the agent in discharging his duty gets a good bar-
gain or makes profits, the profit belongs to the princi-
pal, who can compel a transfer to himself.
See Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn. 6, 5 Am. St. Rep. 808; Leach
v. Railroad Co., 86 Mo. 27, 56 Am. Rep. 408, Cas. Ag. 480; Kramer
v. Winslow, 130 Pa. 484, 18 Atl. Rep. 923, 17 Am. St. Rep. 782;
Simons v. Vulcan Oil Co., 61 Pa. 202, 100 Am. Dec. 628.
§ 171. Usage does not alter rule. — The rule which
forbids the agent's dealing with himself or taking ad-
vantage of his position to make profit for himself at
the expense of his principal, cannot be defeated by any
local or temporary usage, nor does it make any differ-
ence that the agent was acting without pay.
Se« Robinson v. Mollett, L. R. 7 H. of L. 802, 14 Moak's Eng. Rep.
177; Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Prince, 50 Minn. 53, 52 N. W. Rep. 131,
36 Am. St. Rep. 626; Hunsaker v. Sturgia, 29 Cal. 142.
2. To Obey Instructions.
§ 172. Agent must obey instructions. — It is the
duty.of the agent to obey the lawful instructions of his
































































































































§§172-175.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. 96
excuse, he is liable to the principal for any loss which
he may thereby proximately sustain.
See Whitney v. Express Co., 104 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Rep. 207, Car
Ag. 484; Galigher t. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 32 L. ed. 658.
§ 173. Good faith, etc., no excuse. — The fact that
{lie agent, in disobeying the instructions, acted in good
faith, or intended to benefit the principal, is no de-
fense; nor is the fact that he was not to be paid for his
services, if he has actually entered upon the perform-
ance of his undertaking. If he has not so entered
upon its performance, then a want of consideration
would be a good defense for not undertaking the per-
formance.
See Passano v. Acosta, 4 La. 26, 23 Am. Dec. 470, Cas. Ag. 490;
Nixon t. Bogin, 26 S. C. 611, Cas. Ag. 492; Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns.
(N. Y.) 84.
§ 174. In what form of action liable. — If the
agent's breach of instructions relates merely to the
manner of doing the act, that is, if he does not do it
when or as he was directed, then the principal's action
against him will be an action on the ease for damages;
but if the agent's default has consisted in the disposi-
tion of property in a way or for a purpose not author-
ized, he is liable to the principal in an action of trover
for a conversion.
See Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522, 23 Am. Rep. 184, Cas. Ag.
486.
§ 175. Sudden emergency as excuse. — A departure
from instructions may be justified by a sudden emer-
gency not caused by the agent's fault, where there is no
time to communicate with the principal and a strict

































































































































90 DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [§§175-178.
See Foster v. Smith, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 474, 88 Am. Dec. 604;
Greenleaf v. Moody, 13 Allen (Mass.) 363; Bartlett v. Sparkman, 95
Mo. 136, 6 Am. St. Rep. 35.
§ 176. Ambiguous instructions.— And if the instruc-
tions are ambiguous, and the agent in good faith adopts
one reasonable construction, he will not be liable be-
cause the principal may have intended another. Usage
will not justify a breach of positive instructions to the
contrary.
See Leroy v. Beard, 8 How. (U. S.) 451, Cas. Ag. 382.
§ 177. Effect of custom. — It is ordinarily not only
the right but the duty of the agent to observe and com-
ply with such valid and established customs and usages
as apply to the subject matter or the performance of
his agency. Such customs and usages, however, cannot
as between the principal and the agent, overrule posi-
tive instructions to the contrary.
See Wanless v. McCandless, 38 Iowa 20; Osborne v. Rider, 62
Wis. 235.
3. To Exercise Care.
§ 178. Duty to exercise care. — It is also the duty
of the agent not to be negligent in the performance of
his duty. Negligence is the failure to exercise that
— ' r Hi r —
degree of care reasonably to be expected under the cir-
oimistances of the case — suchja degree of care as the
ordinarily prudent man would exercise under like cir-
cumstances. By accepting the employment, without
stipulating otherwise, the ageni impliedly warrants
that he possesses a competent degree of skill for the
duty, and that in performing the duty he will exercise
a reasonable degree of care, skill and diligence. He
does not agree that he will make no mistakes whatever,
































































































































§§178-180.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. 97
but he does agree that he will exercise reasonable skill,
and that he will take the usual precautions.
See Page v. Wells, 37 Mich. 415, Cas. Ag. 493; Johnson v. Martin,
11 La. Ann. 27, 66 Am. Dec. 193, Cas. Ag. 495; Nixon v. Bogin, 26
S. Car. 611, Cas. Ag. 492; Bowerman v. Rogers, 125 U. S. 585, 31
L. ed. 815; Paul v. Grimm, 165 Pa. 139, 30 Atl. Rep. 721, 44 Am. St.
Rep. 648.
§ 171). Special skill required in some cases. — There
arc many cases, however, wherein more than the skill
possessed by the ordinary man may reasonably be re-
quired. Thus, where the agent is employed in a
capacity which implies the possession and exercise of
special skill, as, for example, when an attorney at law,
a broker, etc., undertakes to do some act in the line of
his special calling, then the skill ordinarily possessed
and exercised by persons pursuing that calling may rea-
sonably be required.
See Pennoyer v. Willis, 26 Oreg. 1, 46 Am. St. Rep. 594; Craig v.
Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253; Howard v. Grover, 28 Me. 97; McNevins
v. Lowe, 40 111. 209.
More than the ordinary skill may also be reasonably
required where the agent, though perhaps not belong-
ing to any of the specially skilled classes, has in the
particular case specially undertaken to exercise ex-
traordinary skill.
See Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100, 35 N. E. Rep. 1084, 38 Am. St.
Rep. 766.
§ 180. How when services gratuitous. — When an
agent professiug special skill is employed in the line of
his calling, the fact that he was not to be paid for his
services is no excuse for not exercising such skill ; but
one serving gratuitously in other cases would not be
liable in the absence of gross negligence or bad faith.
See Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. Dec. 168; Shiells

































































































































98 DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [§§ 180-183.
Eq. 189, 53 Am. Rep. 775; First National Bank t. Ocean National
Bank, 60 N. Y. 295, 19 Am. Rep. 181; Isham r. Post, 141 N. Y. 100,
35 N. E. Rep. 1084, 28 Am. St. Rep. 766.
§ 181. Negligence in loaning money. — An agent
employed to make loans does not impliedly warrant the
safety of his loans or the solvency of the borrower, but
he will be liable for losses occurring from negligence
in loaning to irresponsible parties, or from a neglect to
obtain suitable security, or to secure and perfect the
proper evidences of the loan.
See Bank of Owensboro v. Western Bank, 13 Bush (Ky.), 526, 26
Am. Rep. 211, Cas. Ag. 206.
§ 182. Negligence in effecting insurance. — In the
same way, an agent employed to effect insurance does
not impliedly guaranty the soundness of the company
or the collection of the insurance money, but he would
be liable for a loss proximately resulting from his neg-
lect in insuring in a company not in good standing, or
in taking defective policies, or in procuring insufficient
amounts, or in ignoring the instructions of his prin-
cipal.
See Storer v. Eaton, 50 Me. 219, 79 Am. Dec. 611; Strong v. High.
2 Rob. (La.) 103, 38 Am. Dec. 195; Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, 73 111.
404; Sawyer t. Mayhew, 51 Me. 398; Brant t. Gallup, 111 111. 487, 53
Am. Rep. 638; Milburn Wagon Co. v. Evans, 30 Minn. 89.
§ 183. Negligence in collecting. — So an agent em-
ployed to make collections does not impliedly guaranty
that he will collect the money or, unless charged with
the duty of special diligence, that he will drop all other
business and attend solely to that; but he is liable for a
loss of the debt which results from his failure to exer-
cise reasonable care, skill and diligence in collecting
the money, or for a loss of the proceeds caused by
negligence or disregard of instructions in remitting it.
































































































































§§ 183-187.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL.
! n
(Term.) 425; Wilson v. Wilson. 26 Penn. Su 3J3; Foster v. Pre*.
8 Cowen (N. Y.) 108; Kerr v. Cotton, 23 Tex. 411.
§ 184. Liability for defaults of correspond-
ents. —An attorney who hikes a claim "for collection"
is liable for the defaults of his own clerks and agents,
and if he sends the claim to another attorney for col-
lection, he is liable for his defaults. Whether a bank
which undertakes to collect is liable for the default of
its correspondent banks, is disputed, but the weight of
authority is that it is so liable.
See Cummins v. Heald, 24 Kan. 600, 36 Am. Rep. 264, Cas. Ag.
247; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Third Nat Bank, 112 U. S. 276, Cas. Ag.
239; First National Bank v. Sprague, 34 Neb. 318, 51 N. W. Rep.
846, 15 L. A. R. 498; Streissguth v. National Bank, 43 Minn. 50, 44
N. W. Rep. 797, 7 L. R. A. 363; Givan v. Bank of Alexandria, —
Tenn, — , 52 S. W. Rep. 923, 47 L. R. A. 270; Minneapolis Sash and
Door Co. v. Metropolitan Bank, 76 Minn. 136, 78 N. W. Rep. 980, 44
L. R. A. 504; Kershaw v. Ladd, 34 Oreg. 375, 44 L. R. A. 236.
l/ 4. To account for Monet; and Property.
§ 185. Duty to account. — It is the duty of the agent
to keep correct accounts of his transactions, and to ac-
count to his principal for all money or properly which
comes to his hands belonging to the principal.
See Jett v. Hempstead, 25 Ark. 462, Cas. Ag. 496; Baldwin v.
Potter. 46 Vt. 402; Taul t. Edmondson, 37 Tex. 556.
§ 186. Cannot deny principal's title, etc. — lie can-
not deny his principal's title, nor can he set up the ille-
gality of the transaction in which he received the prop-
erty or money as an excuse for not accounting for it.
See Kiewert v. Rindskopf, 46 Wis. 4S1. 32 Am. Rep. 731, Cas. Ag.
497; Pittsburg Mining Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis. 307, 42 N. W. Rep.
259, 17 Am. St. Rep. 149; Peters v. Grim, 149 Pa. 163, 24 Atl. Rep.
192, 34 Am. St Rep. 599; Smith v. Blachley, 188 Pa. 550, 41 Atl. Rep.
619, 68 Am. St. Rep. 887; Floyd v. Patterson, 72 Tex. 202, 10 S. W.
Rep. 526, 13 Am. St. Rep. 787.
§ 187. Duty to give notice of collection. — Upon
































































































































100 DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [§§187-189.
already has instructions as to remitting it, should give
the principal notice of that fact within a reasonable
time, and if he has done so, the agent cannot be sued for
the money until the principal has made a demand for it
which has been refused. The agent will be liable for
interest if he fails to pay over on demand or if he fails
to give notice of the collection. The statute of limita-
tions will usually not begin to run in the agent's favor
until he has given notice of the collection, or until a de-
mand has been made upon him.
See Jett v. Hempstead, 25 Ark. 462, Cas. Ag. 496.
§ 1S8. Agent must not mix principal's funds with
his own. — The agent must not mix his principal's funds
with his own, and if he does so he will be liable for
their loss. The principal may follow and recover his
money or property, so long as he can identify it, until
it comes into the hands of a bona fide holder.
See Naltner v. Dolan, 108 Ind. 500, 58 Am. Rep. 61, Cas. Ag. 623;
Farmer's Bank v. King, 57 Penn. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215, Cas. Ag. 590;
Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E. Rep. 812, 45 Am. St. Rep. 599.
\/ 5. To give Notice to his Principal.
§ 189. Duty to give notice. — It is th e duty of the
agent to give the principal timely notice of all facts
coming to the agent's knowledge and relating to the
subject matter of the agency which it is material for
the principal to know for the protection of his interests.
This duty is not only important in itself, but it fur-
nishes the foundation for the rule, hereafter to be con-
sidered (§ 21(5), that notice to the agent is notice to
the principal.
See Devall v. Burbridge, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 305, Cas. Ag. 499;
ITenry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1, 45 N. E. Rep. 355, 36 L. R. A. 658; Amer-
ican Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 977; Enos v. St.
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CHAPTER XII.
OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE AGENT TO THIRD
PERSONS.
§ 190. In general.
I. LIABILITY IN CONTRACT.
191. What cases may occur.
1. Where he makes a con-
tract without authority.
192. Basis of liability.
193. How want of authority
may arise.
194. What forms present them-
selves.
195. Liability of agent.
196. In what form of action
liable.
197. When liable on the con-
tract itself.
198. Limitations.
2. Where there was no re-
sponsible principal.
199. Agent liable if no princi-
pal in existence.
200. Principal dead.
3. Where agent pledges
his personal responsi-
bility.
201. Agent may bind himself.
202-203. Effect of not disclos-
ing existence or name
of principal.
§ 190. In general. — The ordinary purpose of the
agent is to bring his principal into relations and obliga-
tions to third persons, but not to bind or obligate him-
self. He may, however, so conduct himself — usually
unintentionally but sometimes by design— as to incur
§ 204. Agent of foreign principal.
205. Presumption that princi-
pal was to be bound.
206. Presumption stronger in
case of public agent.
4. Where Agent Has Obtained
Money From Third Per-
son.
207. When money voluntarily
paid by mistake may be
recovered.
208. Money obtained illegally.
5. Where Agent Has Received
Money For Third Person.
209. Money delivered to agent
by principal for third
person.
II. IN TOBT.
210. Agent not liable in tort
for breach of duty ow-
ing to principal alone.
211. Non-feasance — Mis-feas-
ance.

































































































































102 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§ 190-193.
such a liability. This liability, under varying circum-
stances, may be either (1) in contract or (2) in tort
I. LIABILITY IN CONTRACT.
§ 191. What cases may occur. — The agent may
make himself liable to third persons in contract,
either —
(1) Where he makes a contract without authority;
(2) Where he contracts in the name of a principal
having no legal existence;
(3) Where, though authorized to bind his principal
he expressly pledges his personal responsibility;
(4) Where he has obtained money for his principal
from the third person;
- (5) Where he has received money from his prin-
cipal for the third person.
Each of these cases will be separately considered.
1. Where he makes a Contract icithout Authority.
§ 192. Basis of liability. — A person who assumes as
agent for another to make a contract with a third per-
son, impliedly if not expressly represents that he is au-
thorized by his principal to make the contract as he
does; and if it proves to be unauthorized the assumed
agent will be liable to the third person for the loss sus-
tained by the latter from the failure of the contract.
See Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. 311, 47 Am. Rep. 718, Cas. Ag.
501; Farmers' Co-operative Trust Co. v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 26
N. E. Rep. 110, 21 Am. St. Rep. 846; Wallace v. Bentley, 77 Cal. 19,
18 Pac. Rep. 788, 11 Am. St Rep. 231; Adams v. Fraser, 82 Fed. Rep.
211, 27 C. C. A. 108.
§ 193. How want of authority may arise. — His
want of authority may result either, first, because he
never possessed it ; second, because once having had it,
it has since expired; or, third, because, while having
































































































































§§ 193-196.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 1 08
in a certain way, he has exceeded his authority, or
failed to observe the manner prescribed.
§ 194. What forms present themselves. — His liabil-
ity for acting without authority may arise in one of
four classes of cases:
1. Where an agent erroneously believing himself
authorized, makes an express representation as to his
authority.
2. Where an agent, knowing that he is not author-
ized, makes an express representation as to his au-
thority.
3. Where an agent, erroneously believing himself
authorized, makes no express representation, but as-
sumes to act as one having authority.
4. Where an agent, knowing that he has no author-
ity, makes no express representation, but assumes to
act as one authorized.
§ 195. Liability of agent. — In all of these cases the
agent will be liable to the third person with whom he
deals for injury which such person naturally and proxi-
mately sustains by reason of the act's being unauthor-
ized.
See Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. 311, 47 Am. Rep. 718, Cas. Ag.
501; Simmons v. More, 100 N. Y. 140, Cas. Ag. 505; Farmers' Co-
operatire Trust Co. v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 26 N. E. Rep. 110, 21
Am. St. Rep. 847; Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. (S. Car.) L.
87. 51 Am. Dec. 659; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411. 37 L. ed. 790.
It is not at all necessary to the liability of the agent
that he should have acted in bad faith, although that
fact may affect the form or the extent of his liability.
Even where in good faith he believes he has authority
to make the contract, but has not, he is nevertheless
liable. WTiere a loss must fall upon one of two inno-
cent persons he must bear it by whose act, however
































































































































104 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§ 195-198.
See Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, supra; Farmers' Co-operative
Trust Co. v. Floyd, supra; Dale v. Donaldson Lumber Co., 48 Ark.
188, 3 Am. St. Rep. 224.
§ 196. In what form of action liable. — The liabil-
ity of the agent may, according to the facts, be enforced
either in an action of tort or of contract.
Where the agent, knowing that he is unauthorized,
has made express representations as to his authority;
and also where he has assumed to act, knowing that he
is unauthorized, an action on the ease for the deceit
is an appropriate remedy.
Where, however, the agent acted in good faith, an
action based upon the express or implied warranty of
authority would be the appropriate remedy.
And even in the former cases where the action for
deceit might be maintained, the party injured may, at
his option, ignore or waive the element of deceit and
base his action upon the express or implied warranty.
§ 197. When liable on the contract itself. — It has
sometimes been held that an agent who makes a con-
tract without authority is liable upon the contract it-
self, as though originally made by him as principal; but
the better rule is that the agent is liable on the contract
itself only in those cases in which the contract contains
apt words to bind him personally, or in which he has
pledged his personal responsibility. In other cases the
action should be, not on the contract, but on the express
or implied warranty of authority.
See Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am. Rep. 178, Cas.
Ag. 507; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec. 429; McCurdy
v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197, 91 Am. Dec. 468; Thilmany v. Iowa Paper Bag
Co., 108 Iowa, 357, 75 Am. St. Rep. 259.
§ 198. Limitations.— But to make the agent liable in
































































































































§§ 198-199.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 1 05
been enforceable against the principal if the agent had
been authorized to make it.
See Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467.
There is no implied warranty by the agent that the
principal has authority to make the contract. "He
simply covenants that he has authority to act for his
principal, not that the act of the principal is legal and
binding."
See Thilmany v. Iowa Paper Bag Co., 108 Iowa 357, 75 Am. St.
Rep. 259.
If the agent makes no express representation as to
his authority, and fully and fairly discloses to the other
party all the circumstances connected with it, so that
the other party can judge for himself whether the agent
is authorized, the agent will not be liable.
See Thilmany v. Iowa Paper Bag Co., supra.
2. Where there was no responsible Principal.
§ 199. Agent liable if no principal in existence. —
For reasons analogous to those referred to in the pre-
ceding sections, one who assumes to act as agent for a
principal having no legal existence — as, for example, a
committee, a voluntary society, an alleged corporation
whose corporate existence has failed or expired, and
the like — must usually be personally liable. There is
no principal to be held, it was clearly the intention that
some one should be bound, and the responsibility for
the contract must ordinarily fall upon the pretended
agent.
This liability, as in the preceding cases, may be upon
the contract itself where it contains apt words to create
such a liability, or upon the express or implied war-
ranty of the existence of a principal.
































































































































106 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§ 199-201.
the pretended agent acted in good faith : even if he were
entirely innocent the responsibility must still fall upon
him.
See Lewis v. Tilton, 61 Iowa 220, 52 Am. Rep. 436, Cas. Ag. 510;
Clark r. O'Rourke, 111 Mich. 108, 66 Am. St. Rep. 389; Fredenhall v.
Taylor, 26 Wis. 286; Winona Lumber Co. v. Church, 6 S. Dak. 498;
Lawler t. Murphy, 58 Conn. 294, 20 Atl. Rep. 457, 8 L. R. A. 113;
Codding v. Munson. 52 Neb. 580, 72 N. W. Rep. 846, 66 Am. St. Rep.
524.
§ 200. Principal dead. — This rule, however, does
not, it is held, apply in a case wherein, while there has
been a responsible principal, he has, without the knowl-
edge of the agent or the other party, died before the
contract in question was made. The death of the prin-
cipal is usually a fact equally within the knowledge of
both parties, and, if so, the agent cannot be deemed
guilty of a wrong or omission in failing to know of it.
See Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & Wels. 1.
3. Where Agent pledges his personal Responsibility.
§ 201. Agent may bind himself. — The agent may
also make himself liable in many cases where, though
authorized to make the particular contract in question,
he makes it in such a manner as not to bind the princi-
pal. Thus, though he intended to bind the principal, he
may inadvertently or intentionally use such words as to
bind himself personally, and if he does so, he may be
held personally responsible. The very common cases,
already referred to, wherein an agent, though intend-
ing to bind his principal, has signed a contract in hi«
own name with the word "agent," "trustee," and the
like added, are excellent illustrations of this rule.
See ante § 161; Hobson v. Hassett, 76 Cal. 203, 9 Am. St. Rep.
































































































































§§ 201-203.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 107
Knickerbocker v. Wilcox, 83 Mich. 200, 47 N. W. Rep. 123, 21 Am.
St. Rep. 595.
§ 202. Effect of not disclosing existence or name
of principal. — So, for the obvious reason that he din-
closes no one else to be bound and must be presumed to
intend to bind some one, the agent who conceals the
fact of his agency or the name of his principal, and con-
tracts as the ostensible principal, will be personally
liable.
See Amans t. Campbell, 70 Minn. 493, 68 Am. St. Rep. 547; Bald-
win r. Leonard, 39 Vt. 260, 94 Am. Dec. 324; Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y.
348, 27 Am. Rep. 51; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411, 37 L. ed. TV
xVn agent who would escape personal responsil
must disclose both the fact of his agency and the nan:,
of his principal at the time of making the contract, and
the subsequent disclosure of the principal J$J|j Hot be
sufficient to relieve the agent.
See Cobb r. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 34S, 27 Am. Rep. $$,
In many of these cases wherein the principal is un-
disclosed, the principal himself, as will be seen her
after, may be so held liable when discovered; but the
fact that he may be held responsible doesi not relieve
the agent; it simply gives the other party an option to
pursue the one or the other as he pleases.
i
See post § 243.
§ 203. The converse of the rule laid down in the
preceding section is, of course, true. If the agent
makes a full disclosure of the fact of his agency and of
the name of his principal, and contracts only as agent
and for the principal so disclosed, he incurs no personal
responsibility.
































































































































108 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§204-206.
§ 204. Agent of foreign principal. — It was former-
ly the rule that an agent who acted for a foreign prin-
cipal was himself personally liable, because it must be
presumed that credit was given to the agent rather
than to the foreign and inaccessible principal ; but this
rule no longer prevails in this country, and the agent
of a foreign principal stands upon the same ground as
the agent of a domestic principal.
See Maury v. Ranger, 38 La. Ann. 485, 58 Am. Rep. 197; Oelrieks
v. Ford. 64 U. S. (23 How.) 49.
§ 205. Presumption that principal was to be bound.
— Where dealings are had with the agent of a known
principal," the presumption will be that credit was given
to the principal, and that the principal, rather than the
agent, was to be bound; but this presumption may be
rebutted by evidence of an intention to bind the agent
personally.
See Moline Malleable Iron Co. v. York Iron Co., 27 C. C. A. 442,
53 U. S. App. 580, 83 Fed. Rep. 66.
§206. Presumption stronger in case of public
agent. — In the case of a public agent, the presumption
that the agent was not to be personally bound is
stronger than in the case of a private agent ; and a
known public agent will only be held personally bound
where the evidence is very clear of an intention so to
bind him ; and a public agent who discloses the source
of his authority, and is guilty of no fraud or misrepre-
sentation, is not liable upon an implied warranty of
authority; because his authority is a matter of public
law or record, which the other party must examine for
himself.
See McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197, 91 Am. Dec. 468; Knight v.
































































































































85 207-209.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 109
4. Where Agent has obtained Money from third
Person.
§ 207. When money voluntarily paid by mistake
may be recovered. — Where money has, by mistake, been
voluntarily paid to an agent for the use of his prin-
cipal, the agent will not be liable to the person paying
it, if, before notice of the mistake, he has paid it over
to his principal, but he will be liable if he pays it over
after notice.
So an agent who receives money by mistake on ac-
count of his principal, will not be liable where, before
notice of the mistake, his situation has so changed that
he will be prejudiced if the payment is held invalid.
See Herrick v. Gallagher, 60 Barb. 566, Cas. on Ag. 512; Smith
v. Binder, 75 111. 492.
If, however, the agency were not known, the agent
will be liable even though he has paid the money to his
principal.
See Smith v. Kelly, 43 Mich. 390.
§ 208. Money obtained illegally.— An agent who has
obtained money from third persons illegally, as by com-
pulsion or extortion, will be liable to the person paying
it, although he has paid it over to his principal.
See Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 201. 6 Am. Dec. 2T1;
Grover v. Morris, 73 N. Y. 473.
5. Where Agent has rewired Money for third Person.
§ 209. Money delivered to agent by principal for
third person. — Where money has been delivered to an
agent by the principal to be paid to a third person, the
principal may countermand the order to pay, and re-
































































































































110 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§209-211.
agent has either paid it over to the third person, or
assumed an obligation to such third person to pay it.
See Williams t. Everett, 14 East 582.
Whether the third person may sue for and recover it
from the agent is not certain. It is held in many cases
that a person for whose benefit a contract was made
but who was not a party to it, cannot maintain an
action at law upon it. Other cases recognize the right
of the beneficiary under a contract, though not a
party to it, to sue upon and enforce it.
See the exhaustive note upon thiB subject in 71 Am. St. Rep.
176. Also 25 L. R. A. 257; 39 Am. St. Rep. 531; 9 Am. Dec. 155;
3 Am. Dec. 305.
II. IN TORT.
5 210. Agent not liable in tort for breach of
duty owing to principal alone. — An agent is not lia-
ble in tort to third persons who have received injury
because of the agent's failure to perform some duty
which he owed to his principal alone. Thus, one who
purchases real estate in reliance upon an opinion as to
its title given to the vendor by the latter's attorney, or
who purchases a mortgage upon the strength of a
search made by the attorney of the original mortgagee,
cannot recover of the attorney if the title proves de-
fective or the search incomplete.
See Savings Bank v. 'Ward, 100 U. S. 195; Dundee Mortg. Co. v.
Hughes, 20 Fed. Rep. 39; Houseman v. Girard Ass'n, 81 Penn. St.
256; Fish t. Kelly, 17 Com. B. (N. S.) 194.
§ 211. Non-feasance — Mis-feasance. — While it is
thus true that the agent is not liable to third persons for
the breach of a duty owing solely to his principal, there
are many cases wherein he will at the same time incur
































































































































§211.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 11]
with the custody and control of property, while he may
owe duties respecting it to his principal, is at the same
time under an obligation not to permit the property so
controlled by him to cause injury to third persons. An
agent given possession and control of a horse may be
under a duty to his principal not to injure the horse by
overdriving, but he is also under a duty to third per-
sons not to injure them while overdriving the horse.
So an agent given the charge and control of real estate
and charged with the duty of keeping it in repair, owes
a duty to his principal that the latter shall not suffer
from his neglect in making repairs, but he may also owe
a duty to third persons to see that they do not suffer
loss by reason of his failure to keep the property in
suitable repair. Where the agent thus owes a duty
to third persons, he will be liable to them for injuries
caused by his failure to perform the duty owing to
them, even though he may also be liable to his principal
for the neglect of the duty which he owed to him. The
breach of the duty owing to the principal, where it con-
sists in not doing something which he ought to do, is
often termed non-feasance; the breach of the duty ow-
ing to third persons not to injure them by the same act
or omission which causes injury to his principal, is
sometimes termed tnis-feasancr.
The fact that the agent may thus owe a duty to third
persons as well as to his principal seems sometimes to
have been overlooked.
See Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 436,
Cas. Ag. 514; Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437,
Cas. Ag. 518; Baird v. Shipman, 132 111. 16, 22 Am. St. Rep. 504;
Campbell t. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Ellis
v. McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237, 42 N. W. Rep. 1113, 15 Am. St. Rep.
308; Mayer r. Building Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. Rep. 620, 28 L.
R. A. 433; Greenberg v. Whiteonib Lumber Co. 90 Wis. 225, 63 N.
































































































































112 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§ 211-213.
yon-Connell Com. Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. Rep. 358, 44 L. R. A.
508.
Compare notes in 22 Am. St. Rep. 512; 48 Am. St. Rep. 923 et
seq.; 28 L. R. A. 433.
§ 212. Trespass — Conversion. —An agent who
wrongfully enters upon another's land, or wrongfully
takes or detains or sells the goods of another, is liable
to the owner for the trespass or the conversion, even
though he acted in good faith, supposing the property
to be that of his principal, or although he did so by the
direction of his principal supposing that the principal
was authorized to give the directions. The fact that he
has delivered to his principal the property taken, or has
paid over to his principal the proceeds of property
wrongfully sold by his direction, is immaterial. No
one can escape the consequences of his wrongful act by
alleging that he did it as the agent of another.
See Spraights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y. 441, 100 Am. Dec. 452; Miller
v. Wilson, 98 Ga. 567, 58 Am. St Rep. 319; Kimball v. Billings, 55
Me. 147, 92 Am. Dec. 581; Wing v. Milliken, 91 Me. 387, 40 Atl. Rep.
138, 64 Am. St. Rep. 238; Nunnelly v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn.
397, 29 S. W. Rep. 361, 28 L. R. A. 421; Swim v. Wilson. 90 Cal. 126,
27 Pac. Rep. 33, 25 Am. St Rep. 110; Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass.
357, 33 N. E. Rep. 391, 35 Am. St. Rep. 495.
§ 213. How sued. — The agent may be sued alone,
or, in some cases, jointly with his principal.
See Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78;
Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 67 Wis. 495; Campbell v. Portland Sugar
Co., 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Mulchey v. Methodist Society, 12b
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CHAPTER XIII.
OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL TO
THE AGENT.
§ 214. In general.
1. The Payment of Com-
pensation.
215. The right to have com-
pensation.
216. The amount of compensa-
tion.
217. When compensation
deemed to be earned.
— Where authority ter-









221. Where authority right-
fully revoked.
222. Where authority termi-
nated by operation of
law.
§ 223. Where agent abandons
his. undertaking.
224. Where agent acted for
two principals.
225. Where agent violated his
trust.
Where agency unlawful.
Where extra duties re-
quired.




230. Agent's right to re-im-
bursement.
231. Agent's right to indem-
nity.






§214. In general. — The chief duties of the princi-
pal to the agent are (1) to pay him his compensation,
and (2) to indemnify him against loss or injury sus-
tained in the performance of his duty.
1. The Pay men t of Compensation.
§ 215. The right to have compensation. — The
agent's right to compensation may be determined by
the contract of the parties, or be implied by law. Where
the parties have expressly agreed that the agent shall
or shall not be entitled to compensation, their agree-
































































































































114 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [§§ 215-216.
An express agreement to pay is not usually neces-
sary. As a rule, wherever services have been rendered
by one person at the express request of another, the law
will imply a promise by the latter to pay for them.
See Bradford v. Kimberly, 3 Johns. Ch. 431, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 866,
Cas. Ag. 523.
But no promise to pay will be implied where the
parties are near relatives or others who are members
of the same family;
See Harris v. Smith, 79 Mich. 54, 6 L. R. A. 702; Murphy v. Mui
phy, 1 S. Dak. 316, 9 L. R. A. 820.
or where the services were rendered as a mere act ol
kindness, or upon the hope or expectation, merely, that
they would be paid for.
See Chadwick v. Knox, 31 N. H. 226, 64 Am. Dec. 329; Wood v.
Ayres, 39 Mich. 345, 33 Am. Rep. 396.
Though the act when done was unauthorized, its sub-
sequent ratification will give the agent the same right
to compensation as though it had been previously au-
thorized.
See Wilson v. Dame, 58 N. H. 392, Cas. Ag. 526.
§216. The amount of compensation. — Where the
parties have agreed upon the amount of compensation
to be paid, the agreement will usually be conclusive.
See Wallace v. Floyd, 29 Pa. St. 184, 72 Am. Dec. 620, Cas. Ag.
525; Hamilton v. Frothingham, 59 Mich. 253; Jefferson v. Burhans,
29 C. C. A. 481, 58 U. S. App. 586, 85 Fed. Rep. 949.
Where no amount is agreed upon, the law will imply
a promise to pay the usual sum, if there be one, and if
not then to pay what the services are reasonably worth.
See McCrary v. Ruddlck, 33 Iowa 521; Millar v. Cuddy, 43 Mich.
273, 38 Am. Rep. 181.
































































































































5§ 216-217.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 115
ably worth, the opinions of witnesses who arc familiar
with the subject may be received.
See Eggleaton v. Boardman, 37 Mich. Ji; Bowen v. Bowen, 74
Ind. 470; Johnson y. Thompson, 72 Ind. 167, 07 Am. Rep. 152.
§ 217. When compensation deemed to be earned.
— The parties may agree upon the time when the com-
pensation shall be due, and if they so fix the time, th
agreement will be conclusive. In the absence of such
an agreement, however, the agent's compensation will
not usually be considered to be earned until he has
fully completed his undertaking.
If the agent has done all that he undertook to do, he
is entitled to his compensation even though the prin-
cipal received no benefit, or failed or refused to avail
himself of the advantages secured. Thus a broker em-
ployed to effect a sale of property is entitled to his com-
mission when he has found a purchaser ready, willing
and able to buy on the proposed terms, even though I
principal does not, or cannot, through defective title or
otherwise, complete the sale.
See post § ; Gelatt v. Ridge, 117 Mo. 553, 23 S. W. Rep. 8S2,
38 Am. St. Rep. 683; Barthell t. Peter, 88 Wis. 316, 60 N. W. Rep.
429, 43 Am. St. Rep. 906; Wray v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. 271, 27 Pac. Rep.
248, 25 Am. St. Rep. 265; Wilson v. Mason, 158 111. 304, 42 N. E. Rep.
134, 49 Am. St Rep. 162.
It is entirely competent for the parties to agree that
the agent shall be paid only in case he accomplishes a
certain result; and if, without the fault of the princi-
pal, he fails to accomplish that result, he will not be
entitled to any compensation.
See Hale r. Kumler, 29 C. C. A. 67, 54 U. S. App. 685, 85 Fed.
Rep. 161; Idler v. Borgmeyer, 13 C. C. A. 198, 65 Fed. Rep. 910;
Mattingly v. Pennie. 105 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. Rep. 200, 45 Am. St. Rep.

































































































































116 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [§§ 218-219.
§ 218. Where authority terminated by princi-
pal. — Where the employment was merely at will, and
not for a definite time, the principal may terminate it
at any time; in which case the agent will be entitled to
compensation for any services which he has already per-
formed, and which the principal has accepted. The
principal cannot, however, revoke the authority to es-
cape payment of compensation where the undertaking
has been substantially performed, and the agent is upon
the very point of completing it.
See Sibbald v. The Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 441, Cas.
Ag. 301; Warren Chemical Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 586, 23 N. E.
Rep. 908, 16 Am. St. Rep. 788.
§ 219. Where authority wrongfully revoked.
— Where the agent has been employed for a definite
time, and his authority is wrongfully revoked before
that time has expired, he has usually his choice of three
remedies:
1. He may treat the contract as rescinded, and
bring an action at once to recover without reference to
the contract, the reasonable value of the services al-
ready rendered, less any amount already paid him.
2. He mav treat the contract as in force but
broken, and bring an action at once to recover damages
for the probable loss which he has sustained by its vio-
lation — i. e., the damages based upon the reasonable
expectation of his finding other employment.
3. He mav treat the contract as in force but broken
and wait until the expiration of the term, and then re-
cover damages for the actual loss which he has sus-
tained by its violation.
He cannot pursue all of these remedies, and a recov-
ery upon one will bar a recovery upon another.
See Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285, Cas. Ag. 526;
































































































































§§219-221.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 117
stead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 27 Atl. Rep. 501, 44 Am. St. Rep. 273, Cas.
Damages, 464; Boland v. Glendale Quarry Co., 127 Mo. 520, 30 S. W.
Rep. 151, Cas. Damages, 468; Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 71 Am.
St. Rep. 384; James v. Allen Co., 44 Ohio St. 226, 58 Am. Rep. 821.
In Alabama and a few other States, there may be a recovery of
wages on the theory of constructive service. Liddell v. Chidester,
84 Ala. 508, 4 So. Rep. 426, 5 Am. St. Rep. 387, Cas. Ag. 535, Mechem's
Cases on Damages, 460. In Minnesota a peculiar ruling is made
permitting much the same result as that reached in Alabama, though
upon a different theory. McMullan v. Dickinson Co., 60 Minn. 156,
51 Am. St. Rep. 511, 62 N. W. Rep. 120, Mechem's Cas. on Damages,
462. But the weight of authority is opposed to these views, and
permits a recovery of damages for breach of contract only. See
cases cited above.
§ 220. Agent's duty to mitigate his damage.
— It is the duty of an agent wrongfully discharged be-
fore the expiration of his term, to use reasonable dili-
gence to obtain other employment of a like kind, and
thus reduce his damage as far as possible; but he is
not obliged to take employment of a different kind, or
go to a different place to find it.
See Harrington v. Gies, 45 Mich. 374; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala.
299, 38 Am. Rep. 8; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64, Cas. Damages
458.
The burden of proof is upon the employer to show
that the agent might have found such other employ-
ment and failed to do so.
See Farrell v. School District, 98 Mich. 43; Allen v. Whitlark, 99
Mich. 492.
§221. "Where authority rightfully revoked —
Where, though employed for a definite term, the agent's
authority has been rightfully revoked before the expira-
tion of that term, as because of his misconduct or
breach of duty, it is held, in many cases, that he cannot
recover anything. Where his misconduct was treach-
erous, wilful or malicious, this holding is doubtl
































































































































118 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [§§ 221-223.
if, notwithstanding his misconduct, his services have
been of some substantial value to the principal, over
aud above the damage sustained by the principal from
his misconduct, the agent may recover such excess.
See Wadsworth v. Adams, 138 U. S. 380, 34 L. ed. 984; Sea v.
Carpenter, 16 Ohio 412; Vennum v. Gregory, 21 Iowa 326; Branuan
v. Strauss, 75 111. 234; Sumner v. Reicheniker, 9 Kan. 320. See
also Massey v. Taylor, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 447; Lawrence r. Gullifer,
38 Me. 532; Carroll v. Welch, 26 Tex. 147.
§ 222. Where authority terminated by operation
of law. — Where the authority is terminated by opera-
tion of law — as by reason of the death or insanity of
one of the parties — no damages for the revocation can
ordinarily be recovered.
See Griggs v. Swift, 82 Ga. 392, 14 Am. St. Rep. 176, 5 L. R. A.
405, Cas. Ag. 537. But compare Hughes v. Gross, 166 Mass. 61, 55
Am. St. Rep. 375.
§ 223. Where agent abandons his undertaking. —
— Where the agent abandons his undertaking, and the
employment was at will, merely, he may recover for the
services already rendered. If, however, having agreed
to serve for a definite time, the agent abandons his un-
dertaking without cause, before the expiration of that
time, it is held, in many cases, that he can recover
nothing. But a more liberal rule prevails in many
States, which enables the agent, in such cases, to recover
the reasonable value of the services rendered, not ex-
ceeding the contract price, after deducting damages for
whatever loss the principal may have sustained by
reason of the abandonment.
See Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267, 13 Am. Dec. 425, Mechem'a Cas.
Damages, 470; Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462, 43 Am. Rep. 719;
Timberlake v. Thayer, 71 Miss. 279, 24 L. R. A. 231 and note; Brit-
ton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713, Mechem's Cas. Dam-
































































































































§§ 223 226.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 119
Iowa 6G; Pan ell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209; Duncan v. Baker, 21
Kan. 99; Carroll v. Welch, 26 Tex. 147; Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79, 58
Am. Dec. 618; Downey v. Burke, 23 Mo. 228; Steeples v. Newton, 7
Orug. 110. UIJ Am. Rep. 705.
§ 224. Where agent acted for two principals. —
— Where an agent, without the full knowledge and con-
sent of both principals, has assumed to act as agent for
both parties in the same transaction, the law docs not
permit him to recover compensation from either party;
but he may have compensation from both parties if his
double employment was known and assented to by both
principals.
See Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396, 41 Am. Rep. 528, Cas. Ag.
538; Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12; Mc-
Donald v. Maltz, 94 Mich. 172, 53 N. W. Rep. 1058, 34 Am. St. Rep.
331; Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 20 Atl. Rep. 513, 20 Am. St. Rep. 931.
If the commissions have been paid in ignorance of the double
agency, they may be recovered. Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. 25, 21
Atl. Rep. 793, 12 L. R. A. 395; Jansen v. Williams, 36 Neb. 869, 55
N. W. Rep. 279, 20 L. R. A. 207.
The case in which the agent, e. g., a broker, was acting as a mere
"middle-man," is also an exception to the rule forbidding compensa-
tion from both principals. See post § 259.
§ 225. Where agent violated his trust. — An agent
who is guilty of fraud or betrays his trust or violates
his duty by allowing his own interests to interfere with
those of his principal, cannot recover compensation.
See ante § 167; McKinley v. Williams, 20 C. C. A. 312, 36 U. S.
App. 749, 74 Fed. Rep. 94; Hofflin v. Moss, 14 C. C. A. 450. 32 U. S. App.
200, 67 Fed. Rep. 440; Shaeffer v. Blair, 149 U. S. 218, 37 L. ed. 721;
Hall v. Grambill, 34 C. C. A. 190, 92 Fed. Rep. 32.
§ 220. Where agency unlawful.— The agent cannot
recover compensation for the doing of that which was
unlawful to be done. Thus a broker unlawfullv doing
business without a license cannot recover commissions.

































































































































11*0 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [§§ 226-230.
gambling transactions or unlawful dealings in "fu-
tures," cannot recover commissions.
See ante § 33; Buckley v. Huruason, 50 Minn. 195, 52 N. W. Rep.
385, 36 Am. St. Rep. 637, 16 L. R. A. 423; Venning v. Yount, 62 Kan.
217, 61 Pac. Rep. 803, 50 L. R. A. 103; Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass.
1, 22 N. E. Rep. 49, 5 L. R. A. 200; Pope v Hanke, 155 111. 617, 40
N. E. Rep. 839, 28 L. R. A. 568; Jemison v. Citizens' Sav. Bank,
122 N. Y. 135, 25 N. E. Rep. 264, 9 L. R. A. 708.
§227. "Where extra duties required. — An agent
employed at a regular salary cannot recover extra com-
pensation because additional duties of the same kind
are required of him, unless there was an express prom-
ise to pay such extra compensation.
See Ross v. Hardin, 79 N. Y. 84; Pew v. Gloucester Bank, 130
Mass. 391.
§ 22S. Where agent holds over. — Where an agent
has been serving at a fixed compensation for a definite
period, and continues after the expiration of that pe-
riod without any new contract, the law will presume
that he has continued for another like period, and at
the same compensation.
See Wallace v. Floyd, 29 Pa. 184, 72 Am. Dec. 620, Cas. Ag. 525;
Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 84 Ga. 714, 8 L. R. A. 410, Cas. Ag. 273.
§229. Recoupment by principal. — In an action
brought by the agent for the recovery of his compensa-
tion, the principal may recoup any damages he may
have sustained by reason of the agent's failure to per-
form his duty in the execution of his authority.
See Nashville R. R. Co. v. Chumley, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 327; Mobil*
Ry. Co. v. Clanton, 59 Ala. 392, 31 Am. Rep. 15.
2. Rc-irnbursement and Indemnity of Agent.
§230. Agent's right to re-imbursement. — The
agent is entitled to be re-Jiul.iirsed by the principal
































































































































§§230-232.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 121
made in the course of hia employment, on account of or
for the benefit of his principal, if they were properly
and reasonably incurred, and were not rendered neces-
sary by the default of the agent.
See Merrill v. Rokes, 4 C. C. A. 433, 12 U. S. App. 183, 54 Fed.
Rep. 450; Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 37 L. ed. 819; Perin v. Par-
ker, 126 111. 201, 18 N. E. Rep. 747, 2 L. R. A. 336.
§231. Agent's right to indemnity. — The agent is
also entitled to be indemnified by the principal for any
loss or liability which the agent may sustain by reason
of his performing, at the direction of the principal, any
act which is not manifestly illegal and wjiich the agent
did not know to be wrong. In such cases the law im-
plies a promise by the principal to indemnify the agent.
See Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 37 L. ed. 819.
§232. None where act unlawful. — But no
promise to indemnify will be implied, and even an ex-
press promise will not be enforced, if the act was one
which the agent knew or must be presumed to have
known was unlawful.
See Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633, 34 Ala. 147, 73 Am. Dec. 44S;
Coventry v. Barton, 17 Johns. 142, 8 Am. Dec. 376; D'Arcy v. Lyle,
5 Binney 441, Cas. Ag. 542; Pope t. Hanke, 155 111. 617. 40 N. E.
Rep. 839. 28 L. R. A. 568; Jemison v. Citizens Sar. Bank, 122 N. Y.

































































































































DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON.
[§ 233.
CHAPTER XIV.




234. "What questions arise.
I. LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S CON-
TRACTS.
235. In general.
a. The disclosed principal.
236-237. Principal liable, when.
b. The liability of the un-
disclosed principal.
238. In general.
239. Real principal liable
when discovered.
240. Exceptions.
241. When right to be exer-
cised.
242. To what contracts rule
applies.
243. Agent also remains liable.
II. RESPONSIBILITY FOR AGENT'S
STATEMENTS, ETC.
244-245. What statements, etc.,
bind the principal.
III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAT-
TERS BROUGHT TO KNOWL-
EDGE OF AGENT.
§ 246-247. When notice to agent
is notice to principal.
248. Basis of rule.
249. Notice to sub-agent.
250. Notice to one of several
agents.
251. Notice to agents of cor-
porations.
IV. LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S
TORTS AND CRIMES.





259. Principal's liability for
agent's criminal acts.
§ 233. In general. — This subdivision of the general
subject is naturally one of the most important ones. It
certainly is the one most frequently arising. The rea-
son for this is obvious. The very purpose of the crea-
tion of the agency is to enable the principal to put the
agent forward to act, contract, speak, deal and be dealt
with, in the place and stead of the principal in person.
The question, therefore, of the liability which the prin-
cipal incurs while thus acting through the intervention

































































































































§§234-236.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 123
§234. What questions arise. — This question of the
liability of the principal to third persons presents four
chief aspects —
1. His liability upon contracts made by the agent.
2. His responsibility for the agent's statements,
admissions or representations.
3. His responsibility for matters brought to his
agent's knowledge.
4. His liability for his agent's torts and crimes.
I. LIABILITY FOR ACEXT'S CONTRACTS.
§235. In general. — The question of the liability of
the principal for the contracts of his agent may aris-
(a) where the principal at the time of making- the con-
tract was disclosed and known to exist, or (b) where
the principal at the time was undisclosed; and separate
consideration must be given to each aspect.
It is only with respect of contracts that the distinc-
tion between the disclosed and the undisclosed prin-
cipal becomes material.
a. The Liability of the Disclosed Principal.
§230. Principal liable when.— It is not the pur-
pose here to inquire concerning the existence of the au-
thority. The question of how authority may be con-
ferred and upon whom, has already been discussed. As-
Burning that the relation of principal and agent exists,
the question becomes, What contracts of the agent are
binding upon the principal? To this question the an-
swer is: A principal is liable to third persons for all
the lawful contracts of his agent, made for the princi-
pal and in his behalf, while the agent was acting within
the scope of his authority and in the course of his un-
dertaking; or which have subsequently been ratitied by
the principal with full knowledge of the facts.
































































































































124 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§236-238.
contracts made by the agent not within the scope of
the authority and not subsequently ratified.
See Huntley v. Mathias, 90 N. C. 101, 47 Am. Rep. 516,
Cas. Ag. 408; Pickert v. Marston, 68 Wis. 465, 60 Am. Rep. 876,
Cas. Ag. 411; Komorowski v. Krumdick, 56 Wis. 23, Cas. Ag. 413;
Jackson v. National Bank, 92 Tenn. 154, 20 S. W. Rep. 802, IS L. R.
A. 663, Cas. Ag. 415; Brockway v. Mullin, 46 N. J. L. 448, 50 Am.
Rep. 442, Cas. Ag. 419; Vescelius v. Martin, 11 Colo. 391, Cas. Ag.
422; New York Iron Mine v. First Nat. Bank, 39 Mich. 644, Cas. Ag.
423.
§ 237. By the term "scope of the authority" is
meant the extent of the powers expressly or impliedly
conferred upon the agent. It includes not only those
actually given but those apparently conferred. It em-
braces those which custom may confer. It includes,
also, in a given case, those powers whose existence, as
against the party interested, the principal is estopped
to deny. It embraces, finally, all those powders whose
exercise, though not originally authorized, has been
subsequently ratified with a full knowledge of the facts.
See ante § 132 et seq.
h. The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal.
§ 238. In general. — What has thus far been said in
this subdivision has had to do with the liability of the
principal who was known to be such at the time of the
transaction; but, as has been already intimated, it is
not always the fact that the existence and name of the
principal are thus known. The principal, for some rea-
son, may prefer to keep in the background, or the agent,
without the knowledge or authority of the principal,
may fail to disclose that he is an agent and deal as
though he were himself the real party in interest.
What then is the liability of such a principal?
It must be observed that, by the hypothesis, there is
a competent principal in existence who has authorized,
































































































































§§ 228-239.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 125
he has simply not been disclosed. The ease, therefore,
is radically unlike that presented in the domain of rati-
fication where, by the hypothesis, then? was, at the time
of the act, no principal who had authorized it. This
distinction is not infrequently lost sight of, and the
two cases treated as substantially identical.
§ 239. Real principal liable when discovered. — It
is the general rule that the real principal in the trans-
action, though undisclosed at the time of making the
contract, may be held liable, when discovered, upon all
simple contracts made in his behalf by his agent, even
though at the time of making the contract the party
dealing with the agent did not know that he was an
agent or did not know who his principal was, and gave
credit to the agent supposing him to be the principal.
See Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N. Y. 625, Cas. Ag. 553; Maxcy Mfg.
Co. t. Burnham, 89 Me. 538, 36 Atl. Rep. 1003, 56 Am. St. Rep. 436.
In such a case the principal is bound by the apparent
authority given to the agent, and he can not escape lia-
bility by showing that he had instructed the agent not
to do acts which are within the scope of his apparent
authoritv.
See Watteau v. Fenwick, L. R., [1893] 1 Q. B. Div. 346, Cas. Ag.
369; Hubbard v. Tenbrook, 124 Pa. 291, 16 Atl. Rep. 817, 10 Am. St.
Rep. 585, 2 L. R. A. 823, Cas. Ag. 367.
The case, however, presupposes that the principal at
the time of the contract was really undisclosed. For if
he were known at the time of the transaction and the
other party nevertheless elected to give credit to the
agent only, he cannot afterwards charge the principal.
Whether exclusive credit was given to the agent or not
is usually a question of fact.
See Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East 62, Cas. Ag. 545; Addison v.
































































































































126 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 239-240.
9 B. & Cr. 78, Cas. Ag. 547; Raymond v. Crown, etc., Mills, 2 Mete.
(Mass.) 319; James v. Bixby, 11 Mass. 34; Stehn v. Fasnacht, 20
La. Ann. S3; Brown v. Rundlett, 15 N. H. 360; Ferguson v. McBean
91 Cal. 63, 14 L. R. A. 65; Heffron v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, 15 Am. St.
Rep. 764.
The exemption of the principal, in such a case, is
strengthened by the fact that he has settled with the
agent supposing that the third party looked to the
agent only.
See Cleveland v. Pearl, 63 Vt. 127, 25 Am. St. Rep. 748, Cas. Ag.
556; James v. Bixby, supra.
§ 240. Exceptions. — To the general rule thus
giving the other party the right to hold the undis-
closed principal when discovered, there are two excep-
tions: —
1. The principal can not be held where, although he
was not disclosed at the time of the transaction, he has
since been disclosed and the other party has then, with
full knowledge as to the principal and with power of
choice, deliberately elected to give credit to the agent
alone.
Knowledge not only of the existence but of the name
of the principal is necessary, and what the other party
may have done before he received such knowledge can-
not bind him as an election. And even with such
knowledge, the mere presentation of a claim against
the agent or even the commencement of a suit against
him, will not, it has been held, be conclusive evidence
of an election to hold the agent only.
See Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. St. 298, Cas. Ag. 554; Curtis v.
Williamson, L. R. 10 Q. B. 57.
2. The principal can not be held where, before the
other party presents his claim, the principal has settled
































































































































§§240-242.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 127
party from which it was reasonable to infer- that the
agent has already settled with sueli third party.
See Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62, 2 Smith L. C. 342, Cas.
Ag. 545; Thompson v. Davenport, 9 Barn. & Cr. 78, 2 Smith L. C.
351, Cas. Ag. 547; Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. Div. 414, 29 Moak's Eng.
Rep. 371, Cas. Ag. 550.
The American cases, so far as they have considered the subject,
would support the rule only so far as the * See Fradley v. Hyland,
37 Fed. Rep. 49, 2 L. R. A. 749; Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun, (N. Y.)
144; Thomas v. Atkinson, 38 Ind. 248; Clealand v. Walker, 11 Ala.
1058; McCullough v. Thompson, 45 N. Y. Super. 449; Belneld v. Na-
tional Supply Co. 189 Pa. 189, 42 Atl. Rep. 131. But the English rule
is right, and will doubtless be followed in the United States. See
23 Am. L. Rev. 5G5.
' §241. When right to be exercised. — The right of
the other party to so hold the undisclosed principal
must be exercised within a reasonable time after the
principal is discovered.
See Smethurst v. Mitchell, 1 Ell. & Ell. 622.
The existence and identity of the principal may be
shown by parol evidence.
See Waddill v. Sebree, 88 Va. 1012, 14 S. E. Rep. 849, 29 Am. St.
Rep. 766.
§ 242. To what contracts rule applies. — The rule
applies to all simple contracts, whether written or un-
written, and to those required to be in writing as well
as to those not so required; but it does not apply to
negotiable instruments, or to instruments under seal,
though if the seal were unnecessary, the principal may
be held liable on the consideration, if he has ratified
or accepted the benefit of the contract. In other words,
he may be held liable upon an implied contract to pay
for the benefit so received.
See Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169. 45 Am. Rep. 814, Cas.
































































































































128 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 242-244.
436; Mahoney v. McLean, 26 Minn. 415; Badger Silver Min. Co. v.
Drake, 31 C. C. A. 378, 88 Fed. Rep. 48.
In Texas the rule does not apply to conveyances of real estate
though not under seal: Sanger v. Warren, 91 Tex. 472, 44 S. W. Rep.
477. 66 Am. St. Rep. 913.
Specific performance may be had of a contract to buy land:
Waddill v. Sebree, 88 Vt. 1012, 14 S. E. Rep. 849, 29 Am. St. Rep.766.
§243. Agent also remains liable. — This liability
of the undisclosed principal is an additional, and not
an exclusive one; that is to say, the third person is
not obliged to pursue the principal when discovered.
He may do so at his option. The agent also remains
liable, and the creditor, if he prefers, may pursue him
because he was the party with whom he contracted.
See Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Penn. St. 298, Cas. Ag. 554.
IL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AGENT'S STATEMENTS, ETC.
§ 214. What statements, etc., bind the principal.
— The responsibility of the principal is net necessarily
confined to what the agent does: it may in many cases
include also what he says. Indeed the agent may be
authorized expressly and solely to make. statements or
representations; but even where his chief duty is to act,
the authority will include power to say whatever natu-
rally and appropriately accompanies, characterizes or
explains the thing done. The rule is this: The state-
ments, representations and admissions of the agent,
made while acting within the scope of his authority —
(him fervet opus, as it is sometimes put — and in refer-
ence to the subject matter of his agency are admissible
against the principal if the agent's authority has first
been shown by other evidence.
See Sidney School Furniture Co. v. Warsaw School District, 122
Pa. 494, 15 Atl. Rep. 881, 9 Am. St. Rep. 124; Albert v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 122 N. C. 92, 30 S. E. Rep. 327, 65 Am. St. Rep. 693;
































































































































§§ 244-246.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 129
416, 33 Am. St. Rep. 439; Adams Express Co. v. Harris, 120 Ind.
73, 21 N. E. Rep. 340, 16 Am. St. Rep. 315, 7 L. R. A. 214; Cleveland,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 318, 2G N. E. Rep. 159, 9 L. R. A.
754; Worthington v. Gwin, 119 Ala. 44, 24 So. Rep. 739, 43 L. R. A.
382.
§ 245. The power to bind the principal by what
is thus said is implied because it is a part of tin- act
authorized to be done — because it tends to characterize
or explain it, or because it is a natural and appropriate
accompaniment of it. It follows, therefore, that the
power exists only while the act is being performed.
The agent has no implied power to make nana (ions
concerning past transactions. It is only while he is
acting within the scope of his authority that the state-
ments are relevant. Hence the rule that, in order to be
considered as made while he was acting within the
scope of his authority, the statements, representations
or admissions must be made cither while the agent is
actually engaged in the execution of his authority, or
so soon thereafter as to be really a part of the same
transaction. In other words, they must constitute a.
part of the res gestae.
See Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99, Cas. Ag.
572; Jammison v. Chesapeake, etc., Ry. Co., 92 Va. 327, 23 S. E. Rep.
758, 53 Am. St. Rep. 813; Borland v. Nevada Bank, 99 Cal. 89, 33
Pac. Rep. 737, 37 Am. St. Rep. 32; Barker v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co..
126 Mo. 143, 28 S. W. Rep. 866, 26 L. R. A. 843; Carroll v. East Ten-
nessee, etc., R. Co., 82 Ga. 452, 10 S. E. Rep. 163, 6 L. R. A. 214;
Giberson v. Patterson Mills Co., 174 Pa. 369, 34 Atl. Rep. 563, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 823.
ni. RESPONSIBILITY FOR MATTERS BROUGHT TO KNOWL-
EDGE OF AGENT.
§246. When notice to agent is notice to prin-
cipal. — The question of notice or knowledge occupies
a large place in our law. The duty to take action often
































































































































\ 30 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§ 246.
obligation to make repairs or take precautions exists
often only upon notice of their need; whether one ob-
tains a perfect title or a defeasible one depends in many
cases upon his having or not having notice of prior
liens or defen •es; etc. Assuming that notice or knowl-
edge might, in a given case, affect the principal if it
came to him personally, the question at once arises, how-
will he be affected by notice to or knowledge of his
agent? In respect of this, the rule is, that the law-
charges the principal with notice of any fact, relating
to the subject matter of the agency, which the agent
acquires or obtains while acting as such agent and
within the scope of his authority. Many, but not all,
cases go further and charge the principal not only with
the notice or knowledge which the agent acquires during
the agency, but also with that which he may previously
have acquired and then has in mind, or which he had
acquired so recently as to reasonably warrant the as-
sumption that he then remembered it.
The English courts impute to the principal the knowledge pos-
sessed by the agent though he acquired it before he became agent.
Dresser v. Norwood, 17 Com. B. (N. S.) 466; Rolland v. Hart, L. R.
6 Ch. App. 678. The Supreme Court of the United States does the
same, The Distilled Spirits Case, 11 Wall. 367. The lower Federal
courts of course follow this ruling: Brown v. Iron & Coal Co., 18
C. C. A. 444, 25 U. S. App. 679, 72 Fed. Rep. 96.
And it is the rule sustained by the weight of authority: Con-
stant v. University, 111 N. Y. 604, 7 Am. St. Rep. 769, Cas. Ag. 560;
Brothers v. Bank, 84 Wis. 381, 54 N. W. Rep. 786, 36 Am. St. Rep.
932; Wilson v. Minnesota Ins. Ass'n, 36 Minn. 112, 1 Am. St. Rep.
659; Snyder v. Partridge. 138 111. 173, 32 Am. St. Rep. 130; Trentor
v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 24 Am. St. Rep. 225, and note; Fairfield
Savings Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am. Rep. 319; McClelland v.
Saul, 113 Iowa 208, 84 N. W. Rep. 1034, 86 Am. St. Rep. 370.
Certain of the State courts limit the rule to knowledge acquired
during the agency. Thus, Alabama, Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala.
398, 5 So. Rep. 190, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 362; Pennsylvania,
Houseman v. Girard, etc., Ass'n, 81 Penn. St. 256; etc.
Notice after the termination of the agency, of course, does not
































































































































§§246-247.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 131
The notice or knowledge which is so to be imput d
to tlie principal must relate to the subject matter of the
agency, and not to some other matter concerning which
the agent has neither duty nor authority. It mi . ap-
pear to be material, and it must come from such au
apparently authentic and reliable source that an ordi-
narily prudent man would be bound to give heed to it.
See Fairfield Sav. Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am. Rep.
Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 49 N. W. Rep. 129, 24 Am. St. Rep.
225; Congar v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 24 Wis. 157, 1 Am. Rep. 164;
Shafer v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 361; Kearney Bank v. Froman,
129 Mo. 427, 31 S. W. Rep. 769, 50 Am. St. Rep. 456; Washington
Nat. Bank v. Pierce, 6 Wash. 491, 33 Pac. Rep. 972, 36 Am. St. Rep.
174.
§ 247. Three exceptions to the rule exist: Such
notice will not be charged to the principal —
1. Where it is such as it is the agent's duty to some
other principal not to disclose.
Thus, for example, much information comes to an attorney
which it is his duty to his client not to disclose — in the language of
the law, it is privileged. Such information will not be imputed
to another client of the attorney, because the law will not require
him to violate his duty to one client in order to perform what other-
wise might be his duty to some other client. See Melms v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 153, 66 N. W. Rep. 244, 57 Am. St. Rep. 899;
Akers v. Rowan, 33 S. Car. 451, 12 S. E. Rep. 165, 10 L. R. A. 705.
2. Where the agent, though nominally acting as
such, is really acting in his own or another's interest
and adversely to his principal.
In such a case, the agent really ceases to be agent at all. The
law does not permit him to be an agent in such a case, and it does
not presume that he will perform a duty which his adverse interest
renders certain that he will not perform. See Atlantic Mills v. In-
dian Orchard Mills, 147 Mass. 268, 9 Am. St. Rep. 698; Innerarity v.
Bank, 139 Miss. 332, 52 Am. Rep. 710, Cas. Ag. 569; Frenkel v. Hud-
sou, 82 Ala. 158, 60 Am. Rep. 736; Dillaway v. Butler. 135 Mass.
479; Gunster v. Scranton Power Co., 181 Pa. 327, 37 Atl. Rep. 550.
































































































































132 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [58 247-249.
Allen v. South Boston R. Co., 150 Mass. 200, 22 N. B. Rep. 917, 15
Am. St. Rep. 185, 5 L. R. A. 716.
3. Where the person who claims the benefit of the
notice had colluded with the agent to cheat or defraud
the principal.
See National L. Ins. Co. v. Minch, 53 N. Y. 144; Western Mortg.
Co. v. Ganzer. 11 C. C. A. 371, 23 U. S. App. 608, 63 Fed. Rep. 647;
Hudson v. Randc'ph, 13 C. C. A. 402, 23 U. S. App. 681, 66 Fed. Rep.
216.
§ 248. Basis of rule.— The rule that notice to
the agent is notice to the principal finds its origin in
the duty, already considered, resting upon the agent
to inform his principal of all matters coming to his
notice or knowledge, concerning the subject matter of
the agency, which it is material for the principal to
know for his protection or guidance. So far as third
persons are concerned, however, the law will not per-
mit the principal to escape the consequences of notice
by alleging that his own agent has not performed his
duty. The rule, therefore, does not depend upon
whether or not the agent has actually communicated
his knowledge to the principal; the law presumes that
he has done so and charges the principal, although in
fact he knew nothing about it.
o
See ante § 189; Cox v. Pearce, 112 N. Y. 637, 20 N. E. Rep. 566,
3 L. R. A. 563.
§ 249. Notice to sub-agent. — Whether notice to a
sub-agent is notice to the principal depends upon
whether the sub-agent, under the rules already con-
sidered, is to be regarded as the agent of the principal
or of the original agent only. If, having been ap-
pointed with the express or the implied authority of the
principal, the sub-agent is deemed the agent of the
principal, notice to him, within the limits affecting any
































































































































§§ 249-251.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 133
See Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 308; Bates v. American Mortgage
Co., 37 S. Car. 88, 16 S. E. Rep. 883, 21 L. R. A. 340.
§250. Notice to one of several agents. — Notice
to ODe of two or more joint agents is notice to the prin-
cipal. So notice to one of several but not joint agents
will be notice to the principal if it relates to matters
concerning which such agent is under a duty to disclose.
See Wittenbrcck v. Parker, 102 Cal. 93, 36 Pac. Rep. 374, 41 Am.
St. Rep. 172; Fulton Bank v. Canal Co. 4 Paige (N. Y.) 127; North
River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 262.
§ 251. Notice to agents of corporations. — The rules
respecting notice are of constant application in the
case of corporations.
See Johnson v. First National Bank, 79 Wis. 414, 48 N. W. Rep.
712, 24 Am. St. Rep. 722; Morris v. Georgia Loan Co., 109 Ga. 12,
34 S. E. Rep. 378, 46 L. R. A. 506; Hotchkiss Co. t. National Bank,
15 C. C. A. 284, 37 U. S. App. 86, 68 Fed. Rep. 76; Cooper v. Hill, 36
C. C. A. 402, 94 Fed. Rep. 582; Wilson t. Pauly, 18 C. C. A. 475, 37
r. S. App. 642, 72 Fed. Rep. 129; Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 98 Mich. 535,
57 N. W. Rep. 735, 22 L. R. A. 527; Johnston Harvester Co. v. Mil-
ler, 72 Mich. 265, 40 N. W. Rep. 429, 16 Am. St. Rep. 536; Home Ins.
Co. v. Mendenhall, 164 111. 458, 45 N. E. Rep. 1078, 36 L. R. A. 374.
But by reason of the fact that corporations often
have many agents with a great variety of duties and
scattered, not infrequently, over a wide range of terri-
tory, it is indispensable that the notice or knowledge
should be acquired or possessed while the agent in ques-
tion was acting as such, and should relate to some mat-
ter within the scope of his authority.
See cases Nat. Bank v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307, 34 N. E. Rep. 908,
36 Am. St. Rep. 705; Commercial Bank v. Burgwyn, 110 N. Car.
267, 14 S. E. Rep. 623, 17 L. R. A. 326; Phccnix Ins. Co. v. Flem-
ming, 65 Ark. 54, 44 S. W. Rep. 464, 39 L. R. A. 789.
The exeex>tions to the general rule also apply here.
The one most frequently applied is the second, namely,
































































































































134 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 251-252.
such in the transaction in question, or though ostensibly
agent was really acting adversely to his principal, or
attempting to defraud him, the notice is not imputed.
See Allen v. South Boston R. Co.. 150 Mass. 200, 22 N. E. Rep.
917, 15 Am. St. Rep. 185, 5 L. R. A. 716; Seaverns v. Presbyterian
Hospital, 173 111. 414, 50 N. E. Rep. 1079, 64 Am. St Rep. 125; Ship-
man v. Bank, 126 N. Y. 318, 12 L. R. A. 791; National Bank of Com-
merce v. Feeney, 9 S. Dak. 550, 70 N. W. Rep. 874, 46 L. R. A. 732;
Dorr v. Life Ins. Co., 71 Minn. 38, 73 N. W. Rep. 635, 70 Am. St. Rep.
309; Holm v. Atlas Nat. Bank, 28 C. C. A. 297, 55 U. S. App. 570,
84 Fed. Rep. 119; Hadden v. Dooley, 34 C. C. A. 338, 63 U. S. App.
173, 92 Fed. Rep. 274; American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133,
42 L. ed. 977; Thompson, etc., Co. v. Capitol Co., 12 C. C. A. 643, 22
U. S. App. 669, 65 Fed. Rep. 341.
IV. LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S TORTS AND CRIMES.
§252. Foundation of liability for agent's torts.
— It very rarely happens that a principal confers ex-
press authority for the commission of torts, or con-
templates in any way that they will be committed. It
is verv rare, too, that the commission of a tort can be
of benefit to the principal; it is much more likely to
work to his disadvantage. It is likely, therefore, that
instead of authorizing a tort, the principal will caution
or direct against it, and, in employing agents, will ex-
ercise precautions to employ none but those who will
avoid the commission of torts.
Notwithstanding all his precautions, however, and
although he may have expressly forbidden the commis-
sion of such acts, the principal, in many cases> is held
responsible in law for torts committed by his agents.
He is so held, in the ordinary case, not because he di-
rected the commission of the tort, but because he au-
thorized the doing of some other act in the doing of
which the tort was committed, and to which it was an

































































































































§§252 254.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. L35
The rule in this respect is that —
§ 253. Principal's liability for agent's torts. — The
principal is liable to thin! persons in damages for the
negligence, trespasses, frauds, misrepresentations and
deceits of his agent committed while the agent was act-
ing in the execution of his undertaking and within the
scope of his authority.
The older cases hold the principal not liable for the
agent's wilful and malicious acts, but the modern rule
is that he is liable for these also if the agent committed
them while he was acting in the execution of his agency
and within the scope of his authority.
It is entirely immaterial that the principal did not
direct or know of the act complained of, or even that
he disapproved or forbade it, if it were done while the
agent, as has been stated, was acting in the execution
of his agency and within the scope of his authority.
See Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, Cas. Ag. 8; Wilson v.
Owens, 16 Ir. L. Rep. 225, Cas. Ag. 9; Bank v. Railroad Co., 106 N.
Y. 195, 60 Am. Rep. 440, Cas. Ag. 576; Friedlander v. Railway Co.,
130 U. S. 416, Cas. Ag. 579; Southern Express Co. v. Brown, 67 Miss.
260, 19 Am. St. Rep. 306; Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 25 N.
E. Rep. 14. 23 Am. St. Rep. 809; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255,
10 Am. Rep. 361; Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104, 11 Am. Rep.
405; Phelon v. Stiles, 43 Conn. 426; Fifth Ave. Bank v. Forty-second
Street, etc., Ry. Co.. 137 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. Rep. 378, 33 Am. St.
Rep. 712; Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652, 43 N. E.
Rep. 68. 51 Am. St. Rep. 727; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Higdon,
94 Ala. 286, 10 So. Rep. 282, 33 Am. St. Rep. 119; Eichengreen v.
Railroad Co., 96 Tenn. 229, 34 S. W. Rep. 219, 54 Am. St. Rep. 833.
§ 254. The act will be deemed to have been done
while the agent was 11ms acting in the execution of
his agency and within the scope of his authority, if it
were done while the agent was engaged in doing that
which he was authorized to do — if the default com-
plained of were a part of, or incident to, or
































































































































136 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 234-255.
if the thing complained of were designed to
facilitate or promote the act authorized, of which
it thus formed a part — if it were intended how-
ever mistakenly, to further the principal's business,
promote his welfare or protect his interests in matters
concerning which the agent was then acting and au-
thorized to act — it would be within the rule. But so
much as this cannot be required; for it is clear, by the
modern authorities at least, that though the agent at
the moment may not have had the principal's interests
in mind, though he may have been roused to resent-
ment, puffed up by brief authority, or quickened by
mere wantonness, still if he did the act complained of
while he was engaged, in the course of his employment,
in the performance of an act authorized to be per-
formed, the principal will be responsible. Especially is
this true, though it is not the criterion, where the in-
strument or means of injury is some implement, tool,
machine or other agency with which he has been in-
trusted by the principal for the execution of his
authoritv.
See Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Starnes, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 52, 24 Am.
Rep. 296; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dickson, 63 111. 151, 14 Am. Rep.
114; Southern Express Co. v. Platten, 36 C. C. A. 46, 93 Fed. Rep.
936.
§ 255. In the case of carriers of passengers who
owe their passengers a special duty of protection, and
others in like situation, the rule may, perhaps, be more
broadly stated. For if a principal who owes such a
duty entrusts its performance to an agent, he will not
only be liable if it be not performed, but he will clearly
be responsible if the agent not only does not perform
it, but adds to the wrong of non-performance the ag-
gravation of vranton, wilful or malicious injury.
































































































































§5 255-258.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 1 37
501; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180, 8 Am. Rep. 311; Stewart v. Brook-
lyn, etc., R. Co., 90 N. Y. 588, 43 Am. Rep. 185; Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. Flexman, 103 111. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 33; McKinky v. Chicago, etc.
Ry. Co., 44 Iowa 314, 24 Am. Rep. 748.
See the same principle applied to telegraph companies in McCord
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Minn. 181, 39 N. W. Rep. 315, 12 Am.
St. Rep. 636, and as to the duty to furnish safe appliances, etc.:
New York, etc., R. Co. t. O'Leary, 35 C. C. A. 562, 93 Fed. Rep. 737.
§ 256. The doctrine of ratification is constantly
applied, and the rule that he who with knowledge of
the facts receives the fruits or takes the benefits of an
act, must adopt also the liabilities, is especially appli-
cable. Frequent illustrations are found in cases where-
in false representations have been made by the agent
to obtain the benefit which the principal has appro-
priated.
See Mayer r. Dean, 115 N. Y. 556, 22 N. E. Rep. 261, 5 L. R. A.
540; Fairchild v. McMahon, 139 N. Y. 290, 34 N. E. Rep. 779. 36 Am.
St. Rep. 701; Meyerhoff v. Daniels, 173 Pa. St. 555, 34 Atl. Rep. 298,
51 Am. St. Rep. 782; Baltimore Trust Co. t. Hambleton, 84 Md. 456,
36 Atl. Rep. 597, 40 L. R. A. 216; Hoffman y. Mayand, 35 C. C. A.
256, 93 Fed. Rep. 171; Kilpatrick v. Haley, 13 C. C. A. 480, 66 Fed.
Rep. 133.
§ 257. The rule of liability extends also to the
acts of sub-agents, where they have been so appointed,
within the principles already considered, as to make
them in law the agents of the principal.
See Arff t. Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 57, 25 N. E. Rep. 1073, 10 L. R. A.
609; Goode v. Ins. Co., 92 Va. 392, 23 S. E. Rep. 744, 30 L. R. A. 842;
Steele v. Ins. Co., 93 Mich. 81, 53 N. W. Rep. 514, IS L. R. A. 85.
§ 258. Limitations.— It is not to be assumed, how-
ever, that the principal is responsible for every act
which his agent may commit. If the agent has finished
that which he was authorized to do, or if he leaves the
principal's affairs to attend to some matter of his own,
and then commits the act complained of, the principal
































































































































1 38 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 258-259.
or ill-will, he is where he has no business to be — where
he has no duty to perform, where his authority does
not call him — if he be engaged in that which does not
concern his principal — and then commits the tort, the
principal is not liable.
See Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 Com. B. 237; Storey v. Ashton, L.
R. 4 Q. B. 476; Maddox v Brown, 71 Me. 432, 36 Am. Rep. 336; Stone
v. Hills, 45 Conn. 44, 29 Am. Rep. 635; Adams v. Cost, 62 Md. 264,
50 Am. Rep. 211.
§ 259. Principal's liability for agent's criminal
acts.— The principal may also be held liable in a civil
action for the criminal or penal act of his agent com-
mitted under the same circumstances. Thus the agent
may be prosecuted for assault and battery and the
principal be held liable in damages, as the result of the
same act.
The principal will not ordinarily be criminally liable
unless he has, in some way, participated in, counte-
nanced or approved the act; but he may become liable
to a penalty for permitting his agent to perform acts
which a statute has imposed a penalty for performing.
If, for example, a statute forbids, under penalty, the
sale of liquors to minors, or the keeping open of saloons
on Sunday, the principal will be liable for the penalty
if the forbidden act be done by the agent, even though
the principal had no knowledge of it.
See State v. Kittelle, 110 N. C. 560, 28 Am. St. Rep. 698; People
v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 50 Am. Rep. 270; State v. Armstrong, 106
Mo. 395, 16 S. W. Rep. 604, 27 Am. St. Rep. 361; Hall v. Norfolk &
West. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 36, 28 S. E. Rep. 754, 67 Am. St. Rep. 757;
Commonwealth v. Stevens, 153 Mass. 421, 26 N. E. Rep. 992, 25 Am.
St. Rep. 647, 11 L. R. A. 357; Commonwealth v. Joslin, 158 Mass.
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CHAPTER XV.
OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO
THE AGENT.
§ 260. In general.
1. In Contract.
261. Agent usually no right of
action.
262. Sealed instruments or ne-
gotiable instruments
made in agent's name.
§ 3. Contracts made without
disclosing principal, etc.
264 What defences may be
made.
2. In Tort.
265. What actions maintaina-
ble.
§ 260. In general. — The question of the liability of
the third person to the agent may present the same two
aspects which have been noticed in the preceding sub-
divisions, namely, the liability: 1. In Contract. 2. In
Tort.
1. In Contract.
§261. Agent usually no right of action. — The
agent usually has no right of action against third per-
sons upon contracts made by him with them for his prin-
cipal. His duty is, in general, as has been seen, to act in
the name as well as for the benefit of his principal ; and
where he has done so, the rights of action must of course
accrue to th,e principal.
Exceptional cases, however, may arise which require
exceptions to the rule.
§ 262. Sealed instruments or negotiable instru-
ments made in agent's name.— Thus, if, though acting
for the principal, the agent makes a contract under seal
in his own name, or if he takes a negotiable instrument
payable to himself alone, the action must be brought
in the name of the agent, though the recovery will be
































































































































140 DUTIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO AGENT. [§§ 263-265.
§ 263. Contracts made without disclosing princi-
pal, etc. — So in other cases than those mentioned in the
preceding section, if the agent makes a contract without
disclosing his principal, or if he makes a written con-
tract in his own name, the action may be brought in the
name of the agent because it was made in his name.
See Deitz v. Insurance Co., 31 W. Va. 851, 8 S. E. Rep. 616, 13
Am. St. Rep. 909; Carter v. Southern Ry. Co., Ill Ga. 38, 50 L. R.
A, 354.
But in cases other than those referred to in the pre-
ceding section this right of action in the agent is usually
not exclusive. Because the contract was made for the
principal, he may ordinarily enforce in his own name
or permit the agent to sue. And where the principal
may sue (a matter to be discussed more fully in the
following chapter), his right is paramount, and he may
always sue to the exclusion of the agent, unless the
aeent had some beneficial interest in the contract.
See Rhoades v. Blackiston, 106 Mass. 334, 8 Am. Rep. 332, Cas.
Ag. 584; Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206, Cas. Ag. 257; Thompson v.
Kelly, 101 Mass. 291, 3 Am. Rep. 353, Cas. Ag. 653; Wilson v.
Groelle, 83 Wis. 530, 53 N. W. Rep. 900.
§264. What defences may be made.— When the
agent sues in his own name, the other party may ordi-
narily make any defence against the agent which he
may have, either against the agent or against the prin-
cipal in whose behalf the action is brought.
See Gibson v. Winter, 5 B. & Ad. 96; Gardner v. Allen, 6 Ala.
187, 41 Am. Dec. 45. Set off of claim against the principal cannot
be made if would defeat agent's right to reimbursement for ad-
vances: Young v. Thurber, 91 N. Y. 388.
2. In Tort.
§ 205. "What actions maintainable. — The agent may
sue third persons in tort for injuries done by them to
































































































































§265.] DUTIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO AGENT. 141
sion — certainly wherever he has a special property in
the goody, possibly in any case.
See Moore v. Robinson, 2 Barn. & Adol. 817, 22 Eng. Com. L. 344.
Compare I ick v. Jerome, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 294; Pullman Car
Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. Rep. 70, 21 L. R. A. 298.
He may also recover of third persons in tort for frauds
or deceits practiced by them upon him while he was en-
gaged in making contracts with them on the principal's
account, and which have rendered him liable to his prin-
cipal.
He may also recover of them for damages caused by
their wrongfully procuring his dismissal by his princi-
pal; and for slander or other wrong whereby they de-
prive him of his right to earn the stipulated compensa-
tion or commission.
Seo Lucke v. Clothing Cutters Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 19 L. R. A.
x08; Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 33 L. R. A. 225; Whittemore
v. Weiss, 33 Mich. 318; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166, 38 Atl. Rep.
































































































































142 DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. [§§ 266-267.
CHAPTER XVI.
OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO
THE PRINCIPAL.
§ 266, In general.
1. In Contract.
267. What contracts principal
may enforce.
268. "What defences open.
269. Right to follow and recov-
er money or property.
§ 270. Right to rescind unau-
thorized dealings.
2. In Tort.
271. Right to recover damages
for collusion.
272. Recovery for enticing
agent away, disabling
him, etc.
§ 266. In general. — The question of the duties and
liabilities of third persons to the principal, presenting
the same general aspects as the preceding ones, may be
considered under the same classification: 1. In Con-
tract, and 2. In Tort,
1. In Contract.
§267. What contracts principal may enforce. —
The principal may enforce against third persons all law-
ful contracts made in his own name with them by his
agent. This is, of course, the ordinary and familiar
case. Here the principal will be disclosed and the con-
tract will be made in his name and in his behalf.
He may also show himself to be the principal and
enforce contracts, whether written or unwritten, made
on his behalf with them by his agent, though he was not
disclosed at the time of the contract and the contract
was made in the agent's name, except in the cases men-
tioned in the preceding subdivision, namely, contracts

































































































































§§ U67-269.J DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. 143
See Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 371, Cases on Ag. 587;
Ilarkness v. W. U. Tel. Co., 73 Iowa, 190, 5 Am. St. Rep. 672; Mil-
liken v. W. U. Tel. Co., 110 N. Y. 403, 1 L. R. A. 281; Powell v.
Wade, 109 Ala. 95, 19 So. Rep. 500, 55 Am. St. Rep. 915, and note;
Kingsley v. Siebrecht, 92 Me. 23, 42 Atl. Rep. 249, 69 Am. St. Rep.
486.
If the agent has a property interest in the contract
equal to its value, or if the contract were really made
with the agent as the contracting party, to the exclusion
of the principal, as where the third person with knowl-
edge of the principal has elected to deal only with the
agent, these cases also would be exceptions.
§ 2G8. What defences open. — In an action by the
principal, the other party may make any defences which
he may have against the principal, and also, usually, any
defence, such as payment or set-off, which he may have
acquired against the agent before the discovery of the
principal, if the principal was not disclosed and the
agent was permitted to appear as the ostensible prin-
cipal.
See Baxter v. Sherman, 73 Minn. 434, 76 N. W. Rep. 211, 72 Am.
St. Rep. 631; Belfield v. National Supply Co., 189 Pa. 189, 42 Atl.
Rep. 131, 69 Am. St. Rep. 799; Rosser v. Darden, 82 Ga. 219, 7 S. E.
Rep. 919, 14 Am. St. Rep. 152; Montagu v. Forwood [1893], 2 Q.
B. 350.
The principal must also, of course, be affected by any
defences growing out of the fraud, misrepresentation
or deceit of the agent in securing the contract.
See Honaker v. Board of Education, 42 W. Va. 170, 24 S. E. Rep.
544, 57 Am. St. Rep. 847, 32 L. R. A. 413.
>: 209. Right to follow and recover money or prop-
erty. — Where property or money belonging to the
principal comes into the hands of the agent for some
particular purpose, use or disposition, such property or
































































































































144 DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. [§ 269.
defeated except by the act of the principal or the greater
equities of some third person. Any disposition of the
property or money contrary to the purpose for which
the agent received it is unauthorized, and the person
who received it must restore it to the principal unless
he can establish a paramount right. Third persons,
therefore, who by fraud, collusion or sharp practices
obtain such property or money may be compelled to
restore it. And even if the third person has obtained
it in good faith, he must still return it unless he can
show that he is a bona fide holder for value without
notice of the trust.
In the case of ordinary chattels a person, however
free from bad faith he may be or however good a con-
sideration he may give, can obtain no better title than
his grantor had, unless the true owner has done some-
thing which estops him from asserting his title. In the
case of negotiable instruments and money, which is
sometimes said to have no "earmark" by which it may
beMistinguished, one who parts with value in good faith
may be protected.
In pursuing his property or money, it makes no dif-
ference how much it has been changed in form, or
through how many hands it has passed; the principal
may recover it if he can identify it, and if it has not
come into the hands of a bona fide holder for value.
See Farmers' Bank v. King, 57 Penn. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215, Cas.
Ag. 590; Baker v. N. Y. Bank, 100 N. Y. 31, 53 Am. Rep. 150, '
Ag 596; Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E. Rep. 812, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 599; Midland National Bank v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358, 49 S.
W. Rep. 994, 71 Am. St. Rep. 608; First Nat. Bank v. Hummel, 14
Colo. 259, 23 Pac. Rep. 986, 8 L. R. A. 788; Holly v. Domestic, etc.,
Society, 34 C. C. A. 649, 92 Fed. Rep. 745; Gerard v. McCormick, 130
N. Y. 261, 29 N. E. Rep. 115, 14 L. R. A. 234; Dorrah v. Hill, 73
Miss. 787,' 19 So. Rep. 961, 32 L. R. A. 631; Stevenson v. Kyle, 42
W. Va. 229, 24 S. E. Rep. 888, 57 Am. St. Rep. 854; Gilman Oil Co.
































































































































§§ 270-272.] DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. 145
§ 270. Right to rescind dealings where agent
secretly in employment of other party. — As has been
seen, an agent cannot, consistently with his duty, under-
take to represent his principal where he is at the same
time secretly in the employment of the other party.
Where, therefore, he was thus at the same time secretly
in the employment of the other party, the principal is
not bound, and he may, if he so elects, rescind dealings
with the other party and recover from him what he has
parted with to him.
As has been seen also, it is not necessary for the prin-
cipal in such a case to show that he has been injured
or that the agent has in fact betrayed his interests; his
right to repudiate the transaction is absolute, provided
he acts promptly and before the rights of innocent third
parties have intervened.
See New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85;
United States Rolling Stock Co. v. Atlantic R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 450,
32 Am. Rep. 380.
2. In Tort
§ 271. Right to recover damages for collusion. —
The principal may also recover damages from third per-
sons who have colluded with his agent to defraud him;
and he may recover money which such persons have
received from him by virtue of such collusion, or may
defeat a recovery against himself by showing such col-
lusion.
See Boston v. Simmons, 150 Mass. 461, Cas. Ag. 598, 15 Am. St.
Rep. 230; Mayor of Salford v. Lever [1891], 1 Q. B. Div. 168, Cas.
Ag. 601; City of Findlay v. Pertz, 13 C. C. A. 559, 66 Fed. Rep. 427,
29 L. R. A. 188; Glaspie v. Keator, 5 C. C. A. 474, 56 Fed. Rep. 203;
Sbipway v. Broadwood [1899], 1 Q. B. 369.
l'72. Recovery for enticing agent away, disa-

































































































































146 DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. [§ 272.
tions of tort against third persons who maliciously en-
tice his agent to break his contract of service, or who
prevent him from performing, or who so injure him as
to disable him from performing.
See Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780; St. Johns-
bury R. R. Co. v. Hunt, 55 Vt. 570, 45 Am. Rep. 639, Cas. Ag. 608;
O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, 37 Atl. Rep. 843, 61 Am. St. Rep.
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CHAPTER XVII.
OP SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS
§ 273. In general.
1. Of Attorneys at Law.
274. Relation of attorney to
client.
275. How appointed.
276. Duration of relation.
277. Implied powers of attor-
ney.
278. Attorney bound to utmost
loyalty and honor.




281. Liability of attorney to
client.
282. Liability of attorney to
third persons.




— How reasonable value
284.
shoVn.








































Acting for both parties.















§273. Ingeneral. — Some attention has already been
given (§§ 19-26) to certain classes of professional agents
— i. e., persons whose business or profession it is to act
for others in certain capacities. Some further attention
to these special classes of agents seems here desirable.
































































































































148 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§278-276.
the Attorney at Law, the Auctioneer, the Broker, and
the Factor.
1. Of Attorneys At Law.
§ 274. Relation of attorney to client. — The attor-
ney at law is an officer of the court in which he prac-
tices, and is in some sense an officer of the State. But
the relation of the attorney to his client is a relation of
agency, and is in general governed by the same rules
which apply to other agencies.
§ 275. How appointed. — No formal power is ordi-
narily necessary, but the attorney's authority may be
shown as in other cases. When a duly admitted attor-
ney appeal's for a party in a cause, the law presumes
that his appearance was authorized, and while this pre-
sumption is not conclusive, it will suffice until some
showing is made to the contrary, and then the attorney
may be required to produce his authority.
See Reynolds v. Fleming, 30 Kan. 106, 46 Am. Rep. 86, Cas. Ag.
615.
Proceedings taken in reliance upon such an appear-
ance are also presumed to be valid, and only to be im-
peached upon by a direct proceeding. If the principal
is injured by the application of this rule to proceedings
really unauthorized, he has a remedy against the attor-
ney.
See Corbitt v. Timmerman, 95 Mich. 581, 55 N. W. Rep. 437, 35
Am. St. Rep. 586.
§270. Duration of relation. — The employment of
an attorney to conduct a cause is presumed to be an
entire contract on his part for the whole suit, and he
can not lawfully abandon the case before its termina-
tion without just cause and reasonable notice. But on
































































































































19 17C-277.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 149
at will merely, and be may discharge the attorney at
any time upon paying him for services already rendered.
See Tenney v. Berger, 93 N. Y. 524, 45 Am. Rep. 263; Under-
wood t. Lewis [1894], 2 Q. B. 306.
§ 277. Implied powers of attorney. — An attorney
at law employed to conduct a case has implied authority
to control the conduct and management of the cause,
and to do all things which are necessary or incidental
to the prosecution or defense of the cause, and which
affect the remedy only and not the right of action. His
acts and stipulations, therefore, which affect the prac-
tice only will bind his client, but he has no implied
power to confess judgment or compromise or release his
client's cause of action, release liens, levies, or securi-
ties, grant extensions of time, or waive or give up the
substantial rights of his client. He may receive pay-
ment of the claim, either before or after judgment, and
may take the necessary steps to enforce the judgment;
but he cannot release the judgment without payment in
full, or assign it, or receive anything but money in pay-
ment
See Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36, 15 Am. Rep. 72, Cas. Ag.
619; Kirk's Appeal, 87 Penn. 243, 30 Am. Rep. 357, Cas. Ag. 621;
Nichells v. Nichells, 5 N. Dak. 125, 64 N. W. Rep. 73, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 540, 33 L, R. A. 515; Smith v. Jones, 47 Neb. 108, 66 N. W.
Rep. 19, 53 Am. St. Rep. 519; Gardner v. Mobile R. Co., 102 Ala.
635, 15 So. Rep. 271, 48 Am. St. Rep. 84; Garrett v. Hanshue, 53
Ohio St. 482, 42 N. E. Rep. 256, 35 L. R. A. 321.
As in the case of other agents, his powers will con-
tinue after a discharge unless notice of that fact be
given.

































































































































150 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§ 278-280.
§ 278. Attorney bound to utmost loyalty and
honor. — The attorney is bound to exercise the highest
honor and integrity towards his client, not to take his
case if he has any adverse interest which will prevent
his giving his individual allegiance to his client, and to
maintain at all times the utmost loyalty to his client's
interests.
See Strong v. International Building Union, 183 111. 97, 55 N. E.
Rep. 675, 47 L. R. A. 792; Darlington's Estate 147 Pa. 624 23 Atl.
Rep. 1046, 30 Am. St. Rep. 776.
Like other agents also he must absolutely refrain
from permitting his own interests to conflict with those
of his client. He may not buy his client's property at
sales in litigation in which he is concerned. He may not
profit by his own defaults or take advantage of his sit-
uation to make gains for himself at his client's expense.
See Olson v. Lamb, 56 Neb. 104, 76 N. W. Rep. 433, 71 Am. St. Rep.
670; Eoff v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 378, 18 S. W. Rep. 907, 32 Am. St. Rep.
609; Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494; Cunningham v. Jones,
37 Kan. 477, 1 Am. St. Rep. 257; Davis v. Kline, 96 Mo. 401, 9 S. W.
Rep. 724, 2 L. R. A. 78.
§ 279. Dealings between attorney and client. —
Dealings between attorney and client must be charac-
terized by the utmost fairness and good faith. Some
cases hold them absolutely voidable at the option of the
client, but the true rule seems to be that while they will
be scrutinized with great strictness, they will be upheld
if they are entirely fair and voluntary, but of this the
attorney has the burden of proof.
See Elmore v. Johnson, 143 111. 513, 32 N. E. Rep. 413, 36 Am.
St. Rep. 401, 21 L. R. A. 366; James v. Steere, 16 R. I. 367, 16 Atl.
Rep. 143, 2 L. R. A. 164; Barron v. Willis [1900], 2 Ch. 121; Stout
v. Smith, 98 N. Y. 25, 50 Am. Rep. 632, Cas. Ag. 628.
§ 280. Confidential communications privileged. —
































































































































§5 280-281.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGEXTS. 151
attorney, and all information received by the attorney
from the client or from his papers, and of a confidential
nature, arc "privileged," and the attorney will not be
permitted i«» disclose them without the consent of his
client. The operation of the privilege is perpetual
survives not only the relation of attorney and client,
but the lives of the attorney and client as well. It van
only be removed when it becomes necessary for the at-
torney's own protection against his client, or for the
furtherance of public justice.
See Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 58 Am. Rep. 662; Mitchell
v. Bromberger, 2 Xev. 345, 90 Am. Dec. 550; Liggett v. Glenn, 2
C. C. A. 286, 51 Fed. Rep. 381; Butler v Fayerweather, 33 C. C. A.
625, 91 Fed. Rep. 458; O'Brien v. Spalding, 102 Ga. 490, 31 S. E.
Rep. 100, 66 Am. St. Rep. 202.
The privilege is the privilege of the client and not of
the attorney; and it may be waived by the client.
See Michael v. Foil, 100 X. Car. 178, 6 S. E. Rep. 264, 6 Am. St.
Rep. 577.
It exists only when the communication can fairly be
regarded as confidential, and. the relation of attorney
and client must exist.
See Bruley v. Garvin, 105 Wis. 625, 81 X. W. Rep. 1038, 48 L.
R. A. 839. Communications to a law student are not privileged:
Schubkagel v. Dierstein, 131 Pa. 46, 18 Atl. Rep. 1059, 6 L. R. A. 481.
Where several persons employ the same attorney in
the same matter their communications are privileged
as to third persons, but not in a controversy between
themselves.
See Seip's Estate, 163 Pa. 423, 30 Atl. Rep. 226. 43 Am. St. Rep.
803; Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Xev. 127, 26 Pac. Rep. 64.
12 L. R. A. 815.
§281. Liability of attorney to client. — Theattor-
































































































































15.2 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§281-282.
and will exercise a reasonable degree of professional
knowledge, skill and diligence. He does not agree that
he knows all the law and will make no mistakes, but he
will be liable if he is ignorant of the well settled rules
of law or practice, from which his client sustains injury.
He will also be liable to his client for losses sustained
bv him, caused by the failure of the attorney to exercise
reasonable care, skill and diligence in collecting claims,
in bringing suit, in trying the cause, in examining titles,
in preparing contracts, and the like.
He is liable for the neglects and defaults of his part-
ners and clerks in the same manner as for his own. It
is no defence to him that he was acting gratuitously.
See Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 Atl. Rep. 98, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 662; Citizens', etc., Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N. E.
Rep. 1075, 18 Am. St. Rep. 320, 7 L. R. A. 669; Babbitt v. Bumpus,
73 Mich. 331, 41 N. W. Rep. 417, 16 Am. St. Rep. 585; Midgley v.
Midgley [1893], 3 Ch. 282.
§ 282. Liability of attorney to third persons. —
The attorney is not liable to third persons for the neg-
lect of duties which he owes to his client only ; but he
may make himself liable to third persons where he con-
tracts with them personally, though on his client's be-
half.
See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195; Houseman v. Girard
Ass'n, 81 Pa. 256; Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. Rep. 900,
52 Am. St. Rep. 88, 31 L. R. A. 862; Atwell v. Jenkins, 163 Mass.
362, 40 N. E. Rep. 178, 28 L. R. A. 694.
He will not ordinarily be liable to third persons who
may be injured by malicious or wrongful actions insti-
tuted by his client in which he was attorney, but he will
be liable if he shares and aids his client's malice, or if he
acts from malice of his own. He will also be liable with

































































































































§§282-285.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 153
See Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 140, 60 Am. Rep. 236; Cook v. Hop-
per, 23 Mich. 511.
§283. Attorney's right to compensation.— Unless
he has undertaken to serve gratuitously, the attorney
is cut ii led to compensation for his lawful services. The
amount to be paid may be fixed by the contract of the
parties or be left to be determined according to the
reasonable value of the service rendered.
See Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190, 49 S. W. Rep. 822, 45 L. R. A.
196; Russell v. Young, 36 C. C. A. 71, 94 Fed. Rep. 45; Bartlett v.
Savings Bank, 79 Cal. 218, 21 Pac. Rep. 743, 12 Am. St. Rep. 139;
Bowman v. Phillips, 41 Kan. 364, 21 Pac. Rep. 230, 13 Am. St. Rep.
292, 3 L. R. A. 631.
§ 284. Contingent compensation. — A contract
for compensation contingent upon success is valid, and,
in most States, it is no less valid because the attorney
is to receive as his compensation a portion of the money
or thins: recovered.
i t>
See Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, Cas. Ag. 631; Duke T.
Harper. 66 Mo. 51, 27 Am. Rep. 314.
§ 285 How reasonable value shown. — When
no amount has been agreed upon, the attorney is enti-
tled to recover the reasonable value of his services, and
for the purpose of proving this he may call other law-
yers as witnesses to give their opinion. In such cases
the nature and difficulty of the matter, the amount in-
volved and the character and standing of the attorney
may be considered in determining the value.
See Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, Cas. Ag. 631; Eggleston v.
Boardman, 37 Mich. 14; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 136 111.
87, 26 N. E. Rep. 493, 11 L. R. A. 787; Selover v. Bryan;
434, 56 N. W. Rep. 58, 40 Am. St. Rep. 349. 21 L. R. A. 418; Wi .
v. Kohn, 7 C. C. A. 314. 58 Fed. Rep. 462; Davis v. W T ebber, 66 Ark.
































































































































154 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS [§§ 286-288.
§ 280. Attorney entitled to reimbursement and
indemnity. — The attorney is also entitled to reimburse-
ment for his necessary and legitimate expenses and to
indemnity for liability properly incurred in his client's
behalf.
See Clark v. Randall, 9 Wis. 135, 76 Am. Dec. 252.
§ 287. Attorney's lien. — For the purpose of secur-
ing the payment of his costs and charges, the attorney is
entitled to a lien. This lien is of two kinds:
1. A general or retaining lien which entitles him to
retain his client's papers, property or money in his
hands until his claim is paid; and
2. A special or charging lien, which exists in most
States and which attaches to the judgment, money or
property recovered by the services of the attorney, and
secures the payment of his costs and charges in that
particular suit.
In many States the attorney's lien is regulated by
statute.
See Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 N. Y. 157, Cas. Ag. 633; In re Wil-
son, 12 Fed. Rep. 235, Cas. Ag. 638; Weeks v. Judges, 73 Mich. 256,
Cas. Ag. 648; .Hanna v. Island Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E.
Rep. 846, 51 Am. St. Rep. 246, and note; Manning v. Leighton, 65
Vt. 84, 26 Atl. Rep. 258, 24 L. R. A. 684; Randall v. Van Wagenen,
115 N. Y. 527, 22 N. E. Rep. 361, 12 Am. St. Rep. 828.
2. Of Auctioneers.
§ 288. How authorized. — The auctioneer does not
require to be authorized in any particular manner,
though the authority must contemplate a sale by auc-
tion, for general authority to sell property does not jus-
tify a sale by auction.
See Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 195, Cas. Ag. 358.
Parol authority is usually sufficient, even to sell land.
































































































































§§ 289-291.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 155
§281). Terms of Bale.— The owner of the property
to be sold has tin' righl to fix the terms and conditions
of the sale, and where they are made known at the sale,
a purchaser can not acquire a good title in violation of
t hem. But secret limitations would not affect the rights
of a purchaser who lias relied in good faith upon the
usual powers exercised by such agents.
See Farr v. John, 23 Iowa, 286, 92 Am. Dec. 426; Bush v. Cole,
28 N. Y. 261. 84 Am. Dec. 343, Cas. Ag. 650.
§ 290. Implied powers. — The auctioneer has implied
authority to accept the bid, and to receive the price,
though he can not sell for anything except money or
receive anything but money in payment of the price. He
may sue in his own name to recover the price of personal
property sold by him. He has no implied power to dele-
gate his authority, or to sell on credit, or to rescind the
sale, or to sell at private sale, or to warrant the quality
of goods sold unless that is usual. Like other agents, he
is disqualified to sell to himself.
See Thompson v. Kelly, 101 Mass. 291, 3 Am. Rep. 353, Cas. Ag.
653; Boinest v. Leignez, 2 Rich. (S. C.) L. 464, Cas. Ag. 655;
Blood v. French, 9 Gray (Mass.), 197; Dodd v. Farlow, 11 Allen,
426, 87 Am. Dec. 726.
§ 201. Duties to principal. — The auctioneer is
bound to his principal for the exercise of good faith and
for reasonable skill and diligence.
See Hicks v. Minturn, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 550.
He must obey instructions, take reasonable care of
the goods, and account to the principal for their pro-
ceeds.
See Steele v. Ellmaker, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 86; Montgomery v.

































































































































156 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§292-293.
§ 292. Liability to third persons. — The auctioneer
who discloses his principal and sells as agent only, and
within the limits of his authority, incurs no liability to
third persons on the contract of sale, but if he conceals
his principal, he is personally liable upon the contract.
See Bush v. Cole, 28 N. Y. 261, 84 Am. Dec. 343, Cas. Ag. 650;
Seemuller v. Fuchs, 64 Md. 217, 54 Am. Rep. 766.
He is also liable to third persons for injuries which
they may sustain by reason of his acting without au-
thority.
See Dent v. McGrath, 3 Bush (Ky.) 174; Harris v. Nickerson, L.
R. 8 Q. B. 286, Cas. Ag. 659.
It has been held that an auctioneer who receives and
sells the goods of a stranger is liable, even though he
acted in good faith supposing them to be the goods of
the person from whom he received them ; but other cases
hold that he is not so liable where he has paid over the
money to the person from wiiom he received the goods
before he had notice of the fact that such person was not
the owner. The weight of authority seems to be that
he is liable in these cases also.
See Farebrother v. Ansley, 1 Camp. 343; Higgins v. Lodge, 68
Md. 229, 6 Am. St. Rep. 437, Cas. Ag. 656; Frizzell t. Rundle, 88
Tenn. 396, 17 Am. St. Rep. 908; Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass' 357, 35
Am. St. Rep. 495; Kearney v. Glutton, 101 Mich. 106, 59 N. W. Rep.
419, 45 Am. St. Rep. 394; Consolidated Co. v. Curtis [1892], 1 Q. B.
495; Milliken v. Hathaway, 148 Mass. 69, 19 N. E. Rep. 16, 1 L. R.
A. 510. A fortiori will be liable if he had notice of the third person's
rights: Morrow Shoe Mfg. Co. v. New England Shoe Co., 6 C. C. A.
508, 57 Fed. Rep. 685, 24 L. R. A. 417.
§293. Compensation and lien. — The auctioneer is
entitled to compensation for his services, and to reim-
bursement for his necessary expenditures and liabilities.
































































































































§§293-295.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 157
for sale, and a lien upon the goods and their proceeds
for his commissions and charges.
See Webb v. Smith, 30 Ch. Div. 192, Cas. Ag. CC1.
§ 294. Liability of principal for acts of auctioneer.
— The principal is bound, as in any other case of
agency, by the contracts made by the auctioneer with-
in the scope of the authority. And to the same extent
as in other cases, also, he is affected by the represen-
tations which the auctioneer makes in order to effect a
sale.
See Cockcroft v. Muller, 71 N. Y. 3G7; Roberts v. French, 153
Mass. 60, 26 N. E. Rep. 416, 25 Am. St. Rep. 611, 10 L. R. A. 656.
3. Of Brokers.
§ 295. How appointed. — Brokers, as has been seen,
are of many kinds, according- to the special branch of
trade which they pursue, but their rights and powers
are substantially the same. They are appointed like
other agents, and their powers are terminated as in
other eases. Their powers and duties are much con-
trolled by usage, with which it is not only their right
hut their duty to comply unless otherwise directed.
Usage, however, will not justify a departure from pos-
itive instructions, or the disregard of an express con-
tract.
See Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950, 37 L. ed.
819; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. Rep. 874, 21 L. R. A.
102; Fairly v. Wappoo Mills, 44 S. Car. 227, 22 S. E. Rep. 10S. 29
L. R. A. 215; De Cordova v. Barnum, 130 N. Y. 615, 29 N. E. Rep.
1099, 27 Am. St. Rep. 538.
The broker is usually a special agent who can bind
his principal only while acting in pursuance of the limi-
tations put upon his authority.
































































































































158 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§ 296 298.
§ 29G. Implied powers. — The broker lias no implied
authority to delegate his powers, except under the same
circumstances which justify it in the case of other
agents. His acts usually should be done in the name
of his principal only.
See Delafield v. Smith, 101 Wis. 664, 78 N. W. Rep. 170, 70 Am.
St. Rep. 938; Haas v. Ruston, 14 Ind. App. 8, 42 N. E. Rep. 298, 56
Am. St. Rep. 288.
Where he has not been limited as to the price at
which he shall buy or sell, he has implied power to fix
the price, if he acts in good faith and confines him-
self to the usual price, or to a fair and reasonable one
where there is no usage.
See Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin, 51 N. H. 56, 12 Am. Rep. 45;
Putnam v. French, 53 Vt. 402, 38 Am. Rep. 682.
§ 297. Same subject. — He has no general power to
sell with a warranty of quality, but may give one where
it is usually given with such goods at that time and
place. If not restricted, he may sell upon a reasonable
credit. When not entrusted with the possession of the
goods he sells, he has no implied authority to receive
payment. Having once made a valid contract he has
no implied authority to rescind it.
See Hitchcock v. Griffin & Skelley Co., 99 Mich. 447, 58 N. W. Rep.
373, 41 Am. St. Rep. 624; Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 354;
Dodd v. Farlow, 11 Allen (Mass.) 426, 87 Am. Dec. 726; Adams v.
Fraser, 27 C. C. A. 82 Fed. Rep. 211; Saladin v. Mitchell, 45 111. 79.
§298. Duties to principal. — The broker must obey
the principal's instructions, and will be liable for a loss
caused by his disobedience. He owes to his principal
the possession and exercise of a reasonable degree of
care, skill and diligence. He must be faithful to the
interests of his principal, and must not allow his own
interests or those of any other employer to conflict with

































































































































§§298-300.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 159
See Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 333. 32 L. ed.
658; Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425; Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211,
13 Am. Rep. 507, 66 N. Y. 518, 23 Am. Rep. 80; Myles v. Myles, 6
Bush (Ky.) 237; Farnsworth v. Hemmer, 1 Allen (Mass.) 494, 79
Am. Dec. 756; Levy v. Spencer, 18 Colo. 532, 33 Pac. Rep. 415, 36
Am. St. Rep. 303.
§299. Acting for both parties. — He will not be
allowed to represent both parties to the transaction,
without the full and intelligent consent of both, except
in those eases in which he acts as mere middle-man,
bringing- the parties together and then leaving them to
contract for themselves.
See Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12;
Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396, 41 Am. Rep. 528, Cas. Ag. 538;
Vinton v. Baldwin, 88 Ind. 104, 45 Am. Rep. 447, Cas. Ag. 664.
Contracts made while the broker is secretly in the
employment of the otber party are avoidable as in other
similar cases.
See Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1, 26 S. E. Rep. 397, 40 L. R. A.
234; Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. St. 25, 21 Atl. Rep. 793, 12 L. R. A
395.
§300. Liability to third persons. — The broker
will not be personally liable upon the contracts which
he makes where he discloses the name of his principal
and contracts in his name and within the limits of his
authority; though he may make himself personally lia-
ble by exceeding his authority, concealing his principal,
or contracting on his own responsibility.
See Simmons v. More, 100 N. Y. 140, Cas. Ag. 505.
He will, however, be liable, it seems, where he sells
the property, such as stocks, of a third person, even
though he acted in good faith supposing that the per-
son from whom he received the stock for sale was tic

































































































































ICO SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§300-302.
See Swim v. Wilson, 90 Cal. 126, 27 Pac. Rep. 33, 25 Am. St. Rep.
13 0, 13 L. R. A. 605, and cases cited ante §292; Roach, v. Turk, 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 708, 24 Am. Rep. 360; Compare Leake v. "Watson.
58 Conn. 332, 20 Atl. Rep. 343, 18 Am. St. Rep. 270.
§ 301. Compensation. — The broker is entitled to his
compensation when he has completed his undertaking.
If employed to find a purchaser, he is entitled to his com-
pensation when he has found a person ready, willing
and able to buy on the terms proposed, or, if no terms
are fixed, to whom the principal sells. He is not to be
deprived of his compensation because the principal sub-
sequently changes his mind or his terms, or because the
principal's title fails, or because, he can not make a sat-
isfactory conveyance. It is not necessary in these
cases that the broker shall have actually completed a
binding contract. It is enough if he is the procuring
cause of the sale, though the transaction is concluded
by the principal.
Sea Vinton v. Baldwin, 88 Ind. 104, 45 Am. Rep. 447, Cas. Ag. 664;
Plant v. Thompson, 42 Kan. 664, 16 Am. St. Rep. 512, Cas. Ag. 666;
Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 411, Cas.
Ag. 301; Brackenridge v. Claridge, 91 Tex. 527, 44 S. W. Rep. 819,
43 L. R. A. 593; Gilder v. Davis, 137 N. Y. 504, 33 N. E. Rep. 599,
20 L. R. A. 398.
§ 302. Unless there is an express agreement to
the contrary, the principal may revoke the broker's au-
thority at any time before the purchaser has been
found, and in such a case the broker will not be entitled
to any compensation for what he has done in endeavor-
ing to find a purchaser. Where, however, the broker
substantially performed, the principal will not be
permitted to revoke the authority and complete the sale
himself for the very purpose of avoiding the payment
of the commission.
See Cadigan v. Crabtree, 179 Mass. 474, 61 N. E. Rep. 37, 551*.
































































































































§§ 302-304.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 1G1
Where two or more brokers arc employed, he only is
entitled to tin* commission whose services were the ef-
ficient cause of the sale, even though the others have
also contributed in producing the result.
See Whitcomb v. Bacon, 170 Mass. 479, 49 N. E. Rep. 742, 64 Am.
St. Rep. 317.
§ 303. Compensation from both parties. — lie can
not have compensation from both parties except when
he acts as agent of both with their full knowledge and
consent.
Where, however, the broker was acting as a mere
"middle-man," bringing the parties together only and
then leaving them to make their own bargains, — the
broker standing entirely indifferent between them, —
the rule forbidding double compensation does not ap-
ply. In such a case it is held that the broker may
have compensation from each principal although each
may have been ignorant of the broker's relations to the
other.
See Rice v. "Wood; Bell v. McConnell, supra; McDonald v. Maltz,
94 Mich. 172, 53 N. W. Rep. 1058, 34 Am. St Rep. 331; Montross
v. Eddy, 94 Mich. 100, 53 N. W. Rep. 916, 34 Am. St. Rep. 323; Rice
v. Davis, 136 Pa. St. 439, 20 Atl. Rep. 513, 20 Am. St. Rep. 931.
§ 304. Reimbursement, indemnity and lien. — He is
entitled to reimbursement and indemnity like other
agents for losses and liabilities properly incurred and
advances made on his principal's account; but no! where
the loss was caused by his own default or the advances
were made to further a transaction known to be un-
lawful.
See Perin v. Parker, 126 111. 201, 18 N. E. Rep. 747. 9 Am. St.
Rep. 571, 2 L. R. A. 336; Ellis v. Pond Syndicate [1898], 1 Q. B.
426; Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1, 22 N. E. Rep. 49, 15 Am. St.


































































































































162 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§304-307.
The broker is ordinarily not in possession of the
goods he sells, and therefore generally he has no right
of lien. Since it is his duty to contract in the name
of his principal, he has usually no right to sue in his
own name upon the contracts which he makes.
See Fairlie v. Fenton, L. R. 5 Exch. 169, Cas. Ag. 669.
4. Of Factors.
§ 305. How appointed. — The authority of the factor
may be created and terminated like that of other agents.
§306. Implied powers. — He may sell the goods in
his own name, may grant a reasonable credit, and may
give a warranty where that is usual. He has no implied
power to pledge or transfer the goods for his own debt,
though by statutes called Factors' Acts now found in
many States innocent pledges are protected. He has
no implied power to exchange the goods, to delegate
his authority, to compromise the claim for the pur-
chase price, to rescind the sale, to extend the time of
payment, to make negotiable paper, or to receive any-
thing but money in payment for the goods.
See Pinkham v. Crocker, 77 Me. 563, Cas. Ag. 676; Warner v.
Martin, 11 How. (U. S.) 209, Cas. Ag. 678; Insurance Co. v. Kiger,
103 U. S. 352, Cas. Ag. 686; Commercial Bank v. Hurt, 99 Ala. 130,
12 So. Rep. 568, 19 L. R. A. 701, 42 Am. St. Rep. 38; Romeo v.
Martucci, 72 Conn. 504, 45 Atl. Rep. 1, 99, 47 L. R. A. 601; First
National Bank v. Schween, 127 111. 573, 20 N. E. Rep. 681, 11 Am. St.
Rep. 174; Argersinger v. Macnaughten, 114 N. Y. 535, 21 N. E. Rep.
1022, 11 Am. St. Rep. 687; Peek v. Heim, 127 Pa. St. 500, 17 Atl.
Rep. 984, 14 Am. St. Rep. 865; Barnes Safe Co. v. Bloch Bros. Co.,
38 W. Va. 158, 18 S. E. Rep. 482, 22 L. R. A. 850, 45 Am. St. Rep. 846.
§ 307. Duties to principal. — He must act in good
faith, be loyal to his trust and exercise reasonable skill
and diligence.
See Phillips v. Moir, 69 111. 155, Cas. Ag. 671; Conway v. Lewis,
































































































































§§307-309.1 SPEC I.\ I, CLASSES OF AGENT!
Stephenson, 36 Oreg. 328, 48 L. R. A. 432; Sims v. Miller, 3.
Car. 402, 16 S. E. Rep. 155, 34 Am. St. Rep. 762; Charlotte Oil Co.
v. Hartog, 29 C. C. A. 56, 85 Fed. Rep. 150.
§308. Same subject. — He must obey instructions
as to the time and terms of sale, and will be Liable Cor
losses caused by his disobedience; except thai where lie
lias made advances on the goods t<> his principal, he may
sell contrary to orders, for his own reimbursement, if
the principal has neglected to reimburse him within a
reasonable time after demand; and he is not obliged to
sell at a price fixed by the principal when he would
thereby imperil his security.
See Talcott v. Chew, 27 Fed. Rep. 273, Cas. Ag. 689; Lehman v.
Pritchett, 84 Ala. 512, Cas. Ag. 693; Hatcher v. Comer, 73 Ga. 418,
Cas. Ag. 698; Davis v. Kobe, 36 Minn. 214, 1 Am. St. Rep. 663, Cas
Ag. 700; Dolan v. Thompson, 126 Mass. 183, Cas. Ag. 684; Comer v
Way, 107 Ala. 300, 19 So. Rep. 966, 54 Am. St. Rep. 93.
§ 309. Duty to account.— It is the duty of the fae
tor to account to his principal for all goods, proper t;
and moneys of the principal, which come into his hands
as factor, after deducting his own proper advances and
commissions.
See Cooley v. Betts, 24 Wend. 203, Cas. Ag. 702.
The principal may follow and recover his propeity
or its proceeds so long as it can be identified and urtiil
it comes into the hands of a bona fide holder for value.
See ante § 269; Drovers' Nat. Bank v. Roller, 85 Md. 495, 37 Atl.
Rep. 30, 36 L. R. A. 767; Ferchen v. Arndt, 26 Ore. 121, 37 Pac. Rep.
161, 29 L. R. A. 664.
Where the factor sells upon a del credere commis-
sion he guarantees the payment of the price.
See Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412, 3 Am. Rep. 190. Cas. Ag. 706;
Balderston v. National Rubber Co., 18 R. I. 33S, 27 Atl. Rep. 507,
































































































































164 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§ 310-311.
§ 310. Compensation, reimbursement, lien. — The
factor is entitled to compensation, reimbursement and
indemnity, like other agents. He has also a lien upon
all the goods in his possession, and upon the price of
those sold and on securities taken for goods sold to se-
cure the payment of the general balance of the account
between himself and his principal, and he may sell the
goods to satisfy his claim.
See McGraft y. Rugee, 60 Wis. 406, 50 Am. Rep. 378, Cas. Ag. 717;
Comer y. Way, 107 Ala. 300, 19 So. Rep. 966, 54 Am. St. Rep. 93;
Warren v. First Nat. Bank, 149 111. 9, 38 N. E. Rep. 122, 25 L. R. A.
746.
Whether the factor must enforce his lien before call-
ing for reimbursement is in dispute.
See Balderston y. Nat. Rubber Co., 18 R. I. 338, 27 Atl. Rep. 507,
49 Am. St. Rep. 772.
§ 311. Right to sue. — He may sue in his own name
for the price of goods sold by him, and he has such a spe-
cial property in the goods that he may maintain actions
of trespass, replevin and trover in respect of them.
See Ilsley v. Merriam, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 242, 54 Am. Dec. 721;

































































































































[References are to sections.]
ABANDONMENT—
when agent may abandon agency 122
compensation in case of, see "Compensation"
ACCOUNT—
duty of agent to 185 et seq.
see also "Attorney at Law," "Auctioneer," "Broker," "Factor."
ACTION—
in what form of, agent liable to principal 174
in what form of, agent liable to third persons usually 196
no right of, against third persons 261
when agent may sue third person 2G2, 263
what actions maintainable 265
auctioneer may sue 290
factor may sue 311
ADMISSIONS—
of agent will not establish agency 70
bind principal, when 244
ADVERSE INTEREST—
agent may not assume 51
AGENCY—
defined 1
a contractual relation 2
exists usually by assent of principal 3






classification of 13 t 24
actual or ostensible 13
universal, general and special 14
how proved 18
professional and non-professicnal 12, 24
distinction between classes of 24, 27



































































































































[References are to sections.]
AGENCY— Continued.
what contracts for, void 34, 35
how to determine nature of 73
why created HI
enforcement of contract of 119
at will 120
how terminated, see "Termination of Agency"
AGENT—
duties and liabilities of, see "Duties and Liabilities.'
how authority of, exists 2, 3
compared with servant 5, 8
compared with independent contractor 8
the contract appointing 12
classes of 13, 24
distinction between classes of .24, 27
validity as between principal and 34
who may be 43, 51
may not assume adverse interest 51
may represent joint principals 52
several, may jointly represent the same principal 55, 58
appointment of
method of 59, 60
to execute instruments 61, 62
by corporations 63
to sell and convey interest in land 64
by parol 65
doctrine of estoppel on 67, 70
evidences of 70, 74
cannot ratify his own act 82
as a rule cannot delegate authority 100, 103
power of, to appoint sub-agent 103, 106
extent of interest Ill
power to renounce authority 118
discharge of 121
renunciation by 122
death, insanity and bankruptcy of, terminates authority. 125, 128
duty of, in general 158








































































































































[References are to sections.]
ATTORNEY AT LAW— Continued.
how appointed 275
duration of relation 276
implied powers of 277
bound to loyalty and honor 278
donlirrs of, must be fair and in good faith 279
confidential communications privileged 280
liability to client 281
liability to third person 282
right to compensation 283, 284
how amount determined 285






terms of sale 289
implied powers of 290
duties of, to principal 291
liabilities of, to third person 292
compensation and lien of 293
liability of principal for acts of 294
AUTHORITY—
to act as agent 3
created by law 4
delegation of 27, 34
to execute instruments under seal 61, 62
of corporation to appoint 63
required by statute to be in writing 64
may be conferred by parol 65
not to be proved by agent's admissions 70
written instrument best evidence of 72, 73
to appoint sub-agent 103
coupled with an interest Ill et. seq.





distinction between, and instructions 138
powers incident to 142, 150, 158
construction of,
in general 144, 149

































































































































[References are to sections.]
AUTHORITY— Continued.
to sell land 150, 151
to sell personal property 152, 153
to buy 154
to collect or receive payment 155
to make negotiable paper 156
to manage business 157
how executed,
in general 158




other similar contracts 163
parol evidence to explain 164
BANKRUPTCY—
of principal or agent, effect of 127
BENEFITS—





implied powers of 296, 297
duties to principal 298
acts for both parties 299
liability to third persons 3 ;0
compensation of 301, 304
reimbursement, indemnity and lien of 304
CLIENT—
relation of attorney to 274
duration of relation 276
must receive loyalty and honor from attorney 278
dealings between attorney and 279
has privilege of confidential communications with attorney. 280
liability of attorney to 281
CLUBS, SOCIETIES, ETC.—
as principals , 54
COLLUSION—
defeats notice 232
between agent and third person 271
COMPENSATION—
cannot be recovered by agent who serves two principals 167
the right to have 215

































































































































[Reference* are to sections.]
COMPENSATION— Continued.
when earned 217
under conditions 218 et seq.
right of professional and non-professional agents to







of particular powers 149 et seq.
CONTRACT—
agency based on 1
appointing agent 12
when, of agency void 34
Illegal in part 35
enforcement of contract of agency 119
presumed for definite time 120
execution of simple contract 163 et seq.
when agent liable on 197
CORPORATIONS—
may be principal ' 36
as agents 49
how may appoint agent 63




see "Duties and Liabilities."
DELEGATION—
see "Sub-Agent."
of personal duty, etc 29
of authority by agent 100, 106
of power includes incidental authority to effect power
granted 142
of authority by auctioneer 290
of authority by factor 306
DESTRUCTION OF SUBJECT MATTER—
effect of, on agency 130
DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL—
see "Principal," also "Duties and Liabilities."
DUTIES OF THE AGENT TO THE PRINCIPAL—
in general 153

































































































































[References are to sections.]
DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL— Continued.
barred from some acts 167, 168
unloyal act voidable 169
further limitations 170
usage does not alter rule 171
must obey instructions 172 et seq.
good faith — no excuse 173
in what form of action liable 174
sudden emergency as excuse 175
ambiguous instructions 176
effect of custom 177
to exercise care 178
special skill required in some cases 179
when services gratuitious . 180
liable for negligence
in loaning money 181
in effecting insurance 182
in collecting 183
liable for defaults of correspondents 184
to account for money and property 185, 189
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE AGENT TO THIRD
PERSONS—
in general .' 190
in contract without authority 191, 199
when no responsible principal 199, 201
where agent pledges his personal responsibility 201 et. seq.
to disclose principal 202, 203
when principal foreign £04
when principal is known 205
when agent has obtained money from third person ...207, 208
when agent has received money from third person 209
in cases of tort 210, 212
non-feasance — misfeasance 211
trespass — conversion 212
how sued 213
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL TO
THE AGENT—
to pay compensation 215
rules regulating payment 216, 230
when compensation deemed to be earned 217, 221
where authority rightfully revoked 221
when authority terminated by operation of law 222
where agent abandons his undertaking 223
where agent acted for two principals 224

































































































































[ReferenceB are to sections.]
DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT— Continued.
rules where agency unlawful 226
where extra duties required 227
where agent holds over 228
recoupment by principal 229
reimbursement and indemnity of agent 230, 333
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL TO
THIRD PERSONS—
liability for agent's contracts 235, 214
liability of disclosed principal 238, 244
liability of undisclosed principal 238, 211
responsibility for agent's statements 244, 246
responsibility for matters brought to knowledge of agent 246, 252
liability for agent's torts and crimes 252, 260
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO THE
AGENT—
in contract,
usually no right of action 261
exception — sealed instruments or negotiable instruments
made in agents' name 262
when principal undisclosed 263
in tort 265
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO THE
PRINCIPAL—
in contract 267, 271
what contracts principal may enforce 267
what defences open 268
right to follow and recover money or property 269
right to rescind dealings where agent secretly in em-
ployment of other party 270
In tort 271, 273
right to recover damages for collusion 271
recovery for enticing agent away, disabling him, etc... 272
ESTOPPEL—
doctrine of, as applied to agents 67
applied to ratification by conduct 87
may effect determination of authority 138
EVIDENCE—
of authority, see "Authority."
necessity for 145
parol, to explain 164
EXECUTION—
defective or excessive 157

































































































































[Refereaces are to sections.]
EXECUTION— Continued.
of sealed instruments 161





implied powers of 306
duties of, to principal 307, 310
compensation, reimbursement and lien 310
right to sue 311
FORGERY—






agency cannot be created to perform 28
cannot be ratified 77
IMPLIED POWER—
of agent 142, 150 et seq.
of attorney 277
of auctioneer 290
of broker 296, 297
of factor 306
INCAPACITY—
natural or legal 39
of insane persons 40
of infants 41, 44
of married women 42
more important in principal than in agent 43
arising from adverse interest 51
of agent to serve two principals 167
INDEMNITY—










































































































































[Reference* are to flections.]
INSANE PERSON—
cannot be principal 40
INSANITY—
of principal or agent terminates 126
JOINT AGENTS—
discussion of 55, 58
JOINT PRINCIPALS—
discussion of 52, 55
LEASE—
differs from agency 11
LIABILITY—









when agency is affected by 128
MARRIED WOMEN—
as principals 42
as agents 46, 47
may ratify what they can authorize SI
NEGOTIABLE PAPER—
execution of authority to make II
execution of 162
parol evidence in case of 1C4
NOTICE—
duty of agent to give 189
to agent is notice to principal 246
defeated by collusion between agent and third person 247
PAROL EVIDENCE—
to explain authority 164
; ARTNERSHIPS—
may be principal 36
as agent 50, 56
may ratify what they can authorize SO
PERSONAL PROPERTY—
authority to sell 152
what included 153
PRINCIPAL—
duties and liabilities, see "Duties and Liabilities."


































































































































[References are to sections.]
PRINCIPALr— Continued.
number of agents possible 15, 16
validity as between, and agent 34
who may be 37, 38
incapacity to be 39, 43




more competence required than in agent 43
may be joint 52
partners, co-tenants, etc., as 53
clubs, societies, etc., as 54
may be represented by joint agents 55, 58
usually appoints agent 59
responsible for authority of agent 70
effect of ratification as between, and others 94 et seq.
may authorize agent to employ other agents 99
power of, to revoke agency Ill
must give notice of revocation 117
death of, terminates authority 124
insanity of, terminates authority 126
bankruptcy of, terminates authority 127
marriage of, terminates authority 128
appearance given to authority by, controls 137
distinction between authority and instruction of 138
duty of agent to disclose 202
agent of foreign 204
presumption that, to be bound 205
liable for acts of auctioneer 294
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS—
between attorney and client 280
PUBLIC POLICY—
agencies for purposes opposed to, void 28
RATIFICATION—
definition of 75
what acts subject to 76, 78
of forgery 78
by whom may be made 79, 83
conditions of 83
what amounts to f 84, 92
by instrument under seal 85
by authority subsequently conferred 86
by conduct SV

































































































































[References are to sections.)
RATIFICATION— Continued.
by bringing suit 89
by acquiescence 90, 91
effect of,
in general 92, 93
as between principal and agent 94
as to rights of third party against principal 95
as to rights of principal against third party 96
in contract 97
in tort 98
may effect determination of authority 138
RECOUPMENT—










when principal bound by 244, 245
REVOCATION—
compensation, in case, see "Compensation."
of ratification 93
by principal HI
not when coupled with interest 113, 116
distinction between "power" and "right" of 115
need not be express 116
notice of 117
SALE—
distinguished from agency 1°
terms of 289
SEALED INSTRUMENTS—
authority to execute 61
ratification of 85
execution of 161
who bound in 164
SERVANT—



































































































































[References are to sections.J
SOCIETIES, CLUBS, ETC.—




number of special agents possible 16
how to be proved 1 ®
SUB-AGENT—
see "Delegation."
when appointment justifiable 103
relation of sub-agent to principal 104, 105
termination of authority of agent terminates power of 131
SUBJECT-MATTER—
destruction of, terminates agency 130
termination of power over 131
TERMINATION OF AGENCY-
by act of parties,
1. original agreement 108
2. subsequent act of parties,
by mutual consent HO
revocation by principal HI, 118
renunciation by agent 118, 123






destruction of subject matter 130
termination of power over subject-matter 131
of sub-agents 131
TORT—
may be ratified 98
see "Duties and Liabilities."
TRUST—
differs from agency 9
not necessarily a contract relation 9
UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL—
liable when discovered 239
his exceptions 240
agent also liable 243
liable in tort, see "Duties and Liabilities."
UNIVERSAL AGENCY—
definition 14

































































































































[B«forenc«t irt to »»ctlon».]
USAGE—
contributes to determine authority 188
WAR—
effect of, on agency 128
WITNESS—
when agent may be called as 71
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS—
execution of ISO
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